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

POLITICAL VOLCANO

CADDELL AND WIRTHLIN:
As the Presidential Pollsters See It

SIFTING THROUGH THE ASHES:
24-page special election data section

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?:
Tom Wolfe, Midge Decter,
Robert Nisbet, George Gilder,
Irving Kristol

EVERETT LADD AND DONALD FERREE:
Did the Pollsters Go Wrong?

Public Opinion

Volume 3, Number 6 December/January 1981

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CONTENTS

2 **FACE OFF:**

A Conversation with the Presidents' Pollsters—Patrick Caddell and Richard Wirthlin

In the aftermath of the 1980 presidential election, the editors of Public Opinion *went into the political locker-room for a post-game analysis with the candidates' chief pollsters. Patrick Caddell for the Carter team and Richard Wirthlin for Reagan's side offer insights into their respective game plans, the difficulties each team encountered and, of course, the final score.*

13 **WERE THE POLLSTERS REALLY WRONG?**

by Everett C. Ladd and G. Donald Ferree

Since the Republicans pulled off their "November Surprise," many of the nation's pollsters have become sitting ducks in a shooting gallery—open game for everyone with a typewriter and a copy of the final pre-election polls. Ladd and Ferree stand back from the fray to offer a different perspective.

21 **OPINION ROUNDUP**

45 **WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE? DIRECTIONS FROM STAGE RIGHT**

A Symposium with Tom Wolfe, Midge Decter, Robert Nisbet, George Gilder, and Irving Kristol.

"Can Ronald Reagan succeed—and how?" "What advice would you offer the President-elect?" "Where should the country be five years from now?" These are the questions the editors posed to five eminent thinkers of the right (or near-right, as the case may be). Their responses, some quite surprising, are brought together in this symposium.

51 **REAGAN . . . ANOTHER IKE?**

by Fred Greenstein and Robert Wright

Dwight Eisenhower was the last American president to enjoy continued popularity in the Gallup polls—and a second full term in the White House. Authors Greenstein and Wright examine the parallels between Eisenhower and Reagan and offer interesting thoughts on the lessons a Reagan administration can learn from Ike.

56 **BRIEF ENCOUNTERS WITH THE FOURTH KIND**

Reagan's Press Honeymoon

by Michael Robinson and Margaret Sheehan

For the Reagan administration, as for others in the recent past, dealing with the realities of television news coverage may be one of its most daunting challenges. The honeymoon may be here today, but divorce is probably around the corner.

60 **SNAPSHOTS**

by Karlyn Keene

Summary of Polling Methodology

Designing a "perfect" poll is a bit like creating the "perfect" spaghetti sauce: all cooks start with tomatoes, but each uses his own favorite combination of seasonings—sometimes with widely varied results. Presented below are the ingredients that went into the survey designs of four major national polling organizations this past election year; the results of their work are displayed on the opposite page and in the centerspread of this issue. For a discussion, please see the article by Everett Ladd and Don Ferree in this issue and the article by Seymour Martin Lipset ("Different Polls, Different Results in 1980 Politics") in the August/September 1980 issue of *Public Opinion*.

CBS/New York Times

Population sampled from: National adult population telephone survey.

Household selection: Random digit dialing. Up to four attempts to contact household.

Respondent selection: Random selection, appointment made if designated respondent not at home.

Weighting: To correct for household size and to reflect demographics.

Identification of electorate: "Likelihood weight" based on past voting behavior and current intention and reported behavior of similar groups in 1976.

Actual choice: Choice among three major candidates, labeled by party. Leaners included in reported distributions.

Adjustments: None.

Gallup

Population sampled from: Registered Voters. In-person interviews.

Household selection: Households randomly selected from sample precincts. No callbacks.

Respondent selection: Systematic selection based on age and sex.

Weighting: To correct for "times at home" and to reflect demographics.

Identification of electorate: "Likely voters" identified based on past behavior, interest, and intention to vote, and expected turnout.

Actual choice: "Secret ballot" for tickets, labeled by party. Undecided asked to mark ballot based on leaning.

Adjustments: Undecideds allocated; figures corrected for deviation of sample precincts from national results in 1976.

ABC/Harris

Population sampled from: Expected electorate (based on 1976). Series of telephone surveys.

Household selection: Random digit dialing. Households not reached retained for one more survey.

Respondent selection: Systematic selection by modified sex quota.

Weighting: To reflect demographics.

Identification of electorate: "Likely voters" identified based on past behavior and intention to vote, and expected turnout.

Actual choice: Choice among three major candidates labeled by party. Leaners included in reported distributions.

Adjustments: Survey results from last 12 days combined. (No large day-to-day differences noted). Undecided allocated evenly between Carter and Reagan.

*NBC/AP**

Population sampled from: National adult population. Telephone survey.

Household selection: Random digit dialing. No callbacks (except for "busies").

Respondent selection: Systematic selection based on sex quota.

Weighting: None. Sample deemed "self-weighting."

Identification of electorate: "Likely voters" identified based on past behavior, interest, and intention to vote.

Actual choice: Choice among three major candidates, labeled by party (following questions on open-ended preference and whether respondents had made up minds).

Adjustments: None.

Glossary

National adult population. The sample is designed to reflect the characteristics, including geographic distribution, of the entire adult population.

Registered voters. The same, but the population is registered voters, instead of all adults.

Electorate. The same, but the actual electorate—i.e. taking differential turnout on a geographic basis into account.

Random digit dialing. Procedures giving households (both listed and unlisted numbers) a fair chance to be reached.

Callbacks. Multiple attempts to reach a household.

Random selection. Procedure to give each potential respondent in a household a random chance to come into the sample.

Systematic selection. Selection according to same system, depriving the interviewer of the choice of respondent.

Likelihood weight. An estimate of how likely someone is to vote. Someone who is 80 percent likely will count twice as much in the final figures as someone only 40 percent.

Likely voters. An attempt to separate respondents into two groups: "likely voters" and "non-likely voters." Only the latter enter into the reported distributions.

Allocation. Division of the undecided based on other information, such as their partisan preference, issue positions, or data from other surveys.

General Note:

This overview cannot capture the full details of procedures used—for example what precise "demographics" were used.

* AP conducted a survey on its own following the last joint survey.

The Major Election Polls
(See pages 32-33 for graphics)

Gallup

Question: If President Jimmy Carter were the Democratic candidate running against Ronald Reagan, the Republican candidate, and John Anderson, the Independent candidate, which would you like to see win? (Those who named another person or who were undecided were asked: As of today, do you lean more to Carter, the Democrat, to Reagan, the Republican, or to Anderson, the Independent?) (June, August)

Question: Suppose the presidential election were being held TODAY, which of these tickets would you vote for—a Republican ticket of Ronald Reagan and George Bush, a Democratic ticket of Jimmy Carter and Walter Mondale, or an independent ticket headed by John Anderson? (Those who named another person or who were undecided were asked: As of today, would you lean more to a Republican ticket of Reagan and Bush, a Democratic ticket of Carter and Mondale or to an independent ticket headed by Anderson? (July)

Question: If the presidential election were being held TODAY, which would you vote for—the Republican candidates Reagan and Bush, the Democratic candidates Carter and Mondale, or the independent candidates Anderson and Lucey? (Those who named another person or who were undecided were asked: As of today, do you lean more to Reagan and Bush, or to Carter and Mondale, or more to Anderson and Lucey? (September-October 10-12)

Question: Suppose you were voting TODAY for president and vice president of the United States. Here is a Gallup Poll Secret Ballot listing the candidates for these offices. Will you please MARK that secret ballot for the candidates you favor today—and then drop the folded ballot into the box.

		Reagan/ Bush	Carter/ Mondale	Anderson/ Lucey
June 13-16	Registered voters	36%	38%	26%
June 27-30		41	32	22
July 11-14		40	37	23
Aug. 1-4		51	33	16
Aug. 15-18		42	43	14
Sept. 12-15	Registered likely voters	44	40	16
Oct. 10-12		47	44	8
Oct. 30-Nov. 1		48	45	7

Note: June through Aug. 15-18 are responses of all registered voters. Sept. 12-15-Nov. 1 are responses of registered likely voters. The Oct. 30-Nov. 1 sample is approximately 1,900 likely voters. For comparison purposes "other" and "undecided" calculated out.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of October 30-November 1, 1980.

NBC/Associated Press

Question: If the 1980 Presidential election were being held today, would you vote for Ronald Reagan, the Republican; Jimmy Carter, the Democrat; John Anderson, an Independent; Barry Commoner of the Citizens' Party, or Ed Clark of the Libertarian Party?

		Likely voters	
	Reagan	Carter	Anderson
July 8-9	48%	31%	21%
Aug. 5-7	56	26	18
Aug. 15-18	46	38	15
Sept. 22-24	48	38	15
Oct. 8-10	49	40	11
Oct. 22-24	48	41	11

Note: For comparison purposes "Barry Commoner," "Ed Clark," "other (vol.)," and "not sure" calculated out.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of October 22-24, 1980.

ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates

Question: Suppose for president next November it is between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans, Jimmy Carter for the Democrats, and Representative John Anderson (of Illinois) as an Independent. If you had to choose right now, would you vote for Reagan, Carter, or Anderson? (June-August 5, 6)

Question: Let me read you a list of candidates running for president in November (Read list*) If you had to decide right now, who would you vote for? (*Ronald Reagan, Republican; Jimmy Carter, Democrat; John Anderson, Independent, Edward Clark, Libertarian Party; Barry Commoner, Citizens' Party; Ellen McCormack, Right to Life Party; Andrew Pulley, Socialist Workers Party) (August 14-16 thru September 3-7)

Question: (This November/Next Tuesday/In Tuesday's election,) the race for president will be between Ronald Reagan for the Republicans, Jimmy Carter for the Democrats, and John Anderson as an independent. If you had to decide right now, would you vote for Reagan, Carter or Anderson? (October-November 2)

		Likely voters	
	Reagan	Carter	Anderson
June 5-9	40%	35%	25%
July 18-21	55	27	19
Aug. 1-3	54	26	20
Aug. 5-6	51	29	20
Aug. 14-18	44	38	18
Sept. 3-7	43	39	18
Oct. 3-6	45	41	15
Oct. 14-16	45	42	13
Oct. 22-25	46	43	10
Oct. 22-26	46	43	10
Oct. 22-30	47	42	11
Oct. 22-Nov. 1	47	42	11
Oct. 22-Nov. 2	48	43	9

Note: For comparison purposes the "other" and "not sure" responses were calculated out. The October 22-November 2 surveys were a continuous sample. By the second of November 14,982 voters had been reached.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of October 22-November 2, 1980.

CBS News/*New York Times*

Question: If the Presidential election were being held today, would you vote for Jimmy Carter, the Democrat, Ronald Reagan, the Republican, or John Anderson? (June-September)

Question: If the Presidential election were being held today, would you vote for Jimmy Carter, the Democrat, Ronald Reagan, the Republican, or John Anderson? (If undecided) Well, as of today, do you lean more towards Carter, more towards Reagan, or more towards Anderson? (October-November)

		Reagan	Carter	Anderson
June 18-22*		49%	32%	19%
Aug. 2-7	Registered probable electorate	54	31	15
Sept. 10-14		40	44	16
Sept. 19-21		42	47	11
Sept. 23-25		48	42	11
Oct. 16-20		44	46	11
Oct. 26-27		44	47	9
Oct. 30-Nov. 1		46	45	9

Note: *The June figures are for informational purposes only. The percentages should not be compared directly with the August through November figures, as they are based on different groups. The September responses only represent decided respondents, the October-November figures include both decided respondents and respondents who lean to a candidate. For comparison purposes the "someone else (vol.)," "wouldn't vote (vol.)," "no opinion" responses were calculated out. The registered voter sample sizes are: for June 18-22, 1,517; Aug. 2-7, 1,769; Sept. 10-14, 1,417; Sept. 19-21, 817; Sept. 23-25, 810; Oct. 16-20, 1,539; Oct. 26-27, 1,259; Oct. 30-Nov. 1, 2,264. The sample sizes of the registered probable electorate are not known.

Source: Surveys by CBS News, October 26-27, 1980; and by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of October 30-November 1, 1980.

1980 RESULTS

What the Election Showed



	Democrat	Republican
1932	57%	40%
1936	61	37
1940	55	45
1944	53	46
1948	50	45
1952	44	55
1956	42	57
1960	50	50
1964	61	39
1968	43	43
1972	38	61
1976	50	48
1980	41	51

Source: 1932-1976, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979*, 1980, A.E.I. News Digest, November 10, 1980, page 15.

The "Democratic era" in presidential voting ended a full quarter century ago. As these data on cumulative popular vote for president show, the Democrats had a large margin over the Republicans for the 1932-1948 span, but the GOP has amassed more presidential ballots since 1952.

Total Popular Vote in Presidential Elections

	Democrat	Republican
1932-1948	127,668,000	98,791,000
1952-1980	266,828,000	292,135,000

Note: Rounded to the nearest thousand.

Reagan by Region


Alaska
Hawaii
▨ 40-45% (New England)
☐ 46-50% (South Atlantic, East South Central, Middle Atlantic)
☐ 51-55% (East North Central, Pacific)
☐ 56-60% (West South Central, West North Central)
■ 61% and above (Mountain)



Note: *New England*=Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island and Vermont. *Middle Atlantic*=New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, D.C. *East North Central*=Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, Wisconsin. *West North Central*=Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota and South Dakota. *South Atlantic*=Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia and West Virginia. *East South Central*=Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, Tennessee. *West South Central*=Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas. *Mountain*=Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah and Wyoming. *Pacific*=Alaska, California, Hawaii, Oregon and Washington.

Source: A.E.I. News Digest, November 10, 1980, page 15.

REGIONAL ROLLERCOASTERS

SOUTH ATLANTIC STATES



	1932	1936	1940	1944	1948	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Democrat	67%	70%	68%	63%	53%	51%	47%	52%	56%	35%	31%	55%	45%
Republican	32	30	32	36	36	49	51	48	44	39	68	44	50

NEW ENGLAND STATES



	1932	1936	1940	1944	1948	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Democrat	49%	51%	53%	52%	52%	44%	38%	56%	73%	57%	47%	52%	41%
Republican	48	44	47	47	46	56	62	44	27	39	53	46	45

MOUNTAIN STATES



	1932	1936	1940	1944	1948	1952	1956	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976	1980
Democrat	58%	65%	55%	52%	53%	40%	40%	46%	56%	38%	33%	41%	30%
Republican	38	33	44	47	45	60	60	54	43	53	64	56	62

Source: 1932-1948: *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part 2, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, pp. 1077-1078. 1952, 1956: *1972 Statistical Abstract*, p. 362. 1960-76: *1979 Statistical Abstract*, p. 500. 1980: A.E.I. News Digest, November 10, 1980.

Dems Hold on to House



	Democrat	Republican
1932	55%	41%
1934	54	42
1936	56	40
1938	49	47
1940	51	46
1942	46	51
1944	51	47
1946	44	53
1948	52	46
1950	49	49
1952	50	49
1954	53	47
1956	51	49
1958	56	43
1960	54	45
1962	52	47
1964	57	42
1966	51	48
1968	50	48
1970	53	45
1972	52	46
1974	58	41
1976	56	42
1978	54	45
1980	51	48

Source: 1932-1970: *Historical Statistics of the U.S.: Colonial Times to 1970*, Part 2, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1975), p. 1084; 1972: *Statistical Abstract 1977*, p. 500; 1974-78: *Statistical Abstract 1979*, p. 505; 1980: *Congressional Quarterly*, November 8, 1980, pp. 3338-3345.



Note: See page 20 for regional identification.
Source: *Congressional Quarterly Weekly*, November 8, 1980, pp. 3338-3345.

Surveying the State Results: The Return of the Two-Party System

GOVERNORS

Democrat		Republican
37	1976	12
32	1978	18
27	1980	23

MEMBERS OF THE STATE LEGISLATURES

Democrat		Republican
5,128	1976	2,370
4,762	1978	2,680
4,497	1980	2,918

CONTROL OF STATE LEGISLATIVE HOUSES BY REGION

Democrat		Republican
63	National	34
10	North Central	12
10	Northeast	8
31	South	1
12	West	13

PROPORTION OF MEMBERS OF STATE LEGISLATURE BY REGION



Note: Figures are post-1980 elections unless otherwise specified. Nebraska is excluded from legislative house calculations because it is a unicameral, nonpartisan legislative system. Alaska's Senate is controlled by neither party (10 Democrats and 10 Republicans).

Source: State legislatures: All 1980 figures are from the National Conference of State Legislatures, "Party Control in the State Legislature—Tentative Report," November 17, 1980 EXCEPT [illegible] Mississippi, [illegible] data from Secretary of State offices. [illegible] Republican. For 1976 and 1978 [illegible] see Public Opinion, November/December 1978. [illegible] All 1980 figures [illegible] News and World Report, November 17, 1980. For 1976 and 1978 figures see Public Opinion, November/December 1978.

This is Massive Alienation?



Note: Population is resident population (including aliens) estimated as of November. Population 21 years old and over, 1932-1970, except as noted, and 18 years old and over thereafter; includes armed forces. Prior to 1960 excludes Alaska and Hawaii. District of Columbia is included in votes cast for president beginning in 1964. Voting age population 18 and over in Georgia, 1944-1970, and in Kentucky 1956-1970, 19 and over in Alaska and 20 and over in Hawaii, 1960-1970.

Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States 1979, p. 513 (for elections from 1932 to 1976); Congressional Quarterly Weekly, November 8, 1980 for 1980 election, p. 3297.

What the Opinion Polls Showed

THE PAST: WHEN PEOPLE DECIDED

The Center for Political Studies of Michigan's Institute for Social Research provides the following trend in response to the question: How long before the election did you decide that you were going to vote the way you did? These data show a sharp jump in 1976 in the proportion of the electorate making a late decision.

	1960	1964	1968	1972	1976
Knew all along, always vote same party, pre-conventions	31%	41%	35%	44%	33%
At time of conventions	31	25	24	18	21
After conventions	26	21	19	22	22
Within 2 weeks of election, on election day	12	13	21	13	24

Another widely held assumption—that voters were disgusted with the choices and were voting against rather than for a particular candidate—has some basis in the poll data we have reviewed. But, in mid-October when the CBS/*New York Times* organization posed this question, ". . . would you say that you personally care a good deal which party wins the Presidential election this fall, or that you don't care very much which party wins?", 76% of Carter supporters said they cared a good deal, as did 79% of Reagan's adherents, and 45% of those who planned to vote for Anderson.

1980: WHEN PEOPLE DECIDED

Question: Have you made up your mind for whom you will vote in the presidential election in November or are you not planning to vote?



Likely voters 1980	Made up mind	Haven't made up mind/Not sure (vol.)	Not planning to vote
August 5-7	47%	51%	2%
August 15-16	57	40	3
September	61	37	2
October 8-10	68	30	2
October 22-24	73	25	2

Note: In the October 22-24 asking, [illegible] of Republicans said they had made up their minds, as compared with 71% of Democrats and 66% of Independents.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of October 22-24, 1980.

Question: When did you decide who to vote for?

Voters as they left the polls *



Note: *Sample = 12,782.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, November 4, 1980.

Was the President the Issue?

Question: What kind of a job do you think Jimmy Carter is doing in handling the economy . . . do you think he is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or do you think he is doing a poor job?



Note: Sample = 2,393 adults for September 1980.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of September 22-24, 1980.

Question: What kind of a job do you think Jimmy Carter is doing in handling our foreign affairs . . . do you think he is doing an excellent job, a good job, only a fair job, or do you think he is doing a poor job?



Note: Sample = 2,393 adults for September 1980.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of September 22-24, 1980.

Question: Have you heard or read anything about Americans being held hostage in Iran? (If yes) Do you approve or disapprove of the way President Carter is handling this situation?



Note: "Not sure" response calculated out for comparison purposes. Highest "not sure" response = 11%.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of October 22-24, 1980.

Perceptions of Reagan and Carter

THE ECONOMIC ISSUES

Question: Which candidate—(Ronald) Reagan, (Jimmy) Carter or (John) Anderson—do you think would do the best job solving the nation's economic problems, or don't you see much difference between the candidates on this?

	Sept. 1980	Likely voters Oct. 8-10, 1980	Oct. 22-24, 1980
Reagan	43%	46%	41%
Carter	19	18	22
Anderson	11	9	11
No difference	28	28	26



Note: According to an NBC News/Associated Press survey of likely voters of October 8-10, Carter supporters were more likely than Reagan supporters, Anderson supporters or all likely voters to think "the economic problems are too complicated for any President to solve." Seventy-three percent of Carter supporters agreed, while 64 percent of Reagan supporters, 69 percent of Anderson supporters and 69 percent of all likely voters felt that way.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of October 22-24, 1980.

Question: Do you think that if . . . is elected president in 1980, the economy will get better, get worse, or stay about the same?



Note: The sample of registered voters is 2,264. The sample size of the registered probable electorate is not known. The "no opinion" response has been calculated out for comparison purposes. Highest "no opinion" response: 11%.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, October 30-November 1, 1980.

THE WAR ISSUE

Question: Regardless of which candidate you would like to see win the election in November, which of the three candidates—Carter, Reagan, Anderson—do you think is best described by each of the following statements? Which candidate do you think is best described by the statement? . . . Best able to keep us out of war.



Registered Voters

	Carter	Reagan	Anderson	None/Don't know
June 1980	37%	23%	12%	28%
Sept.	38	23	9	30
Oct.	52	23	6	19

Note: Registered voter sample sizes are: for June 1980—1,080; September 1980—1,045; October 1980—1,046.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization conducted for *Newsweek*, latest that of October 17-20, 1980.

Question: Are you afraid that if . . . were elected president in 1980, he would get us into a war?



Note: For the October 16-20, 1980 survey the sample = 1,539 registered voters. For the October 30-November 1, 1980 survey the sample = 2,264 registered voters. For both surveys, the sample size of the registered probable electorate is not known. The "no opinion" response has been calculated out for comparison purposes. The highest "no opinion" response: 12%.

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of October 30-November 1, 1980.

THE RODNEY DANGERFIELD QUESTION

Question: Now, if you had to choose between Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter and John Anderson, which one do you feel (read each item)?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, October 14-16, 1980.

Question: If . . . is elected in 1980, do you think he will see to it that the United States is respected by other nations?



Note: The sample of registered voters is 1,539. The sample size of the registered probable electorate is not known. The "no opinion" response has been calculated out for comparison purposes. The highest "no opinion" response = 14%.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, October 16-20, 1980.


MACNELLY
THAT DOES IT! —I'M APPOINTING A STUDY COMMISSION.

NOTE ON OPINION ROUNDUP

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

The reader may note that in some cases a "no opinion" column is shown while in others it is not. This reflects a common practice in the publication of polls: when the "no opinion" or "undecided" responses are relatively small, on the order of 10 percent or less, one reports only the answers of those who have a definite opinion. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they *are* reported because they reveal a substantial degree of unawareness or uncertainty within the populace on the issues in question.

THE LEADERSHIP QUOTIENT

Question: Do you think (Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan) . . .



Note: The sample of registered voters is 1,537. The sample size of the registered probable electorate is unknown.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, October 16-20, 1980.

CRISIS OF CONFIDENCE IN CARTER

Question: Now, if you had to choose between Ronald Reagan, Jimmy Carter and John Anderson, which one do you feel would inspire more confidence in the White House?



	Likely Voters					
	Apr. 26-30	Aug. 14-18	Sept. 22	Oct. 3-6	Oct. 14-16	Oct. 22-26
Reagan	42%	46%	47%	47%	46%	46%
Carter	31	29	32	34	39	38
Anderson	25	24	19	15	12	13
None (vol.)	2	1	2	3	3	3

Note: The October 22-26 sample = 5,984 likely voters. The September 22 sample = 1,065 likely voters. The April 26-30 sample = 1,190 likely voters.

Source: Surveys by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of October 22-26, 1980.

U.S. Senate: End of an Era



	1932	34	36	38	40	42	44	46	48	50	52	54	56	58	60	62	64	66	68	70	72	74	76	78	80
Democrat	63%	72%	79%	72%	68%	60%	58%	47%	56%	51%	49%	50%	51%	65%	65%	67%	68%	64%	57%	54%	56%	56%	60%	61%	46%
Republican	36	26	16	24	29	39	40	53	44	49	50	49	49	35	35	33	32	36	43	44	44	42	37	38	54

Source: *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1979*

WINNERS AND LOSERS

	WINNERS	LOSERS	
78%	Inouye (D-Hi.)*	Brown (R-Hi.)	18%
74%	Garn (R-Utah)*	Berman (D-Utah)	26%
72%	Hollings (D-S.C.)*	Mays (R-S.C.)	28%
71%	Andrews (R-N.D.)	Johanneson (D-N.D.)	29%
71%	Glenn (D-Ohio)*	Betts (R-Ohio)	29%
66%	Mathias (R-Md.)*	Conroy (D-Md.)	34%
65%	Ford (D-Ky.)*	Foust (R-Ky.)	35%
64%	Dole (R-Kans.)*	Simpson (D-Kans.)	36%
59%	Cranston (D-Cal.)*	Gann (R-Cal.)	39%
58%	Laxalt (R-Nev.)*	Gojack (D-Nev.)	38%
58%	Abdnor (R-S.D.)	McGovern (D-S.D.)*	39%
59%	Bumpers (D-Ark.)*	Clark (R-Ark.)	41%
57%	Dodd (D-Conn.)	Buckley (R-Conn.)	43%
56%	Dixon (D-Ill.)	O'Neal (R-Ill.)	43%
55%	Murkowski (R-Alask.)	Gruening (D-Alask.)	45%
53%	Nickles (R-Okla.)	Coats (D-Okla.)	43%
54%	Quayle (R-Ind.)	Bayh (D-Ind.)*	46%
54%	Grassley (R-Iowa)	Culver (D-Iowa)*	46%
52%	Packwood (R-Ore.)*	Kulongoski (D-Ore.)	44%
54%	Gorton (R-Wash.)	Magnuson (D-Wash.)*	46%
52%	Eagleton (D-Mo.)*	McNary (R-Mo.)	48%
52%	Rudman (R-N.H.)	Durkin (D-N.H.)*	48%
51%	Denton (R-Ala.)	Folsom (D-Ala.)	48%
51%	Specter (R-Penn.)	Flaherty (D-Penn.)	49%
51%	Hart (D-Col.)*	Buchanan (R-Col.)	49%
51%	Hawkins (R-Fla.)	Gunter (D-Fla.)	49%
51%	Mattingly (R-Ga.)	Talmadge (D-Ga.)*	49%
51%	Leahy (D-Vt.)*	Ledbetter (R-Vt.)	49%
51%	Kasten (R-Wisc.)	Nelson (D-Wisc.)*	49%
50%	Goldwater (R-Ariz.)*	Schulz (D-Ariz.)	49%
50%	Symms (R-Idaho)	Church (D-Idaho)*	49%
45%	D'Amato (R/Con./RTL-N.Y.)	Holtzman (D-N.Y.)	44%
50%	East (R-N.C.)	Morgan (D-N.C.)*	50%

Note: * = incumbent candidate. Percentages based on unofficial returns.
Source: Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, November 8, 1980.

Reagan - Carter -





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Anderson: 1980





uestions and data

Debating the Debate

Since the Carter-Reagan debate came very late in the campaign, attracted an enormous audience, and occurred in the context of an electorate that was unusually weakly tied to the parties and the candidates, there was reason to expect that it might have a very large impact. It is now clear that the debate was in fact very influential.

To determine the impact of the debate with some precision, it was necessary to do more than ask questions like "Who won?" and "Did the debate change your mind?" And this is why the battery of questions included in the Connecticut Poll (ConnPoll) conducted by the University of Connecticut's Institute for Social Inquiry is so useful. ConnPoll sought to determine the change which occurred following the debate in the overall perception of Reagan and Carter and of the contest between them. ConnPoll interviewed independent samples of state residents in the three days before the October 27 debate, and in the three days immediately after. As the data below show, basic perceptions of the Republican nominee—e.g., is he "forceful" or "rash"—and of how the presidential election was unfolding were changed in the wake of the debate. At least in Connecticut, the 90-minute debate was unusually decisive—especially since large numbers of voters were already locked into the candidate choices before the Cleveland confrontation.

Everett Ladd
Consulting Editor, Opinion Roundup

Percent watching debate at half hour intervals



Source: Survey by the Nielsen Organization, 1976 (first debate) and 1980 (Reagan/Carter debate).

Question: Which candidate do you think did the best job—or won the debate—Carter or Reagan?



Response shown for the 83% of the sample who watched or listened to the debate

Note: The sample of registered voters is 1,019. The sample size of the registered probable electorate is not known. In a CBS News/*New York Times* poll of October 30-November 1, 1980, among the 78% of the registered probable electorate who watched or listened to the debate, 41% felt that Reagan won the debate, while 26% felt Carter won. Twenty-seven percent felt that there was a tie, both had won or that neither man had won. Six percent had no opinion.

Source: Survey by CBS News, October 28, 1980.

CONNECTICUT SPEAKS

Question: Who do you think the debate will help more, Ronald Reagan or Jimmy Carter?



Question: Regardless of who you want to win in November, who do you think *will* win?



Note: *"Don't know" = "can't say," "going to House of Representatives" and "don't know" responses combined.

Question: No matter what you say about President Carter's record, Ronald Reagan would be an even greater risk in the White House.

Would you be more likely to describe Ronald Reagan as forceful, or as rash?

Would you be more likely to describe Jimmy Carter as careful, or as weak?



Question: Do you think that (Jimmy Carter/Ronald Reagan) . . .

Percent agree



Note: The "don't know" response has been calculated out for comparison purposes. The highest "don't know" response = 13% in the Oct. 25-27, 1980 description of Reagan.

Source: Surveys by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, latest that of October 29-31, 1980.

Vox Pop Tells Tale

UNEMPLOYMENT vs INFLATION

Question: Please mark an "x" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements . . . unemployment is a more important problem today than inflation.

Voters as they left the polls *



Voters as they left the polls *



Note: *The sample is 12,782 voters.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

GOVERNMENT SPENDING

Question: Do you think government spending on domestic programs should be increased, decreased, or kept about the same?

Registered probable electorate



Registered probable electorate



Note: The sample of registered voters is 1,539. The sample size of the registered probable electorate is not known. The "no opinion" response has been calculated out for comparison purposes. The highest "no opinion" response = 13%.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, October 16-20, 1980.

TAX CUTS vs BALANCED BUDGETS

Question: Please mark an "x" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements . . . cutting taxes is more important than balancing the federal budget.

Voters as they left the polls *



Voters as they left the polls *



Note: *The sample is 12,782 voters. In an October 16-20 CBS News/*New York Times* question "Do you favor a large income tax cut, a smaller tax cut, or no tax cut at all," 51% of the total sample preferred a smaller tax cut, 20% a larger tax cut, and 30% no tax cut at all. 23% of Reagan voters preferred a larger tax cut, 53% a smaller tax cut, 24% no tax cut. Carter voters responded 16% larger tax cut, 49% smaller tax cut, and 36% no tax cut.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

MILITARY STRENGTH

Question: Do you think the military strength of the United States should be superior to the Soviet Union, should be about equal in strength, or doesn't the United States need to be exactly as strong as the Soviet Union?

Registered probable electorate



Registered probable electorate



Note: In early October, Gallup asked 778 registered voters: "Do you think the U.S. has been falling behind the Soviet Union in power and influence in recent years?" Seventy-eight percent responded affirmatively, 22% answered no.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, October 16-20, 1980.

A MORE MUSCULAR FOREIGN POLICY

Question: Please mark an "x" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements . . . we should be more forceful in our dealings with the Soviet Union even if it increases the risk of war.

Voters as they left the polls *



Voters as they left the polls *



Note: *Sample = 12,782 voters.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

ATTENTION TO THE NEEDS OF BLACKS AND MINORITIES

Question: Do you think the government in Washington is paying too much, not enough, or about the right amount of attention to the needs of Blacks and other minorities?

Registered probable electorate



Registered probable electorate



Note: The sample of registered voters is 1,539. The sample size of the registered probable electorate is not known.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, October 16-20, 1980.

E.R.A.

Question: Please mark an "x" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: I support the Equal Rights Amendment—E.R.A.—the Constitutional amendment concerning women.

Voters as the left the polls *



Voters as they left the polls *



Note: *Sample = 12,782.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

Never Forget These

Question: In the election this November did things come up which kept you from voting or did you happen to vote? (If "Yes, voted") Did you happen to vote for . . .?



Percent national vote for Republican Presidential Candidate (Gallup)

% 55.0 58.0 50.0 39.0 43.0 62.0 48.0 48.0 55.0 58.0 50.0 39.0 43.0 62.0 48.0 48.0 55.0 58.0 50.0 39.0 43.0 62.0 48.0 48.0

Elephantine Voting Patterns

The charts below show the deviation from the national vote for the Republican presidential candidate among various subgroups of the population based on Gallup poll data. It is possible to see, for example, the Republicans making gains among Catholic voters from 1960 through this election.



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of November 1980.

Sorting Out the Reagan Rout

Question: In the presidential election who did you just vote for? . . . Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, John Anderson, Ed Clark, Barry Commoner, didn't vote for president, other.



The charts show the regional variation in Carter, Reagan and Anderson support by group. CBS/*NYT* exit poll defines the four-fold region differently than the Census Bureau. East = CT, DE, DC, ME, MD, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT, WV. South = AL, AR, FL, GA, KY, LA, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA. Midwest = IL, IN, IA, KS, MI, MN, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI. West = AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY.



Note: *Sample is 12,782 voters.

Source: Survey by CBS News/New York Times, November 4, 1980.

Splitting the Sexes

Voters as they left the polls *



Note: *Sample=12,782 voters.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

Question: Compared to a year ago, is your family's financial situation: better today, worse today, about the same?

Voters as they left the polls ★





Note: *Sample size = 12,782 voters.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

Question: Which qualities best describe your choice? (Respondents could check two boxes) . . .

Voters as they left the polls*	**All voters**	**Reagan voters**	**Carter voters**	**Anderson voters**
He's my party's candidate		12%		2%
He is a real conservative	7	11	3	3
He is a strong leader	15		10	9
He has good judgment	16	12	18	24
He impressed me during the debate(s)	8	10	5	8
His experience in government	10	6	15	11
He has honesty and integrity		9		
He is not too extreme	4	1	8	4
I like his Vice President	7	9	5	1
It is time for a change			1	
Don't know/no answer	16	15	17	15

Note: *Sample = 12,782 voters.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

Thisa and Thata Data

A FORD IN HIS PAST

Question: In the presidential election who did you vote for? Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, John Anderson, Ed Clark, Barry Commoner, didn't vote for president. In 1976, for whom did you vote? . . . Jimmy Carter, Gerald Ford, someone else, did not vote.

Voters as they left the polls *



Note: *Sample = 12,782 voters. "Other" includes Clark, Commoner and "someone else."
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

AN EXPANDING MIDDLE

Question: How would you describe yourself—very conservative, fairly conservative, middle-of-the-road, fairly liberal, very liberal? (1972)

Which one of these categories (respondents handed a card: far left, substantially left, moderately left, just slightly left of center, just slightly right of center, moderately right of center, substantially right of center, far right) best describes your own political position? (1976)

People who are conservative in their political views are referred to as being right of center and people who are liberal in their political views are referred to as being left of center. Which one of the categories (respondents handed a card same as above) best describes your own political position? (1980)



Note: In 1972 liberal=very liberal and fairly liberal; in 1976 and 1980 liberal=far left and substantially left of center and moderately left of center. In 1976 and 1980, middle of road=just slightly left of center, middle of road (vol.), and just slightly right of center. In 1972 conservative = fairly conservative and very conservative; in 1976 and 1980 conservative=moderately right of center, substantially right of center, and far right.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 9-12, 1980.

RING FOR REAGAN

Question: Has a presidential campaign worker contacted you in person, by telephone, or by mail, on behalf of any of the presidential candidates? (If yes) Which ones?

Likely voters



Note: Responses add to more than 100% due to multiple responses.
Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 22-24, 1980.

ALL THAT AND PASSION TOO

Question: Which *one* statement comes closest to your feeling about your presidential preference: I strongly favor him, I support him but with reservations, I am voting mainly against the other candidates.



Note: Sample = 12,782 voters.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 198

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CONSERVATIVES...

(Neo-, paleo-, populist, traditional, libertarian,
w Right, emotional, analytical, religious,
ical, foreign and domestic—we've got 'em all)

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AT
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James Watt

ay Weidenbaum

With Data...

Richard Wirthlin

George Katona

☐ ☐ ☑

and in our remarkable
24-page center section

AT ODDS...

Herbert Stein

AND
EVEN OVERSEAS.

Paul Johnson
Richard Rose

plus Wolfinger, Linquiti, Crewe, Plissner and Mitofsky

Public opinion

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CONTENTS

2 **ECONOMIC POLICY, CONSERVATIVELY SPEAKING**
by Herbert Stein
Now that the ball is in the conservatives' court, will they seize the opportunity to score? Economist Herbert Stein coaches the new administration to shoulder responsibilities and approach the nation's economic problems realistically.

7 **THE LESSONS OF THE 1964 TAX CUT: WILL THEY APPLY TODAY?**
by George Katona
The dean of the behavioral economists examines the 1964 tax cut. Can the experience of 1964 be applied to 1981? George Katona provides an answer.

10 **CONSERVATIVES AT COURT**
A conversation with Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Secretary James Watt and Council of Economic Advisers Chairman Murray Weidenbaum
With the reviews just starting to come in, three stars from Ronald Reagan's new production discuss the goals of the administration and its prospects for success. If the enthusiasm of the players is any indication, this show could be a blockbuster.

15 **MARGARET THATCHER: THE LADY'S NOT FOR TURNING**
by Paul Johnson
If one were allowed a single word to characterize Margaret Thatcher, it would probably be "firm." Paul Johnson examines her Prime Minister-as-Headmistress style of leadership and asks the question, "Will personality pay political dividends?"

18 **POLLING THE POLLSTERS AFTER LABOUR'S SPLIT**
by Richard Rose
A recent split in Britain's Labour party may well result in the birth of a new party. Rose reviews the prospects.

19 **OPINION ROUNDUP**

43 **CAMPAIGN CHRONICLE**
by Richard Wirthlin, Vincent Breglio and Richard Beal
In a postelection analysis, the three main strategists from the Reagan camp tell what they knew, when they knew it, and how it affected their campaign.

50 **WHAT IF THEY HELD AN ELECTION AND NOBODY CAME?**
by Martin Plissner and Warren Mitofsky
Does a decline in voter turnout signal an unhealthy republic? Diagnosticians Plissner and Mitofsky offer a second opinion.

52 **AS THE WORLD TURNS OUT**
by Ivor Crewe
Turnout figures constitute the only reliable information we have about electoral participation in the majority of liberal democracies. In examining voting behavior in twenty-seven democracies, Ivor Crewe points out the major national differences.

56 **TUNING IN AND TURNING OUT**
by Raymond Wolfinger and Peter Linquiti
At 8:15 E.S.T. on election night, NBC pronounced Ronald Reagan's victory. On the West Coast thousands of tuned-in voters were turned-off by the early announcement. Or were they?

OPINION ROUNDUP

CONSERVATISM: A NATIONAL REVIEW

Today, there is much interest in the status of conservatism. In the last two years, this magazine has examined much of the data bearing on this topic. While there can be no doubt that important movement toward conservatism has occurred at the levels of public policy and elite opinion, there is reason for caution in attributing to the general public a significant swing in this direction.

The pages that follow represent a comparison of the social characteristics and policy preferences of Americans who call themselves conservatives and those who say they are liberals. While these comparisons are interesting and instructive from a number of perspectives, they serve primarily to remind us how lacking in ideological rigor or coherence conservatism and liberalism are within the populace at large.

In 1964, University of Michigan social scientist Phillip Converse published an article of exceptional importance on the topic of how people see political issues and relate one to another. Most people are not conservatives or liberals, he argued, because their thinking simply does not show the consistency of a coherent belief system. Individuals lack the formal information about government and politics that ideological categories such as liberalism and conservatism presuppose. "[A]s one moves from elite sources of belief systems downwards on such an information scale, several important things occur. First, the contextual grasp of 'standard' political belief systems (ideologies) fades out very rapidly, almost before one has passed beyond the 10 percent of the American population that in the 1950s had completed standard college training. . . . At the same time, moving from top to bottom of this information dimension, the character of the objects that are central in a belief system undergoes systematic change. These objects shift from the remote, generic and abstract to the increasingly simple, concrete, or 'close to home'."

Converse's point is underscored by the disparate findings of polls on the number of conservatives in America today. The General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center (NORC) show a slight increase since the mid-1970s in the number of self-described conservatives. Gallup, on the other hand, has found conservative ranks declining slightly over this period. While contrasting question wording accounts for some of these differences, the prime factor is the mushiness of the categories themselves. Most people just are not conservatives or liberals in any wide-ranging ideological sense. When the reality is soft, measures of it necessarily vary greatly.

Within the general public, people who call themselves conservatives are consistently more likely to take conservative stands on various issues—but not that much more likely. Take the question of an amendment to the Constitution to permit prayers in the public schools as an example. In late March 1980, 87 percent of conservatives favored such an amendment, but so did 77 percent of liberals. Affirmative action on behalf of jobs for blacks was endorsed by 76 percent of liberals in early 1980; it was also backed by a substantial majority, 61 percent, of conservatives. A constitutional amendment banning abortions was *opposed* in August 1980 by 72 percent of self-labeled liberals—but it was opposed, too, by 57 percent of conservatives.

Conservative politicians and writers are much more in favor of cuts in governmental expenditure than are their liberal counterparts. Within the public at large, though, conservatives are only modestly less in favor of government spending than liberals. In its annual General Social Survey, NORC asks respondents whether they think spending is "too much," "too little," or "about right" in eleven different policy areas. The judgments of conservatives and liberals are remarkably similar. Large majorities of both groups in 1980 rejected the argument that expenditures were too high on education, the environment, urban problems, the needs of blacks, health, space exploration, combatting drug addiction, and reducing crime. Only on foreign aid and welfare, among the eleven areas explored, did the public think spending was excessive—and here majorities of conservatives and liberals were on the same side.

There are reasons why some people call themselves conservatives while others prefer the liberal label; the choice of one tag or the other is not random or meaningless. But *the reasons are not ideological.* That is, they do not, for the most part, involve adherence to a formal package of political ideas and prescriptions. Instead, they are generally narrow, specific, and individualistic. Because of this, conservatives and liberals are not sharply different overall in their political views.

There are clear class differences in the meanings of conservatism, too. When, for example, one divides self-described conservatives into four groups by their educational attainment, from the grade school educated to those with postgraduate degrees, one sees some strikingly different policy preferences. Thus, two-thirds of conservatives with grade school educations do not believe a woman should be able to obtain a legal abortion "if she is married and does not want any more children," while two-thirds of the postgraduate conservatives *favor* abortions in this instance. On this issue, the class differences—whether measured by education, income, or occupation—are greater than the differences between liberals and conservatives of the same class.

In 1980, 69 percent of the grade school educated conservatives considered spending for space exploration to be too high, the view of only 32 percent of conservatives who had completed college and 27 percent of those with postgraduate degrees. Sixty percent of conservatives with less than a high school education maintained that "unemployment is a more important problem today than inflation"; just 26 percent of conservatives who graduated from college took this position.

Applying a general ideological category like conservatism to the public at large carries with it wonderful possibilities for confusion and obfuscation. Most Americans are not conservatives or liberals; they do not apply "overarching conceptual dimensions" to give order and coherence to a variety of specific public policy stands. The data presented in the following pages faithfully reflect the status of conservatism and liberalism within the populace at large—as modest inclinations in policy preferences that lack the sharp distinctiveness of the same positions among political leaders and activists.

Everett Carll Ladd
Consulting Editor
Opinion Roundup

Counting Conservatives: The Polls Disagree

GALLUP SEES A SLIGHT DECLINE

Question: People who are conservative in their political views are referred to as being right of center and people who are liberal in their political views are referred to as being left of center. Which one of the categories (respondents handed a card: Far left, substantially left, moderately left, just slightly left of center, just slightly right of center, moderately right of center, substantially right of center, far right) best describes your political position? (1980)

	Liberal	Middle-of-the-Road	Conservative
April 1972	27%	34%	39%
March 1976	20	47	33
September 1980	19	49	31

Note: For earlier question wording, see *Public Opinion*, December/January 1981.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of September 9-12, 1980.



NORC: A CONSERVATIVE INCREASE



Question: We hear a lot of talk these days about liberals and conservatives. I'm going to show you a seven-point scale on which the *political* views that people might hold are arranged from extremely liberal—point 1—to extremely conservative—point 7. Where would you place yourself on this scale?

	Liberal	Moderate	Conservative
1974	31%	40%	30%
1975	30	40	30
1976	29	40	31
1977	29	39	32
1978	28	38	34
1980	26	41	34

Note: Liberal = Extremely liberal, liberal, and slightly liberal; Moderate = moderate, middle-of-the-road; Conservative = slightly conservative, conservative, and extremely conservative.

Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of 1980.

CONSERVATIVES RIGHT ON . . .

Question: Do you think of yourself as: Conservative, Moderate, Liberal, Radical?

Registered Voters



Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, August 26-28, 1980.

The Conservative Mainstream

Question: Regardless of the party you may favor, do you lean more toward the liberal side or the conservative side politically?

Voters as they left the polls★





Note: Sample is 9,341 voters as they left the voting booth.
Source: Survey by ABC News, November 4, 1980.

Conservative Mores...

UPRIGHT, UPTIGHT, WELL-ARMED, ON BENDED KNEE

Question: Do you ever have occasion to use any alcoholic beverages such as liquor, wine, or beer, or are you a total abstainer?


Yes, use alcoholic beverages

Question: Do you happen to have in your home (If house: or garage) any guns or revolvers?


Yes, have gun or revolver at home

Question: Have you seen an X-rated movie in the last year?


Yes, have seen X-rated movie in last year

Question: How often do you attend religious services?


Attend religious services

Note: Categories not shown: "about once a month," "several times a year," "about once, twice a year," "never, less than once a year." 17% of conservatives compared to 27% of liberals fell into the last category.

Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

...And Mood

IDEOLOGICAL CONSENSUS: I'M OK, WE'RE NOT

Question: How are things going in your personal life—would you say very well, fairly well, pretty badly or very badly?


Things in personal life going...

Note: Sample = registered voters

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 14-16, 1980.

Question: How do you feel that things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, pretty badly, or very badly?


Things in country going...

Note: Sample = registered voters

Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, August, 26-28, 1980.

DO AS I DO . . . NOTHING NEW

Question: Different people have different needs. I'm going to read you a list of needs that people feel, and for each one I'd like you to tell me if it's a need you feel strongly, moderately, slightly, or not at all? . . . The need to satisfy your hunger for new experiences.

Feel strongly about the need to satisfy your hunger for new experiences



Note: Sample = registered voters.
Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, May 14-16, 1980.

Question: Here are two statements. Will you tell me which one you agree with more? First, the younger generation should be taught by their elders to do what is right. Second, the younger generation should be taught to think for themselves even though they may do something their elders disapprove of.



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

Conscience of a Conservative

ABORTION

Question: Then, of course, there are the issues. Do you favor or oppose: a constitutional amendment banning abortion?



Note: Sample = registered voters.
Source: Survey by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, August 26-28, 1980.

. . . FOR THE UNMARRIED

Question: Please tell me whether or not *you* think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if . . . READ EACH STATEMENT, AND CIRCLE ONE CODE FOR EACH . . . she is not married and does not want to marry the man?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

OPINION ROUNDUP

E.R.A.

Question: Please mark an "X" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: I support the Equal Rights Amendment—E.R.A.—the constitutional amendment concerning women.



Note: Sample is 12,782 voters: "Don't know" recalculated for comparison purposes.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

LEGALIZATION OF MARIJUANA

Question: Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal or not?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

PRAYER IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Question: Do you favor or oppose an amendment to the Constitution that would permit prayers to be said in the public schools?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, March 28-31, 1980.

HOMOSEXUALITY

Question: What about sexual relations between two *adults* of the *same* sex—do you think it is always wrong, almost always wrong, wrong only sometimes, or not wrong at all?



Note: Wrong = always wrong and almost always wrong. Not wrong = wrong only sometimes and not wrong at all.
Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

THE DEATH PENALTY

Question: Do you favor or oppose the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

WHO SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO TEACH?

Question: There are always some people whose ideas are considered bad or dangerous by other people. For instance, somebody who is against all churches and religion. . . . Should such a person be allowed to teach in a college or university, or not? (For complete question wording, see *Public Opinion*, October/November 1980, page 26.)

Should be allowed to teach...



Note: *Allow = Should not be fired; Not allow = Should be fired. Original response categories revised where necessary for comparison purposes.
Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

CONSERVATIVES VIEW AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Question: A number of efforts have been made to help certain groups in this country improve their opportunities. . . . What about blacks and job opportunities—do you think that we in this country have gone too far, not far enough, or have done about the right amount in making job opportunities for blacks?



Note: In the national sample, 33% said "gone too far . . . ," 43% said "about right," and 24% "not far enough."
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-3), February 9-23, 1980.

NOTE ON OPINION ROUNDUP

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

The reader may note that in some cases a "no opinion" column is shown while in others it is not. This reflects a common practice in the publication of polls: when the "no opinion" or "undecided" responses are relatively small, on the order of 10 percent or less, one reports only the answers of those who have a definite opinion. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they *are* reported because they reveal a substantial degree of unawareness or uncertainty within the populace on the issues in question.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Conservative Governance

THE RHETORIC . . .

Question: Some people think the government should provide fewer services, even in areas such as health and education, in order to reduce spending. Other people feel it is important for the government to continue the services it now provides even if it means no reduction in spending. (Show respondent scale) A. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

Spending vs. services



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

. . . AND THE REALITY

Question: We are faced with many problems in this country, none of which can be solved easily or inexpensively. I'm going to name some of these problems, and for each one I'd like you to tell me whether you think we're spending too much money on it, too little money, or about the right amount. First (Read Item A) . . . are we spending too much, too little, or about the right amount on (Item)?

Majorities say we're spending . . .

	Too little			**Too little/About the right amount**			**Too much**		
	National	**Liberal**	**Conservative**	**National**	**Liberal**	**Conservative**	**National**	**Liberal**	**Conservative**
Halting crime	% 72	69	70	% 94	96	92	%		
Drug addiction	65	61	63	92	94	89			
Health	57	66		92	95	86			
Defense	60		67	88	80	89			
Education	55	61		90	93	84			
Environment	51	57		84	90	76			
Big cities				76	82	65			
Blacks				74	80	67			
Space exploration				58	62	61			
Foreign aid							74	69	78
Welfare							59	54	69

KONSERVATIVES KWIETLY KWASH KEMP

Question: Please mark an "X" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: . . . Cutting taxes is more important than balancing the federal budget.



Note: Sample = 12,782 voters.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

INFLATION TAKES TOP PRIORITY

Question: Please mark an "X" to show if you agree or disagree with each of the following statements: . . . Unemployment is a more important problem today than inflation.



Note: Sample = 12,782 voters.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

CONSERVATIVES LESS LIKELY TO PRESERVE

Question: There is continuing talk about an energy crisis and the idea that there won't be enough electricity and other forms of energy to meet consumer demand in the coming years. Some people say that the progress of this nation depends on adequate supply of energy and we have to have it even though it means taking some risks with the environment. Others say the important thing is the environment, and that it is better to risk not having enough energy than to risk spoiling our environment. Are you more on the side of adequate energy or more on the side of protecting the environment?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-9), September 27-October 4, 1980.

OPINION ROUNDUP

Conservatives View the World

ON THE FIRING LINE

Question: There has been some discussion about the circumstances that might justify using U.S. troops in other parts of the world. I'd like to ask your opinion about several different situations. First, would you favor or oppose the use of U.S. troops, if the Soviet Union invaded West Berlin? How about . . . (Read list)?



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-3), February 9-23, 1980.

COMMUNISM

Question: Thinking about all the different kinds of governments in the world today, which of these statements comes closest to how you feel about Communism as a form of government?



Source: Survey by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1980.

REINSTATEMENT OF THE DRAFT

Question: Would you favor or oppose the reinstatement of the draft for the armed forces?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, January 29-30, 1980.

U.S. HONOR

Question: If it comes down to it and we had to choose, which do you think is more important in settling the hostage situation in Iran—to preserve the lives of the 52 hostages or to preserve the honor of the United States?



Source: Survey by ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, February 3-6, 1980.

Conservatives Aren't Always Con

(Conservative Views,













servative: A Difference of Degree

by Educational Status)













Rating the Prime Ministers:

Question: Are you satisfied or



Labour's Love Not Lost

dissatisfied with . . . as Prime Minister?



(For data see page 32)

IS THE IRON LADY LOSING HER MAGNETISM?

Question: How would you vote if there were a General Election tomorrow?



	General Election May 79	Oct. 79	Mar. 80	Apr. 80	June 80	July 80	Aug. 80	Sept. 80	Oct. 80	Nov. 80	Dec. 80	Jan. 81
Conservative	45%	41%	38%	39%	41%	37%	37%	37%	34%	36%	32%	35%
Labour	38	46	46	44	43	47	48	46	50	50	56	45
Liberal	14	11	13	14	13	13	13	15	15	13	11	17
Other	3	2	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1	4

Source: Surveys by Market & Opinion Research International, London, latest that of January 22-26, 1981. The Wembley conference was January 24, 1981.

Data for pp. 30-31

	Percent Satisfied					
Month took office	**Thatcher** *June 79*	**Callaghan** *April 76*	**Wilson** *(2nd term)* *April 74*	**Heath** *Sept. 70*	**Wilson** *(1st term)* *Nov. 64*	**Douglas-Home** *Nov. 63*
	41%	57%	53%	35%	60%	42%
After 1st month	41	43	50	42	64	48
2nd month	45	36	49	39	56	43
3rd month	45	46	41	45	60	42
4th month	46	44	44	41	58	44
5th month	44	46	41	37	63	44
6th month	40	36	45	38	56	44
7th month	39	33	50	43	48	44
8th month	37	35	51	35	51	46
9th month	38	37	49	31	50	48
10th month	41	36	47	32	54	47
11th month	44	37	51	37	61	
12th month	43	38	44	32	65	
13th month	41	43	40	35	66	
14th month	41	44	46	38	65	
15th month	37	45	46	39	60	
16th month	38	43	45	39	63	
17th month	35	49	45	37	69	
18th month	31	59	46	36	58	

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., London, latest that of January 14-19, 1981.

In France, Polls Forecast Close Race

Note to readers: In 1974, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing defeated François Mitterrand by the narrowest of margins, 50.8 percent to 49.2 percent. The 1974 election was only the third time in the history of modern France that the people directly elected their chief executive. Seven years later, in late April, the French will go to the polls again to select a president. France uses a two-tiered electoral system with a first round including all candidates who meet minimal qualifications and a second ballot, or run-off, between the two leading contenders.

THE FIRST ROUND...

Question: If a presidential election were held today and the following candidates ran in the first round, which one would you vote for?



	Nov. 79	Dec./ Jan. 80	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May/ June	July	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan. 81
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	40%	43%	42%	43%	39%	35%	32%	36%	36%	38%	30%	28%
François Mitterrand	30	28	26	26	22	24	22	22	20	23	23	24
Georges Marchais	19	17	20	18	15	14	15	13	13	16	17	16
Jacques Chirac	11	12	12	13	12	10	9	9	10	14	12	11
Michel Debré					3	5	6	6	6	N/A	5	6
An Ecology Candidate*							9	9	10	6	6	6
A Candidate of the Extreme Left**							3	2	2	2	2	3
A Candidate of the Extreme Right***							2	N/A	2	1	1	1
Other					9	12	2	3	1		4	5

*Ecology candidates included: Delarue, Lalonde.

**Candidates of the Extreme Left included: Laguiller, Bourchardeau, Kravine, Garaudy.

***Candidates of the Extreme Right included: LePen, Gauchon.

Note: Candidates Marie-France Garaud and Michel Crepeau (listed individually in some of the surveys) were included in the "Other" category. Sample includes only those individuals who named a candidate. "Don't know/No answer" and "Abstain" not shown.

AND THE SECOND

Question: And if the following candidates won in the first round of voting, which one would you vote for in the second round?



Source: Surveys by Public S.A. for Paris *Match*, latest that of January 1981.

	Nov. 79	Dec./ Jan. 80	Feb.	Mar.	Apr.	May/ June	July	Sept.	Oct.	Nov.	Dec.	Jan. 81
Valéry Giscard d'Estaing	52%	57%	57%	56%	58%	54%	53%	58%	60%	57%	52%	50%
François Mitterrand	48	43	43	44	42	46	47	42	40	43	48	50

Looking Around the World,

Question: So far as you are concerned, do you



Note: "Don't know" response not shown.

Question: Looking ahead to next year—1981—do you think it will be a



Question: In your opinion, what is the most



Source: Surveys by the Gallup International Research Institutes, latest that of November/December 1980.

Gallup's Year End Review

think that 1981 will be better or worse than 1980?



year of economic prosperity or economic difficulty, or remain the same?



important problem facing this country today?



Early Expectations:

CLOSING THE CARTER BOOK: NOT THE BEST

Question: I'd like to ask you about the last eight presidents of the United States. Please keep in mind Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford and Carter. If you *had* to choose *one*, which president do you think (Read each item) . . . was best on domestic affairs . . . was best in foreign affairs . . . was least able to get things done.

	FDR	HST	DDE	JFK	LBJ	RMN	GRF	JEC
Best on domestic affairs	24%	10%	9%	23%	10%	5%	5%	2%
Best in foreign affairs	11	11	10	20	2	30	3	5
Least able to get things done	1	1	5	4	9	12	13	44

Note: "Not sure" category not shown.
Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of January 2-7, 1981.

REAGAN'S PROSPECTS

Question: Compared with these past eight presidents, do you feel Ronald Reagan will turn out to be one of the very best, better than most, not as good as most, or definitely worse than most of them?



Note: When Gallup asked a similar question in December 1980, 4% responded that Ronald Reagan would make a "great president," 40% good, 39% fair and 17% poor.
Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, January 2-7, 1981.

Late Polls: A Feb. 19-20 *Washington Post*/ABC News survey found that by a margin of 3-1 the public approves of the tax and spending cuts proposed by President Reagan. 68% indicated they approved of his handling of the presidency, 15% disapproved and 17% had no opinion. The NBC/AP poll of Jan. 21-23 found that of the 76% of Americans who had formed an opinion of Reagan, 58% rated him favorably, 18% negatively. In the January 26-29 CBS/*NYT* poll, 46% had a favorable opinion of Reagan (compared to 42% a year ago). His negative rating dropped from 38% a year ago to 11%.

THE TRUST DIMENSION

Question: How much of the time do you think you can trust . . . to do what is right . . . just about always, most of the time, some of the time, or almost never?



Note: *The sample for the October 1980 asking of this question = likely voters. "Not sure" calculated out for comparison purposes. Largest response was 11%.

Source: Surveys by NBC News/Associated Press, latest that of January 21-23, 1981.

Comparing Chief Executives

HEALTHY EXPECTATIONS EARLY ON

Question: Here are some things various people have said are likely to happen once Governor Carter (Governor Reagan) becomes President. (Card shown respondent). Would you read down that list and for each one will you tell me whether you think it is something that can be expected of him during the next four years, or something that cannot be expected of him? First, he will be able to reduce unemployment.



Note: ★In December 1976, item read ". . . keep our national defense strong." "Don't know" calculated out for comparison purposes.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, December 1976, and December 6-13, 1980.

IS THE HONEYMOON OVER?

Question: Here are some things various people have said are likely to happen once Governor Reagan becomes President. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list and for each one will you tell me whether you think it is something that can be expected of him during the next four years, or something that cannot be expected of him? . . . He will be able to hold down inflation. (Roper)

During his term in office, do you think that Ronald Reagan will (Read each item) . . . Cut the rate of inflation . . . or not? (ABC/Harris)

Do you think the Reagan administration will or will not be able to . . . Reduce inflation? (Gallup)

As President, do you think Ronald Reagan will be able to control inflation? (NBC/AP)

Do you think that Ronald Reagan will or will not . . . be able to keep prices from going up all the time? (CBS/*NYT*)



Note: "Don't know/no opinion/not sure" calculated out for comparison purposes. Largest response was "No opinion 16%."

Original responses—Roper = Expected of him, not expected of him; Harris = Will do, will not do; Gallup = Yes, no; NBC/AP = Yes, no; CBS/*NYT* = Will, will not.

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-1), December 6-13, 1980; ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, November 7-10, 1980; Gallup Organization, November 21-24, 1980; NBC News/Associated Press, January 21-23, 1981; CBS News/*New York Times*, January 26-29, 1981.

Referendums, 1980 Style

State and local referendums continue to be the only device by which American voters can both directly and officially express their opinions on issues of public policy. In the November 1980 elections at least one referendum measure was on the ballot in 42 states and the District of Columbia, and over 200 propositions were voted on in all. Their results provide a picture of public opinion that is at least as mixed as the picture which emerged in the 1978 elections (see *Public Opinion*, Nov./Dec. 1978, pp. 26-28).

Thirty-one propositions in 18 states seem to have been of more than local interest, and the first noteworthy thing about them was their relatively high voting turnouts. Turnouts ranged from a low of 22.5% in New Hampshire on an amendment to remove "sexist" language from the state constitution to a high of 64.4% in Utah on a proposal to abolish the state sales tax (both measures failed). The average turnout for the 31 propositions was 52.1%, which was not only well above the average turnout of 40% in the 1978 referendums (as we would expect, given the much larger turnout in the 1980 presidential election than in the 1978 congressional elections) but it was close to the national turnout in the presidential election.

The outcomes of these selected 31 propositions show several clear strands of opinion. For one thing, it is evident that "Proposition 13 fever" has largely subsided: six states had measures putting limits on property taxes, and they lost in five states. The only exception was Massachusetts, where the voters endorsed "Proposition 2½" by a 60% majority, and perhaps thereby discouraged residents of neighboring states from continuing to call it "Taxachusetts."

Other states had propositions affecting taxes in various ways. Nevada voted to exempt food and household goods from taxation; Montana voted in favor of indexing tax rates to the rate of inflation; Ohio rejected a proposal to raise corporate in-

The Results

Measures Cutting Property Taxes

☒ **Arizona** (property tax limitation; tax increases possible only if approved by 2/3 vote of the people or legislature)

Yes	247,107	30.1%
No	570,820	69.9%
	817,927	Turnout – 46.0%

☑ **Massachusetts** (Proposition 2½ limiting local taxes)

Yes	1,438,768	59.6%
No	998,839	40.4%
	2,437,607	Turnout – 56.7%

☒ **Michigan** (Tisch amendment to decrease property taxes, require 60% voter approval to raise state taxes)

Yes	1,622,301	44.2%
No	2,051,008	55.8%
	3,673,309	Turnout – 56.0%

☒ **Nevada** (restrict the amount of taxes on real property)

Yes	103,334	42.4%
No	140,018	57.6%
	243,352	Turnout – 45.7%

☒ **Oregon** (limit real property taxes)

Yes	401,835	34.8%
No	751,870	65.2%
	1,153,705	Turnout – 60.4%

☑ **South Carolina** (give legislature power to levy additional taxes on real and personal property)

Yes	355,077	52.3%
No	323,812	47.7%
	678,889	Turnout – 32.8%

☒ **South Dakota** (limit real property growth for taxation purposes)

Yes	113,863	37.2%
No	192,116	62.8%
	305,979	Turnout – 63.1%

☒ **Utah** (limit property taxes)

Yes	258,749	45.2%
No	313,370	54.8%
	572,119	Turnout – 63.5%

Other Tax Limitation Measures

☒ **Massachusetts** (limit state and local taxes and increase state's share of educational costs)

Yes	816,805	35.6%
No	1,473,804	64.4%
	2,290,609	Turnout – 53.3%

☒ **Michigan** (Smith-Bullard proposition to make local school boards responsible for personnel and programs and to reduce local property tax minimums for operation purposes)

Yes	746,027	21.2%
No	2,769,497	78.8%
	3,515,524	Turnout – 53.6%

☑ **Missouri** (general limit on taxes)

Yes	1,002,935	55.4%
No	807,187	44.6%
	1,810,122	Turnout – 50.7%

☑ **Montana** (index state taxes to inflation rate)

Yes	233,497	69.4%
No	102,635	30.6%
	336,132	Turnout – 60.0%

☑ **Nevada** (exempt household goods and furniture from taxation)

Yes	178,947	77.3%
No	52,593	22.7%
	231,540	Turnout – 43.3%

☑ **Nevada** (exempt food from taxation)

Yes	163,384	70.3%
No	68,985	29.7%
	232,369	Turnout – 43.6%

☒ **Ohio** (tax credits for real estate owners and renters for persons having incomes less than $30,000/year; increase rates for persons earning more than $30,000/year)

Yes	878,220	22.8%
No	2,980,015	77.2%
	3,858,235	Turnout – 50.1%

☒ **Utah** (abolish sales tax)

Yes	256,075	44.1%
No	324,555	55.9%
	580,630	Turnout – 64.4%

Nuclear Power and Nuclear Waste Restriction Measures

☒ **Missouri** (close down an operating nuclear power plant)

Yes	772,597	39.1%
No	1,201,821	60.9%
	1,974,418	Turnout – 55.3%

☑ **Montana** (prohibit disposal of radioactive waste material within the state's borders)

Yes	172,909	50.1%
No	172,493	49.9%
	345,402	Turnout – 61.7%

☑ **Oregon** (nuclear plant licensing must be subject to voter approval and to having adequate waste disposal facilities)

Yes	579,066	52.8%
No	517,912	47.2%
	1,096,978	Turnout – 57.5%

come taxes; and Utah, as noted, voted to retain its sales tax. Massachusetts, by a mountainous majority of 88%, voted down a salary raise for state legislative and executive officials.

The continuing dispute over nuclear power and the disposal of nuclear wastes produced referendum measures in five states: in three of them (Montana, Oregon, and Washington) the voters approved measures prohibiting or restricting the disposal of nuclear wastes inside their borders, while two (Missouri and South Dakota) voted down measures restricting the construction or operation of nuclear power plants.

In other issue areas, an environmentalists' initiative controlling litter and requiring the recycling of bottles lost in Montana, and in California, Proposition 10, which proposed to extend the compulsory designation of smoking and non-smoking areas, also lost.

Several states approved reforms of the political process and governmental structure: Illinois voted to reduce the size of its House of Representatives and replace the old multi-member districts with single-member districts and cumulative voting with first-past-the-post voting. Minnesota approved a measure imposing campaign spending limits on candidates for state offices and fell just short of adding the initiative and referendum to their lawmaking processes (the measure won 53% approval by those voting on it, but the total number of yes votes constitute less than half of all the votes cast in the presidential election, so it failed). And two feminist propositions failed: Iowa voters rejected an ERA amendment to the state constitution, and 84% of New Hampshire voters voted against a measure to change all references in the state's bill of rights from "man," "men," and "man's" to "person," "people," and "person's."

Do the 1980 referendum results confirm the general conservative trend that most observers see in the results of the presidential and congressional elections? Such a question is never easy to answer because it is often difficult to determine whether a particular measure did or did not pose a clear choice between conservative and liberal alternatives, perceived as such by the voters. However, by my "box score" the 1980 referendums produced a modest 12-9 margin for liberal positions over conservative: liberals won by an 8-3 margin in the tax cutting and tax shifting measures and by a 3-2 margin on nuclear issues, while the conservatives won 4-0 on environmental, feminist, and criminal justice issues. But those scores may well be an artifact of my coding—and, even more, of the fact that most voters and most referendum measures are much less concerned about what is the "liberal" or the "conservative" position than with what is the right or wrong position.

Austin Ranney
Resident Scholar
American Enterprise Institute

☒ **South Dakota** (prohibits disposal of nuclear wastes and construction of nuclear power plants unless approved by the voters)

Yes	146,381	48.4%
No	156,293	51.6%
	302,674	Turnout – 62.4%

☑ **Washington** (prohibits bringing nuclear wastes into the state without approval of state legislature)

Yes	1,211,606	75.5%
No	393,415	24.5%
	1,605,021	Turnout – 53.9%

Environmental Measures

☒ **Montana** (controls litter and requires recycling of bottles)

Yes	100,761	28.8%
No	248,928	71.2%
	349,689	Turnout – 62.4%

☒ **California** (extends requirement for designating smoking and non-smoking areas in certain facilities)

Yes	3,793,402	46.5%
No	4,370,241	53.5%
	8,163,643	Turnout – 48.1%

Women's Rights Measures

☒ **Iowa** (amendment to state constitution guaranteeing equal rights for women)

Yes	468,708	44.2%
No	591,925	55.8%
	1,060,633	Turnout – 50.7%

☒ **New Hampshire** (changes all references in state bill of rights from "man," "men," and "men's" to "person," "people," and "person's")

Yes	24,251	16.4%
No	123,901	83.6%
	148,152	Turnout – 22.5%

Political Process Reform Measures

☑ **Illinois** (reduce the size of the House of Representatives; replace multi-member districts with single-member districts; replace cumulative voting with first-past-the-post voting)

Yes	2,112,224	68.7%
No	962,325	31.3%
	3,074,549	Turnout – 38.2%

☒ **Minnesota*** (add popular initiative and referendum to lawmaking process)

Yes	970,407	53.2%
No	854,164	46.8%
	1,824,571	Turnout – 61.7%

☑ **Minnesota** (imposes campaign spending limits for state offices; requires public disclosure of campaign expenditures)

Yes	1,457,454	78.5%
No	398,551	21.5%
	1,856,005	Turnout – 62.8%

* This measure failed because the total number of yes votes constituted less than half of the votes cast in the presidential election.

Other Measures

☒ **Arkansas** (set minimum standards of education for each school district in the state)

Yes	314,105	44.2%
No	396,821	55.8%
	710,926	Turnout – 45.5%

☒ **Massachusetts** (approve salary raises for legislators and executives)

Yes	265,675	11.7%
No	2,014,261	88.3%
	2,279,936	Turnout – 53.0%

☑ **Nevada** (increase the types of crimes for which bail may be denied)

Yes	177,592	78.1%
No	49,690	21.9%
	227,282	Turnout – 42.6%

CONSERVATIVE-LIBERAL SCORECARD, 1980

Conservative-Liberal Scorecard, 1980

Issue	*Conservative Wins*	*Liberal Wins*
Property tax limitations	Mass.	Ariz., Mich., Nev., Ore., S.C., S.D., Utah
Other tax limitations	Mo., Mont.	Mass.
Nuclear power and waste limits	Mo., S.D.	Mont., Ore., Wash.
Bottle recycling	Mont.	
Women's rights	Iowa, N.H.	
Restriction of defendants' rights	Nev.	
Campaign spending limits		Minn.

Fat Stats and Jeans Scene

Harris Launches Fat Finding Mission

WEIGHTING POLLS

Question: Now I'd like to ask you a few questions about health and diet. Do you feel that you are overweight, underweight or about right?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, December 3-6, 1980.

MORE WOMEN WAGE WEIGHT WAR

Question: Are you dieting now, are you not dieting now but have dieted in the past, or have you never dieted?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, December 3-6, 1980.

THE VILLAINOUS VICTUALS

Question: Of the things you eat or drink, which are the hardest to stay away from? Any others?



Note: Multiple responses per respondent. Other = 21%, None/not sure = 14%.
Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, December 3-6, 1980.

SHIELD BROOKE FROM OVEREXPOSURE

Question: Do you agree or disagree with the action of some TV stations in withdrawing some jeans commercials as too sexy?



Note: Sample = 400 adults in New York City, Nassau, Suffolk, Westchester and Rockland counties.
Source: Survey by Richard F. Link and Associates for the *New York Daily News*, December 8-9, 1980.

by Richard Wirthlin, Vincent Breglio and Richard Beal

Campaign Chronicle

The last campaign strategy meeting at the Reagan-Bush headquarters in Arlington, Virginia, took place on the morning of October 31st. The endgames of both major presidential candidates were discussed and the latest survey data and computer simulations were reviewed. The briefing was encouraging; after all the strategizing and all the campaigning, Ronald Reagan was in a position to win on Tuesday. The actual ballot estimate from Thursday night's tracking survey was: Reagan 44 percent, Carter 37 percent, Anderson 10 percent, and undecided 9 percent. The simulated vote for Tuesday, after adjusting for turnout, the undecided rate, Anderson's decline, trends in the ballot, historical patterns and subjective judgment, was: Reagan 50.0 percent, Carter 40.5 percent, and Anderson 9.3 percent.

The state-by-state simulations suggested a projected electoral victory of significant proportions. No one in the room, as it turned out, seemed particularly surprised by the *worst-case* estimate of 290 electoral votes. They had all seen data before which suggested a Reagan win, and they all knew of the more cautious public polls calling the race a toss-up. But privately each deputy director seemed to sense he was seeing data which corresponded closely to his or her own political judgment of the election's momentum.

The simulations and surveys reinforced the commitment to the strategic components of the Reagan endgame. The endgame allocation strategy was to focus media dollars, political organization and candidate time to turn out the vote in (a) the industrial states, (b) the states bracketing the South—Texas, Florida and Virginia, (c) the Deep South inroad states, e.g., Louisiana, and (d) the West, particularly California, Oregon and Washington. The candidate should concentrate his efforts to reinforce the vote and mobilize it particularly in the industrial and Great Lakes States, assuming that in the closing days the vote was still competitive. The key to ultimate success was the proposition that campaigns are won in the last few days *if* the base has been solidified early (in this case, the expanded Republican base, the Western vote, the Catholics, union members, disaffected Democrats, and political moderates); *if* the political organization is in place to turn out the vote; and *if* the candidate remains competitive in the large industrial states.

Carter's endgame prospects seemed bleak. If our own data were a legitimate reference point, it seemed clear Carter's endgame had to follow a big state blitz strategy. There was simply not enough time for him to put together the necessary mix of small, medium, and large electoral states. Hence, New York, the Great Lakes industrial states, Texas and even California were the primary targets and at this juncture only remote possibilities. But there was not much time for him to attract and mobilize the vote with so few days remaining.

Constructing a Landslide

Before the election a few pundits publicly contemplated, and ultimately dismissed, the prospects of a Reagan landslide. The view was advanced that political conditions were probably ripe for a landslide, but the prevailing campaign stategy was not up to the task. The election proved otherwise.

The principal functions of the strategists in a modern presidential election are four-fold: (1) identify the strategic objectives of the campaign, (2) target the scarce resources of the campaign—media dollars, political organization, and candidate time, (3) dynamically adjust the intermediate objectives and allocation formulae to changing political circumstances without abandoning the overall strategic objectives of the campaign, and (4) monitor the efforts of the campaign to determine the degree to which the campaign is properly meeting its objectives, and whether those objectives remain politically viable. *The strategists' tasks are targeting and tracking against campaign objectives.*

A campaign strategy survives the rigors of a crisisdriven presidential election to the degree that it (a) correctly identifies the obstacles to victory, (b) is a conceptualization of the electoral process, (c) provides an action frame of reference, rather than an operational manual, and (d) evolves without surrendering its basic propositions every time pressures mount demanding a new direction.

Exhibit 1

Excerpts from the *Seven Conditions of Victory* Memorandum of October 9, 1980

(1) Without alienating the Reagan base, we can beat Jimmy Carter twenty-five days from now if we continue to expand it to include more
- Independents
- Anderson voters
- Disaffected Democrats–union members, Catholics
- Urban ethnics and Hispanics

to offset Carter's larger Democratic base and the incumbency advantage.

We should *not* break any major new issue ground except in the foreign policy and highly targeted "social" issue areas. The thrust of our speeches to accomplish this condition must be directed toward:
- Inflation
- Jobs
- Economic growth and
- A more responsible and more efficient federal government

(2) Allocate all campaign resources carefully against the target list of battleground states.

We must remember that the successful outcome of many months of effort hinges on just the few percentage points we garner marginally in less than ten states.

Sufficient media funds should be available to purchase heavy spot market exposure in a few key states during the final two weeks.

The time commitments of Ronald Reagan and George Bush must be assessed and assigned against state target priorities.

Event schedules should be kept free of low-mileage meetings or events and provide sufficient personal time to *recharge* during the closing days of the campaign.

(3) Focus campaign resources to reinforce the Governor's image strengths that embody the presidential values a majority of Americans think are important:
- Leadership
- Competence
- Strength and
- Decisiveness

At the same time, we must minimize the perception that he is dangerous and uncaring.

Ultimately the voters will choose the man they believe best suited to *lead* this country in the decade of the 80s. In addition to the above general "leader perceptions" we need to reinforce, we must give the voter the opportunity to get a glimpse of the quality, skill, and experience of the men and women that a Reagan Administration would attract.

(4) Reinforce through our media and spokespersons Carter's major weaknesses–that he is:
- An ineffective and error-prone leader
- Incapable of implementing policies
- Mean-spirited and unpresidential
- Too willing to use his presidential power politically, and
- Vacillating in foreign policy, creating a climate of crisis

A sharp contrast must be drawn between Carter's political promises and his performance.

Given Carter's proclivity to mount personal and vindictive attacks, we have the opportunity to play it very cool and come out of those exchanges more "presidential" than "President" Carter. In sum, the voters do not want Carter, but are not yet quite sure of us. His outbursts help. They may be muted, but they will continue.

(5) Neutralize Carter's "October Surprise," and avoid fatal, self-inflicted blunders.

(6) Position the campaign to pick up as much of the Anderson vote as possible as Anderson fades in the stretch.

It appears Anderson has not achieved the national momentum necessary to sustain a viable candidacy. Anderson's national base may be no larger than 6-8 percent and significant only in New York, Massachusetts, and the Northeast generally.

Furthermore, on November 4th, many loyal Anderson voters will be confronted with the reality of "throwing away" their votes if they stay with Anderson. In all probability many of these voters will opt not to vote for Anderson, and will cast a vote for either Reagan or Carter because they are vehemently against one of the candidates.

Now, Carter carries more negative baggage than Reagan. Every effort should be made to appeal to these voters, giving them every reason to vote for Reagan. The target Anderson states–Illinois, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Michigan and New England generally.

(7) Maintain control of the thrust of our campaign by refusing to let it become event-driven especially in the last two weeks. Be prepared to end the campaign either on a hard note or a high note depending on the momentum and level of support we achieve next week.

The most fundamental tenet of the strategy was that *Ronald Reagan was the best electronic media candidate in American history.* Nevertheless, the hurdles to Reagan's election were high and many.

- Reagan was well known, but not known well.
- Reagan was perceived to be considerably more conservative than the majority of Americans.
- He was challenging an incumbent president who occupied the ideological center of the political spectrum.
- Reagan, while politically active as a Republican for many years, did not have strong linkages throughout the Republican hierarchy.
- Reagan had to overcome the potentially larger numerical strength of the Democratic coalition.
- His candidacy hinged on expanding his political base among constituencies which were traditionally Democratic.
- John Anderson's independent candidacy compounded the difficulty of the race, rendering many conventional axioms irrelevant.
- The fluidity and volatility that Reagan had experienced during the primaries meant that no constituency could be taken for granted.

To overcome these problems all the resources of the candidate as a communicator would be required.

The essential components of the Reagan campaign plan were summarized in an inventory of "conditions of victory." Initially there were twenty-one, but it was always felt that as the campaign achieved some of its intermediate objectives and the election environment changed, the number of conditions would be reduced. Ultimately seven conditions were used to guide the campaign during its final phase—the period from October 17 through election day. These conditions were formally discussed in the October 9th memorandum detailing the status of the campaign and some strategic considerations. The excerpt from that memorandum describes the strategic elements of the campaign at that point in the contest. (See Exhibit 1.)

An important point should be made regarding the conditions of victory and the campaign timeline. The notion was simple and rested on the proposition that the election would be won in the last twenty days. Obviously the objective was to peak on election day, not before or after. Consequently, the campaign was divided into three periods. The first period ran from the close of the primaries through the first week of September; the second period covered the time from September 8th until October 16th; and the final period October 17th until November 4th. The general thrust of the first period was *to solidify the Republican base.* The second period was *to expand the coalitional base* to include the political moderates, union members, Catholics and urban ethnics. This was also the period when the Governor had to increase the voters' familiarity with his positions on the issues and establish his credibility as a presidential candidate. The final period was designed *to turn out the vote*, and, having established the Governor's credibility, use him *to attack aggressively* the performance of the Carter administration.

Voter Cohort Targets

The results of the 1976 Ford campaign plus the Reagan primary experience helped us identify key voter groups we would need to win. The campaign strategy written in June 1980, outlined the direction:

- It was essential that Reagan not only hold his Republican base, but that he capture a majority of the *independent* vote. The June 1980 Decision/Making/Information (D/M/I) survey indicated that Reagan had strong support from Republican party identifiers as well as a smaller lead among independents.
- It was essential that Reagan capture a large proportion of the *moderate* vote. Though in June Reagan held a strong lead among conservatives, Carter maintained the edge among the moderate self-identifiers.
- Of the various age cohorts, those most likely to vote were middle-aged. Reagan needed strong support from this bloc. The June survey indicated that Reagan held a substantial lead over Carter among all those aged thirty-five to fifty-four, and a marginal lead among younger voters. That lead had to be protected and expanded.
- Among the better educated, traditionally a source of Republican strength, Reagan measured a fifteen point advantage over Carter in June. This was an essential constituency and one which may have been prone to shift to Anderson. However, trends in the D/M/I surveys up to June 1980 suggested such shifts had been at Carter's expense rather than Reagan's.
- Reagan had strong support among those in the upper-income brackets, but ran evenly with Carter among the middle classes and behind him among the lower-income voters. Greater support from the middle-income populace was important. Furthermore, early survey data showed sizable support for Anderson among the more affluent, a possible threat to Reagan's strength.
- It was essential that Reagan make inroads during the general campaign with nontraditional sources of Republican support. These targets of opportunity included: clerical/sales workers, craftsmen and foremen, union households, veterans, working women, Catholics, and "born again" Christians.

Table 1

REAGAN-BUSH VOTE BY POLITICAL TARGET GROUPS

	Pre-election Surveys					
	June	August	Early October	Late Oct./Nov. Tracking	Difference Oct./Nov. Minus June	Post Election
Ideology						
Very conservative	54%	65%	57%	61%	+ 7%	71%
Somewhat conservative	50	50	49	53	+ 3	64
Moderate	26	36	31	38	+12	41
Somewhat liberal	20	24	24	27	+ 7	28
Very liberal	19	20	31	19	0	20
Partisan Strength						
Strong Republican	83	86	85	88	+ 5	91
Weak Republican	62	64	69	67	+ 5	83
Lean to Republicans	57	67	70	76	+ 9	85
Independent/No Preference	33	36	38	41	+ 8	52
Lean to Democrats	19	15	18	14	− 5	22
Weak Democrat	24	30	24	30	+ 6	35
Strong Democrat	10	11	7	10	0	15
N =	1,500*	7,200	1,300	10,000 (Aggregate)		3,000

Question: If the full ticket for the presidential race in November were (ROTATE) *Ronald Reagan-George Bush, Republicans;* Jimmy Carter-Walter Mondale, Democrats; and John Anderson-Patrick Lucey, Independents; for which ticket would you vote?

Note: *In-person survey.

Source: Surveys by Decision/Making/Information.

Table 1 summarizes the data from several surveys for some of the key target groups.

While the Reagan campaign held and even expanded its lead among Republican and conservative self-identifiers as shown in Table 1, our *largest gains* came from moderates and independents.

As for demographic targets, we were able to hold the Reagan margin among middle-aged voters. Moreover, sizable gains were made among younger voters. Among those seventeen to twenty years old, Ronald Reagan moved from 24 percent support in June to 37 percent in the late October/November tracking. Twenty-five to twenty-nine year olds provided a twelve point increase in the same period (24 percent–36 percent), and thirty to thirty-four year olds an eleven point increase (32 percent–43 percent). College educated voters provided a large margin of Reagan support, moving from 40 percent in our June survey to 49 percent in the late October/November tracking. Our postelection results showed that 56 percent of college graduates voted for Reagan, compared to 52 percent of those with postgraduate educations. Substantial gains were also made among those with high school diplomas. Not surprisingly, income was positively related to the Reagan vote—the higher the reported income, the larger the Reagan percentage. Even so, gains were measured among those earning less than $20,000 per year.

Some of the target groups that received special attention during the campaign produced positive results, too. Our postelection survey showed that:

- Forty-four percent of the craftsmen/foremen who voted supported Ronald Reagan. (38 percent supported him in the August survey.)
- Among those living in union households, 43 percent voted for Mr. Reagan. (34 percent supported him in August.)
- Veteran support was particularly strong with 56 percent casting their votes for the Republican ticket.
- The campaign made substantial gains among younger men, from 39 percent in August to 53 percent, and working women, from 34 percent in August to 47 percent.
- Fifty percent of the Catholics supported Ronald Reagan, compared to the 35 percent who said they would support him in August.
- "Born again" Christians gave the Republican ticket 50 percent of their vote.

Table 2

COALITION OF LARGE, MEDIUM, AND SMALL STATES NEEDED TO WIN

Size	Electoral votes	Changes
Large States		
California*	45	Add Michigan (early Sept.)*
Illinois*	26	Add New York (late Oct.)*
Texas*	26	
Ohio*	25	
Pennsylvania*	27	
Medium States		
Indiana	13	Delete Tennessee (early Sept.)
Virginia	12	Delete Maryland (early Oct.)
Tennessee*	10	Add New Jersey (early Sept.)*
Florida*	17	Add Louisiana (early Sept.)*
Maryland	10	Add Wisconsin (early Sept.)*
		Add Tennessee (early Oct.)*
		Add North Carolina (mid-Oct.)*
		Add Missouri (late Oct.)*
Small States		
Idaho	4	Add Connecticut (early Sept.)*
South Dakota	4	Add Oklahoma (early Sept.)*
Wyoming	3	Add Kentucky (early Oct.)*
Vermont	3	Add Mississippi (early Oct.)*
Utah	4	Add Alabama (mid-Oct.)*
Nebraska	5	Add South Carolina (mid-Oct.)*
North Dakota	3	Add Arkansas (late Oct.)*
New Hampshire	4	
Kansas	7	
Montana	4	
New Mexico	4	
Nevada	3	
Arizona	6	
Oregon*	6	
Alaska	3	
Iowa	8	
Colorado	7	
Washington*	9	
Maine*	4	

*Final Battleground State

TARGETED ELECTORAL VOTE COUNT BY MONTH
(Battleground and Reagan Base States)

	End June	End Sept.	End Oct.
Large states	149	170	211
Medium states	62	90	115
Small states	91	107	146
	302	367	472

Breaking the 50 percent mark in popular vote was due in part to the margins of support garnered among these targets of opportunity. Even so, it was possible to win the popular vote and still lose the election if the campaign failed to win its targeted states producing a minimum of 270 electoral votes.

State Targeting Strategy

Our campaign strategy did not concede a single region in the United States to Carter. Even so, the allocation of limited resources—the candidate's time, media dollars and campaign organization—was guided by the definition of a winning coalition of key states. With this in mind, we estimated the potential for a Reagan victory within each of the fifty states, and targeted for special attention Reagan base and battleground states.

Table 2 displays the original winning coalition of states developed in June. It also shows the number of electoral votes targeted within each size category, identifies the key battleground states, and specifies the changes in target states that occurred during the campaign. Battleground states were targeted for disproportionately larger shares of campaign resources than their populations of registered voters would dictate.

There were any number of possible state combinations within each size category to produce the desired outcome. From the outset of the campaign we had more ways of winning than did Carter. In October, the list of target states was still undergoing changes reflecting new survey data. Nearly all the changes added new battleground states to the winning coalition.

The original state strategy emphasized the following points:

- The Reagan base of mostly western states would be relatively impregnable to the Carter campaign. Nevertheless, California would have to be carefully protected.
- The principal battleground for the Reagan campaign would be the industrialized states surrounding the Great Lakes.
- Inroads would be made into Carter's southern base by bracketing the South with demonstrated strength in Texas, Virginia, and Florida.

The allocation of the candidate's time, media placement and organization paralleled these strategic considerations during the month of September. The heaviest allocations were made in the battleground states of the Great Lakes.

The principal change in this strategy came in early October when it appeared the Carter southern base was on the verge of collapse. At this point, we revised the allocation formula, placing additional weight on the South. Specifically, we attempted to drive a wedge into the Carter base by targeting as battleground states Louisiana, Mississippi, Tennessee, and Kentucky.

The Leadership Issue

Ronald Reagan was elected because he, more than any other national candidate, could project the image of a leader with the attributes most voters wanted in the president of the United States. In June of 1979, a national study of personal values and personality characteristics conducted by D/M/I tested six scenarios for the future. The scenarios ranged in tone from the "less is better" notion all the way to "America can do." Not only was the "can do" scenario preferred, but voters were optimistic that this nation could be put back on the right track through the selection of good leaders.

Table 3 shows five candidate attributes related to leadership. Data from the postelection study clearly indicate that Ronald Reagan was perceived as stronger than Carter on every leadership attribute.

Table 3

LEADERSHIP ATTRIBUTES

Attribute	Reagan	Carter	Anderson
The best hope to reduce inflation	71%	14%	5%
Has the strong leadership qualities the country needs	61	18	10
He is competent	48	25	12
He would provide honest and moral leadership for the country	45	27	12
He is trustworthy	33	32	10

Question: Which of the three Presidential candidates, in your opinion, is best described by the phrase . . . ?

Note: "Don't know" not shown.

Source: Telephone survey by D/M/I, November 5-8, 1980; N = 3,000.

For voters who ranked strong leadership high among the many attributes desired in their president, the choice was clear—more than two out of three voted for Reagan.

The emphasis on leadership in this campaign was reinforced by a media strategy that focused on Reagan's abilities as a political communicator. Most of the paid political advertising featured Governor Reagan talking to the people about his approach to solving America's problems. Early in the campaign our research suggested that voters were not impressed with slick, paid political advertising. Rather, they wanted to see the candidate addressing them directly, describing what he would do if elected. This one-on-one media strategy featured short spots (thirty second/one minute), five minute commercials and thirty minute specials. It is unlikely that any recent political candidate has spent more time talking directly to the American public than Ronald Reagan.

The positive nature of the Reagan campaign is further demonstrated in the direct comparison of our television ads with those of Jimmy Carter. The results of our postelection survey strongly suggest that a substantial margin of voters remember the Reagan TV ads as more pro-Reagan than anti-Carter. Carter ads were remembered as considerably more negative in tone. These findings are of particular interest since the Reagan campaign waged an aggressive attack strategy focusing on the Carter record.

The Attack Strategy

In the early stages of the general election voters were not at all enthused about Carter's performance. Nevertheless we felt it was most important that Ronald Reagan not attack the President's record frontally until the closing weeks of the campaign. In September, it was the surrogates who launched the attack. The themes were:

- Carter as an ineffective, error-prone leader
- Carter as incapable of implementing his policies
- Carter as too willing to use his presidential power politically

Table 4

NATIONAL PRESIDENTIAL BALLOT: MARCH 28—NOVEMBER 3, 1980

Survey date	Reagan margin	Reagan	Carter	Anderson	Undecided
Mar. 28	− 7	36	43	15	6
Jun. 25	2	36	34	20	10
Jul. 25	25	48	23	15	14
Sep. 30	6	41	35	12	12
Oct. 11	1	40	39	11	10
Oct. 14	− 2	39	41	11	9
Oct. 17*	6	43	37	10	11
Oct. 18	8	43	35	8	13
Oct. 19	7	43	36	8	13
Oct. 20	8	43	35	8	13
Oct. 21	5	42	37	10	12
Oct. 22	6	43	37	10	10
Oct. 23	6	43	37	9	9
Oct. 24	8	44	36	10	10
Oct. 25	7	43	36	10	10
Oct. 26	5	43	38	11	9
Oct. 27	5	43	38	10	9
Oct. 28	7	44	37	10	9
Oct. 29	5	44	39	8	9
Oct. 30	7	44	37	10	9
Oct. 31	9	45	36	8	10
Nov. 1	10	45	35	9	11
Nov. 2	11	45	34	9	13
Nov. 3	11	45	34	9	12

*National Tracking began October 17—estimates based on 3-day moving averages (N = 1,800).

Source: Surveys conducted by Decision/Making/Information.

- Carter as unsteady in his foreign policy, creating an unnecessary climate of crisis

The surrogates carried the attack through the first weeks of October.

By the first week of October, it was evident that the voters, while they did not want Carter, still had reservations about Ronald Reagan. The race was dead even on October 11th. (See Table 4.)

Very early in the campaign, we discovered that Ronald Reagan was well known—more than 90 percent of the American electorate was familiar with his name—but he was not known well. In early September, over 40 percent said they "knew very little about him and what he stood for." Our paid media, focusing on Reagan's California record, was designed to fill that information gap. Campaign 80's ads met that objective well. Through September and the first weeks of October, these ads were run so often that most of us grew sick of them. But more and more voters were getting to know Ronald Reagan better.

In early October, Carter himself provided us with a major break. In Chicago, he asserted that electing Reagan would divide North from South, Christian from Jew, and rural from urban. Reagan responded more in sadness than in anger, saying, "(Carter's) reaching a point of hysteria that's hard to understand." The President's overblown attack rhetoric stuck him with the tag "dirty campaigner" for the remainder of the election. As a result, the President lost credibility. In the second and third weeks of October, the campaign achieved something close to a role reversal. By election day, Ronald Reagan was viewed as more "presidential" than the President.

This change in image was accompanied by a sharp drop in the number of individuals who said they knew "very little" about Ronald Reagan and his views. Thus, by mid-October the Governor had the necessary credibility to launch the frontal attack.

It was at this point that Ronald Reagan started to ask the question with which he closed the debate a week later: "When you go to the polls, you will make a decision. I think when you make that decision, it might be well if you ask yourself, 'Are you better off now than you were four years ago?' "

After the debate Reagan's lead consistently widened. He had managed not only to neutralize the great power of presidential incumbency, but to turn it to his own advantage.

Nevertheless, there was one element that hung over the fall campaign like Damocles' sword—what would happen if the hostages should return, under Carter's aegis, prior to the election?

The Incumbent Strategy: The October Surprise

In our June campaign plan we discussed Carter's habit of timing good news to secure maximum political advantage (e.g. the possible release of the hostages from the militants' grip during the June primary). We reasoned that he could dump an "October Surprise" in our laps. Gary Lawrence of D/M/I coined the phrase. We felt the political impact of that kind of move might be blunted if key campaign personnel began to sprinkle their conversations with the press with references to Carter's "October Surprise." We did not define the surprise, but simply let the media speculate. Then on October 15, the *Washington Post* ran a front page story carrying the news that, "Some senior U.S. officials . . . now say privately . . . that they would not be surprised for a break in the U.S. Embassy hostage crisis to come in the next two or three weeks." All signs pointed to the "October Surprise."

All of us would have been pleased to have the hostages back on American soil at any time. Nevertheless, the political impact of such a unique event was almost impossible to determine *a priori*. However, our early summer studies suggested that we could expect it to change the vote by about ten points in favor of the incumbent.

Given our expected margin of victory, this could well have made the difference between Ronald Reagan's winning or losing the election. Inasmuch as we considered this event the single most pivotal action of the entire campaign, we set out on the 16th of October to structure a campaign within the campaign to deal specifically with the eventuality of the hostage return.

In a five-day period a special group generated a strategy, media messages, and public relations steps that might be employed should the hostages return prior to the election.

The Anderson Factor

The second major factor beyond our control that created early concern was the independent candidacy of John Anderson.

The Anderson vote, as measured in the summer and early fall, imposed voting anomalies that were neither simple nor consistent across the states. We felt we had to develop alternative contingency strategies at different stages of the campaign to cope with the Anderson candidacy, because of the uncertainty created by his challenge.

By the first week of October it was evident to us that John Anderson's support was fading in the stretch and that we could expect his base to be no larger than 6-8 percent. The marginal impact of his vote did affect, in our opinion, the New York and Massachusetts outcomes and ended up ballooning our electoral support.

The Endgame Strategy

Two strategic guidelines conditioned our actions during the closing ten days of the campaign. These were: first, do not let the campaign become event-driven; second, bring maximum persuasive pressure to bear on the electorate during the closing week.

As indicated above, there were two events that we felt were, to a large extent, outside our realm of direct influence. These were the hostage situation and the Anderson vote. The Reagan-Carter debate was the third event that would have enormous impact. It turned out to be a major conditioning event of the last six days of the campaign. While Carter scored well technically, every attitudinal measure—we sponsored four separate surveys of the debate's impact—pointed to a smashing Reagan success. As the following table shows (see Table 5), the electorate at large believed that the debate increased Reagan's chances for winning the election. More important, this view was also held by voters who were undecided at that juncture and by a sizable majority of the independents. The debate accomplished one critical task: it neutralized to a large extent Carter's effort to paint Ronald Reagan as radical and reckless.

Table 5

THE DEBATE AND PERCEIVED ELECTION CHANGES

	Chances for Election		
	Increased	Decreased	Neither
Total Sample			
Ronald Reagan	62%	21%	16%
Jimmy Carter	45	34	20
Undecideds			
Ronald Reagan	51	22	24
Jimmy Carter	44	27	27
Independents			
Ronald Reagan	65	17	18
Jimmy Carter	38	37	24

Question: Do you believe that *Jimmy Carter's/Ronald Reagan's* participation in the debate increased or decreased his chances for election?

Source: National Study commissioned by Decision/Making/Information and completed by RICI in the twenty-four hour period following the October 27th debate, telephone, N = 1,500.

On Sunday morning, November 2nd, the hostage situation came back into the headlines. Through a national sample, we confirmed that even if the hostage dilemma were resolved prior to the election, it would provide Carter only slight benefit—nothing approaching the 10 percent shift we envisioned earlier. The number of Americans agreeing that "Jimmy Carter is controlling the timing of the hostage release for political purposes" rose from 19 percent in late October to 44 percent on November 2nd.

It was apparent by Sunday noon that there was no need for the campaign to address the Iranian issue specifically. We could drive home our most telling points in the closing hours of the campaign, ending with a positive and visionary theme. The final speech Governor Reagan taped in a Peoria, Illinois, television studio Monday morning and aired to the nation that night addressed the hopes of America, and not its failures under the Carter administration.

The campaign thus successfully avoided becoming event-driven in its closing days. The second guideline—to bring maximum persuasional pressure to bear on the electorate during this period—was also satisfied.

In June we had planned for the fact the election would be won in the last twenty days.

Beginning Wednesday, October 29, 1980, we tracked a rather remarkable and consistently expanding vote margin for Ronald Reagan. What forces in our endgame strategy induced these changes? In our opinion there were five:

1. The sheer mass of media resources brought to bear on targeted states and communities in the last ten days.
2. Reagan's excellent preparation and effectiveness in the debate.
3. The organizational effort which was nearly twice as effective as the Carter organization in identifying and turning out the vote.
4. The skill of the tour and its tactical responses to a complex and volatile political environment.
5. The question "Are you better off today than four years ago?" which focused voter attention on the Carter record—his Achilles heel.

The final vote produced a 10 percent win and 489 electoral votes—a Ronald Reagan landslide.

What Did the Vote Signify?

Ronald Reagan won by a landslide because the public yearned for a national leader to restore the country to sound bearings. Carter was unable to satisfy that desire.

In that sense, 1980 was a replay of the 1976 election. It was a referendum on national leadership focusing particularly on the economy. This was precisely the attraction of Ronald Reagan as a candidate and precisely the reason for the vote.

Our campaign successfully utilized the negative predispositions toward Carter to underscore the fact that with a stronger, more capable, and confident leader America could look toward better years.

From June 1980 through the November election, our surveys showed that both Carter and Reagan enhanced their general images. But, the change in positive feelings toward Reagan far outscored Carter's moderate gains.

Ronald Reagan was elected by his substantial margin because he, more than any other national candidate, projected the image of a leader with the attributes most desired in a president. Specifically, Reagan won because he articulated clearly the themes that struck a responsive chord not only among traditional Republican groups, but also among union households, urban ethnics, high school graduates, and Catholics. The campaign reinforced deeply held values and aspirations of Ronald Reagan and a large segment of the electorate.

Reagan's presidential mandate is easily identified: "Induce change!" We view the 1980 presidential election as *the* event which demarcated a major political opportunity for redrafting the country's political agenda. In our opinion, the American voter has sanctioned the search for and articulation of a new public philosophy to govern America.

by Martin Plissner and Warren Mitofsky

What if They Held an Election and Nobody Came?

The simple-minded view of what happened last November is that Ronald Reagan won an easy majority of the voting public and an even larger victory in the electoral college. Thus, according to this view, he took office with the uncommonly clear consent of the governed.

There is another view. It is held mostly by academics and columnists with space to fill on slow news days. This view is based on "turnout." It says that what Reagan got last election day was not a mandate but a slap in the face. Nearly half the people, you see, didn't vote for anybody. Barely one in four who could have voted for the winner, did so. This is a landslide?

For some years the leading orchestrator of turnout commentary has been the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate (hereafter known as the Committee), which describes itself as a "Washington-based, bipartisan, nonprofit organization." Two weeks before the 1980 election, the Committee not only predicted the "fifth consecutive voter turnout decline," but warned that "the percentage of eligible Americans who vote might fall below 50 percent."

Table 1
PERCENT OF VOTING AGE POPULATION VOTING FOR PRESIDENT

1932	52.4%
1936	56.9
1940	58.9
1944	56.0
1948	51.1
1952	61.6
1956	59.3
1960	63.1
1964	61.8
1968	60.7
1972	55.4
1976	54.4
1980	53.9[a]

[a] The 1980 turnout figure would drop a little over a point if the Census Bureau based its projection of that year's voting age population on the 1980 census. The 1980 VAP currently used in calculating turnout is a projection based on the *1970* census, which understated the U.S. population throughout the 1970s. A better projection for 1980 could raise the VAP by 3 million or more. That in turn would reduce the calculated turnout figure. However, improved projections for all three presidential elections since the 1970 census would leave the comparative rates of turnout for each of these elections substantially unchanged. It would also, as indicated later in this article, remain a somewhat misleading measure of the rate of voting by those actually eligible to vote.

That, of course, did not happen. Even by the Committee's easygoing definition of "eligible Americans," the percentage whose vote for president was recorded held at 53.9 percent—barely a half percentage point below the corresponding figure for 1976.

As small as the latest decline turned out to be, the Committee had called it. Buoyed by that success, it held a two-day conference in Washington the week before the inauguration. There, one participant offered a fresh perspective on what the uninitiated might consider a decent enough victory for Reagan. The then President-elect, according to MIT's Walter Dean Burnham, won a smaller percentage of the "potential electorate" than had Wendell Willkie!

The Committee's president, Maurice Rosenblatt, declared that Reagan's election coincided with "more public disgust, more noses held than any other in recent history. . . ." Committee Director Curtis Gans, referring to the diminished turnout, continued, "The voters are sending a message."

Whatever the voters' message was, the President-elect did not appear to get it. A few days later, oblivious to all the controversy over the basic defect in his election, Reagan took the oath of office.

Are things really as bad as the turnout mavens make them out to be? Consider first the 53.9 percent 1980 turnout figure, on which so much attention has been focused. The Committee, along with many others who discuss turnout, describes this as the percentage of "eligible Americans" who did vote. But as one conference participant, Richard Scammon, noted, it is not that at all. Actually, 53.9 percent is the ratio of the *recorded* vote for president to the *voting age population*. The recorded vote for president excludes people who go to the polls but fail to vote for president and those who inadvertently cast invalid ballots. The voting age population includes many people categorically ineligible to vote: aliens, prisoners, and mental patients among others. If all those who went to the polls were counted as voters and only the genuinely eligible were counted as "eligible Americans," the resulting turnout figure for 1980 would approach 60 percent.

Pre-election forecasts of a significant drop in turnout last year were based on, among other things, the notion of some unique voter displeasure with the candidates. Committee President Rosenblatt's implied held-nose count of disgusted Americans gets partial confirmation from postelection polls by CBS News and the *New York Times*. Immediately after both the 1976 and 1980 elections, over 2,000 people of voting age were polled.[1] Among the professed voters in both elections, more last year said their choice was based mainly on dislike of some candidate. But, whatever the basis for their choice, these people said they *did* vote. Among people who said they did *not* vote, there was no significant difference from one election to the next in the proportion who cited dissatisfaction with the candidates. In both years less than 20 percent gave that reason for not voting.

It is not easy, however, to demonstrate that the marginally diminished turnout portends anything very ominous for the health or stability of the republic.

Neither of the CBS News/*New York Times* surveys found alienation from government or the political system to be major factors in failure to vote. A variety of questions designed to measure such alienation yielded no remarkable difference between the responses of voters and nonvoters. The most common reason offered in 1976 and 1980 for not voting was failure to register. Only one nonvoter in four gave something disparaging about the candidates or about voting itself as a reason for not casting a ballot.

In 1980, nonvoters were somewhat less likely than voters to say they had paid "a lot of attention" to the campaign. But the great majority of both voters and nonvoters watched the Carter-Reagan debate. An overwhelming majority of both groups agreed that it "makes a difference" who is president. Two-thirds of the nonvoters said they "cared a lot" about the election.

The vote for president as measured against the voting age population has varied in the past half-century from a high of 63 percent in 1960 to a low of 51 percent in 1948. Since 1960 the figure has dropped with each election. But the decline in the past two elections has been the smallest of the period, and the drop of less than half of one percent in 1980 may point to an eventual reversal of the trend.

In nearly half the states last year voting was up. This was especially true of the South, where voting continues to trail the rest of the country but has been steadily catching up. The growth in southern voting very likely reflects the decline of barriers to black participation and the growth of two-party politics (enhancing the significance of general election voting). There is a fair chance it will continue. In so doing, the South has largely offset the continued slide in the Northeast.

In the next four years a shift in the composition of the voting age population (VAP), if nothing else, could add a point or so to the turnout figure. The relatively large number of Americans born immediately after World War II will soon be at the ages during which voting peaks. In the most recent elections their presence in the VAP has been a drag on the turnout figures. Soon they should start to boost them.

The most obvious drag on voter participation remains registration. Changes in federal and some state laws have reduced many impediments to registration, but this nearly universal prerequisite to voting sharply affects the voting habits of our highly mobile people—one in five of whom moves each year. Each of these has to re-register. Many can't, don't or put it off. Among participants in the 1980 CBS News/*New York Times* poll, the rate of voting among movers was 20 percent lower than for people who hadn't moved.

Still, for those who worry about turnout, there is hope. If the price of gas and climbing mortgage rates will only keep more Americans in place, if the aging babies of the postwar boom settle down and vote as they are expected to, and if the South rises again, there may be a little less to deplore in the turnouts to come. ☑

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[1] As in all such surveys, the proportion claiming to have voted was obviously excessive. Those who said they had voted clearly must have included some who had not. The acknowledged nonvoters, however, are likely to have been fairly free of people who did vote.



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As the World Turns Out

by Ivor Crewe

To what extent do the people of the world's major liberal democracies exercise the most basic of democratic rights, the right to vote? In Democracy at the Polls, *soon to be published by the American Enterprise Institute, British political scientist Ivor Crewe looks around the world at twenty-seven major democracies to determine who votes, how turnout differs and how it has changed over the last thirty years. Finally, he asks "does turnout matter?" Excerpts from his essay follow.*

The universal franchise is a remarkably recent provision, even among those countries with an uninterrupted record of democracy since World War II. In the United States, the legal basis for the disfranchisement of blacks in federal elections was not finally removed until the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In Australia, aborigines were not fully enfranchised until 1967. Women were not granted the vote on equal terms with men until 1944 in France, 1946 in Italy, Japan and Venezuela, 1948 in Belgium and, most notorious of all, 1971 in Switzerland. The twenty-seven countries* shown here are alike in that none deny their citizens the vote on grounds of income, sex, race, religion, ethnicity, politics, or literacy; in none is plural voting allowed; in all, the vast majority of the adult population is allowed to vote.

The extent to which variations in the composition of voting registers depress or inflate cross-national turnout figures does not alter the fact that four out of five citizens of the world's major democracies *do* vote. Only in such precarious and recently reestablished democracies as Colombia do nonvoters outnumber voters. The second striking feature of this table is the spectacular range in national turnouts, despite the assumption that voting is a universally simple act. This range suggests that there are real and major national differences in people's willingness to participate in elections. This conclusion is reinforced by a third feature: the remarkable stability of most countries' turnouts since the war. In twenty-one of the countries for which calculations can be made, turnout has moved by an average of only 2.7 percentage points between elections. By and large, countries with unusually high or unusually low turnouts in the immediate postwar period had similarly high or low turnouts in the 1970s.

But does turnout matter? There are arguments in defense of apathy; to abstain is no less precious a right than to vote; moreover, low national turnout might reflect quiet satisfaction, not hostility or resignation. Why should one be disturbed if a country's turnout is below the international average or has declined over the years? After all, in all but two of the twenty-seven democracies, the majority of citizens go to the polls, in most cases in overwhelming numbers. Is it worth worrying about whether the majority consists of 60 percent rather than 90?

There are two reasons for not worrying — too much. First, it is difficult to see what more could be done in most countries to raise the level of turnout appreciably. Registration rules, residency requirements, and the like, could all be improved, but other than in the United States it is unlikely that they would make any substantial difference. A deliberate reduction in the number of safe seats through changes in the electoral system might raise turnout, although the impact would probably be small. The more powerful determinants of turnout levels are usually too deeply rooted in a country's social and political arrangements to be made either the subject or the instrument of social engineering.

Second, turnout rates provide only a limited perspective on the amount of electoral participation. Turnout cannot measure the frequency of elections. Although turnout in the United States is below that of most other democracies, American citizens do not necessarily do less voting; in fact, they probably do more. No country can approach the United States in frequency and variety of elections. Only one other country, Switzerland, can compete in the number and variety of local referendums. Only Belgium and Turkey hold party "primaries" in most parts of the country.

I would argue that turnout rates do have a serious claim on our attention to the extent that turnout levels and trends reinforce the conclusion that the more privileged and not the more deprived tend to make the most use of the vote and its political influence. In countries with low turnout, those who need the vote most, tend to use it least. In these countries, universal suffrage has failed to provide the political counterweight to the power of property and wealth that was intended by its radical proponents. ☑

TURNOUT STATISTICS

Country	Number of Elections since 1945	Compulsory Voting?	Mean Turnout since 1945[a]	Rank Order	Postwar Trend: 1940/50s to 1970s (in percentage points)
1. Australia	14	Yes[b]	95.4	1	Down: —0.6
2. Netherlands 1945-67	7	Yes	94.7	2	not app.
3. (Venezuela)	(5)	(Yes: if aged 21-65)	(94.4)[c]	(—)	(not app.)
4. Austria	10	3 provinces only	94.2	3	Down: —3.2
5. Italy	9	Almost, but not formally	92.6	4	Up: +1.0
6. Belgium	12	Yes	92.5	5	Up: +0.2
7. New Zealand	12	No	90.4[d]	6	Down: —6.6
8. (Portugal)	(2)	(No)	(87.6)	(—)	(not app.)
9. West Germany	8	No	86.9	7	Up: +6.9
10. Denmark	14	No	85.8	8	Up: +5.0
11. Sweden	10	No	84.9	9	Up: +10.6
12. (Netherlands 1970+)	(3)	(No)	(83.5)	(—)	(not app.)
13. (Sri Lanka)	(6)	(No)	(82.2)[e]	(—)	(not app.)
14. Israel	9	No	81.4	10	Down: —2.6
15. Norway	9	No	80.8	11	Up: +2.5
16. France	11	No	79.3	12	Up: +2.0
17. (Greece)	(11)	(Yes: if aged 21-70 and within 200 km of constituency)	(79.1)[f]	(—)	(n.a.)
18. Finland	10	No	79.0	13	Up: +2.7
19. United Kingdom	11	No	76.9	14	Down: —3.9
20. Canada	12	No	76.4[g]	15	Up: +2.9[h]
21. Ireland	9	No	74.7	16	Up: +2.2
22. Japan	13	No	73.1	17	Down: —1.3
23. (Spain)	(2)	(No)	(72.7)	(—)	(not app.)
24. (Turkey)	(10)	(No)	(67.4)[i]	(—)	(not app.)
25. Switzerland	8	No (except 4 small cantons)	64.5	18	Down: —15.1
26. India	6	No	58.7[j]	19	not app.
27. United States (presidential)	8	No	58.5[a]	20	Down: —2.2
28. Colombia	(5)	(No)	(46.6)[k]	(—)	(not app.)
Average, ranked countries only	10	—	81.0	—	Up: +0.02
Average, all countries	9	—	78.6	—	—

Note: The figures for countries *without* a continuous record of democracy since the late 1940s are placed in parentheses and excluded from the rank order, as are those for which exact figures are not available for a sufficient number of elections; n.a. = data not available; not app. = not applicable—too few observations.

[a] Except for the United States, turnout is defined as votes cast (including invalid and blank votes) as a percentage of registered voters. The figure for the United States refers to valid votes only, as a percentage of the voting age population.
[b] Voting compulsory for all registered voters; registration optional for aborigines.
[c] Based on 1968 and 1973 elections only; data for 1947, 1953, and 1963 elections unreliable or not available.
[d] Excludes 1978 election, for which no turnout data are yet available.
[e] Based on estimates of total electorate for 1960, 1965, and 1970 elections; turnout data not available for 1952, 1956, and 1977 elections.
[f] Based on elections of 1956, 1958, 1974, and 1977 only; turnout data for eight other postwar elections not available or unreliable.
[g] Based on ten elections, 1945-1972; turnout figures for the 1947 and 1979 elections not available.
[h] Based on difference between 1940/50s and 1960s/70s.
[i] Based on last four elections (1965, 1969, 1973, 1977) only; turnout data for six other postwar elections not available or unreliable.
[j] Based on five out of six elections since independence (no turnout data available for 1967 election).
[k] Based on most recent three elections only (1968, 1970, 1974); turnout data for 1946 and 1949 elections not available.

Sources: Inter-Parliamentary Union, *Parliaments of the World*, Inter-Parliament Union, *Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections and Developments*, 1965+; *Keesing's Contemporary Archives;* Mackie and Rose, *International Almanac of Electoral History* (also supplements in the *European Journal of Political Research*, vol. 2 (3), September 1974; vol. 4 (3), September 1976; vol. 5 (3), September 1977; vol. 6 (3), September 1978); Rose, *Electoral Behavior: A Comparative Handbook* (London: Collier, Macmillan, 1974).

by Raymond Wolfinger and Peter Linquiti

Tuning In and Turning Out

Does it make a difference if television networks pronounce the winner of the presidential election before the polls close in some states? And, if it does, what should be done about it? These questions have arisen after every recent presidential landslide, in 1964, 1972, and again in 1980. President Carter's early concession intensified the debate.[1] Many angry western Democrats claimed that Carter's hasty action discouraged voters who might have brought victory to narrowly defeated Democratic candidates for Congress and state legislatures.

Because it is impossible to prevent presidential candidates from conceding when they wish to do so, the anger about Carter's surrender may have found an outlet in the attacks on the networks for their early pronouncements. The networks had few defenders in the postelection months. The common view was that they should not be allowed to "perpetrate such an outrage again."[2] Several members of Congress have introduced bills to close the polls at the same time all across the country or to prevent the disclosure of election returns until voting is over.

The assumption behind this assault on the networks is that their early verdicts do, in fact, keep some people from voting. Is there any factual basis for the belief that early verdicts discourage would-be voters? For a topic that has been the subject of recurring controversy, the evidence is remarkably sparse.

One claim the networks make in their own defense is not very satisfactory. This is the argument that there are many offices at stake on election day and voters, well aware of this, are not discouraged when they learn that one contest has been decided. The flaw in this argument is that many Americans' impulse to vote is so weak that it can be activated only by the prospect of voting for president. Witness the fact that the vote cast for congressional candidates in presidential years is always much heavier than it is in midterm elections. Since 1960, House turnout in presidential years has averaged 13 percentage points higher than in off-year elections. While we might want American civic virtue to be greater than it is, there is no escaping the fact that it takes the excitement of a presidential race to get many people to the polls. Therefore it *seems* reasonable to expect that some people who otherwise would go to the polls, and vote for nonpresidential candidates, choose instead to forego voting when the top draw is no longer in doubt.

The networks point to research which shows that their early calls in 1964 did not discourage voters.[3] One approach, taken in some of the published work, uses respondents' reports about what influenced their conduct. However, nonvoters often prove to be bad analysts of their own behavior. For example, a third of those interviewed in North Dakota about why they failed to vote said that it was because they were not registered. The flaw in this explanation is that North Dakota does not have a voter registration requirement! Thus, one should be skeptical if few people cite early network pronouncements as a reason for not voting. A second problem is that the target group here is people who are registered to vote but do not do so—about 10 percent of the population.[4] In a typical national public opinion poll sample, there would be about 150 such respondents in the entire country, of whom less than two dozen would live on the West Coast. The authors of the best known study on the influence of network projections reported that they interviewed only twelve registered nonvoters in California.[5] This is an uncomfortably small number of cases for valid conclusions, even if enormous differences are detected. For differences of a few percentage points—the biggest impact that anyone could reasonably expect—conventional survey samples are likely to be hopelessly inadequate, because the margin of error doubtless would be larger than any detectable effect of network announcements.

One series of studies does interview enough people to illuminate this issue: the Census Bureau's Current Population Survey, which every month provides data on more than 90,000 people, or about sixty times as many as in a Gallup poll sample.[6] In November of election years, the Current Population Survey has a Voter Supplement with questions about the election, including whether a vote was cast and, in some years, at what time of day. Unfortunately, the latter question was not asked in 1976. We do not know if it was asked in 1980, and, in any event, it will be some time before the 1980 data are available for analysis. Time of voting was ascertained in both 1972 and 1974, however, and this information yields some clues about what happens when the networks pronounce a presidential winner hours before polls close in the West.

The 1972 landslide provides an opportunity to learn something about the impact of early network verdicts on western turnout. On election night in 1972, NBC pronounced Nixon the winner over McGovern at 8:30 p.m. E.S.T., just fifteen minutes later than its call in 1980. CBS called Nixon at 8:50. Thus, two of the three networks gave their verdicts more than two hours before the polls closed on the West Coast. For purposes of research, 1972 has an advantage over 1980: there was no quick concession by the loser to muddy the waters. (It is easy to believe that Carter's announcement had more impact than NBC's, but since no one is proposing to muzzle presidential candidates on election night, questions about legislative "solutions" focus on the consequences of the networks' pronouncements.)

The huge Census Bureau sample lets us see what share of the votes in particular states was cast after 6 p.m. local time in 1972 and 1974. The states likely to be most affected by early election verdicts are California, Oregon, Washington, Hawaii, and Alaska, all of which had at least two and a half hours to vote after NBC pronounced Nixon the winner.[7] The most straightforward analysis compares after-six turnout in these five states with after-six turnout in the other forty-five states.[8] In this comparison, we limit ourselves to respondents who did not vote by absentee ballot, knew what time they had voted, and were reporting on their own turnout.[9]

This comparison, presented in Table 1, shows heavier after-six voting in the Pacific states. In 1972, 14.6 percent of all Pacific votes were cast after 6 p.m., compared to 11.7 percent of votes in the rest of the country. This is not surprising, because polls in all of these states but Hawaii stay open until 8 p.m. local time, while many other states close down at 7 p.m., and a few do so at 6 p.m. Of course, this means that a larger proportion of Pacific residents are vulnerable to the potentially discouraging effects of the networks' early projections.

Table 1

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST AFTER 6 P.M. LOCAL TIME

	Pacific states			Other states		
	1972	1974	1972-1974 Difference	1972	1974	1972-1974 Difference
	14.6	19.2	− 4.6	11.7	13.3	− 1.6
N =	6,506	5,350		38,818	31,233	

Before we can assess the impact of the network projections in 1972, we must first calculate what the expected 1972 turnout would have been in the absence of the projections, and then compare this expected turnout to the actual turnout. We begin with the actual Pacific zone turnout in 1974, when 19.2 percent of the votes were cast after 6 p.m. To adjust this figure for differences between 1972 and 1974, we look to the rest of the country. As Table 1 shows, after-six turnout elsewhere slipped from 13.3 percent in 1974 to 11.7 percent in 1972, a drop of 1.6 percentage points. Making this correction for the Pacific states, we expect an after-six turnout in 1972 of 17.6 percent ($19.2 - 1.6 = 17.6$). Since the actual after-six turnout was only 14.6 percent, this suggests that the networks did indeed affect Pacific voting in 1972.[10]

To translate these figures into the more intuitively meaningful measure of total turnout, we take the fraction of *eligible* Pacific residents who arrived at the polls before six in 1972, 60.4 percent, and divide it by the fraction of *actual* voters who would have voted before six given the expectations stated above. This proportion of before-six voters is simply one minus the proportion of after-six voters: $1 - .176 = .824$. Dividing .604 by .824 gives us 73.3 percent. Given a turnout of 60.4 percent by six o'clock, and without network calls, turnout could have been expected to reach 73.3 percent by day's end. The actual total turnout in the two groups of states in 1972 and 1974 is shown in Table 2. Subtracting the actual 1972 Pacific turnout (70.6 percent) from the expected turnout (73.3 percent) yields a disparity of 2.7 percent.

Table 2

VOTER TURNOUT IN 1972 AND 1974 [a]

	Pacific states (%)	Other states (%)
1972	70.6	64.8
1974	51.5	46.3

[a] This table is limited to citizens reporting on their own voting who, if they voted, reported what time they had voted.

Before attributing this gap to the networks' early calls in 1972, we should consider other possible reasons why residents of the Pacific states would be less likely than other Americans to vote late in the day in 1972. The poll closing times in these five states did not change between 1972 and 1974. The same is true for the rest of the country, with trivial exceptions. By the same token, the weather reports for 1972 and 1974 provide no clues. It is widely believed that voters in midterm elections are substantially better off and better educated than the larger number of presidential year voters. This belief is incorrect.[11] Even if it were correct, however, it would not explain a decline in late voting that was limited to the Pacific states. In the absence of any other explanation for this gap of 2.7 percentage points, we think it reasonable to suggest that it reflects the networks' early verdict on the 1972 election.

This 2.7 percent amounts to about 454,410 votes in the five Pacific states. In California, it represents around 337,000 votes, or about 7,800 per congressional district. The probability that this number of votes could affect the outcome of a legislative election depends on the closeness of the election and on the characteristics of the people discouraged from voting. A few contests are decided by very small margins. In 1980, for example, the veteran California Democratic Representative James Corman was defeated by 864 votes and blamed his defeat on the early verdicts by Carter and/or NBC.

The likelihood that network announcements could affect such a contest depends on the kind of people who

Table 3

PERCENTAGE OF VOTES CAST AFTER 6 P.M.
BY LEVEL OF EDUCATION

	Pacific states			Other states		
	1972	1974	1972-1974 Difference	1972	1974	1972-1974 Difference
Elementary school only	7.9	8.5	— .6	8.1	7.9	+ .2
Some high school	13.8	16.1	— 2.3	12.2	11.9	+ .3
High school graduates	15.1	19.7	— 4.6	13.2	15.1	— 1.9
Some college	17.7	21.8	— 4.1	11.2	14.3	— 3.1
College graduates	13.8	21.2	— 7.4	11.6	13.9	— 2.3
Total	14.6	19.2	— 4.6	11.7	13.3	— 1.6


TUESDAY MORNING: NOV. 4th...
REMEMBER... IF YOU DON'T VOTE, YOU DON'T COUNT!
THE WEST COAST
BRIAN BASSET
THE SEATTLE TIMES ©1980
FIELD NEWSPAPER SYNDICATE
NOW THIS... FROM ELECTION HEADQUARTERS IN NEW YORK, N.B.C. PROJECTS RONALD REAGAN AS OUR NEXT...
THE WEST COAST

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are most likely to refrain from voting if the outcome of the presidential election is known before they go to the polls. The first guess might be that the people most vulnerable to this sort of discouragement are those with the weakest political interest, the least educated. In fact, the opposite is true. The data we examined showed no significant difference from 1972 to 1974 in the proportion of grammar school graduates who voted after six. As one goes up the educational scale, the 1972-74 disparity in late voting widens. College graduates in the Pacific states showed a gap of 7.4 percent in late voting between 1972 and 1974. Subtracting from this the 2.3 percent gap for the rest of the country yields a disparity of 5.1 percent in the voting of the best educated segment of the population.

This is surprising because educated people would appear to be more strongly motivated to vote and more likely to know that McGovern was a sure loser. Our contrary finding may reflect the fact that before people can be deterred from voting by knowing that the networks have called the winner, they must first hear the news. Who is more likely to hear political news than the best educated? There are, of course, strong relationships between education and information about politics, exposure to political material in the mass media, and so on. The uneducated might have weaker political motivations, but they are also less likely to know that the mass media have predicted the winner.

The Census Bureau asks no questions about political preferences and so there is no way to measure directly the partisan impact of the early verdict in 1972. We can get a clue by looking at the drop in late voting by different occupational groups. Professional and managerial people were influenced by the early verdict to about the same degree as blue collar workers. This suggests that, at least in 1972, the impact of the early verdicts fell fairly equally on both parties' candidates.

Another line of argument is that people who support the winner will keep right on going to the polls when they hear who has won, because they want to be identified with victory, whereas supporters of the losing candidate who hear that he has lost will drive instead to the nearest bar. It is difficult to dig up convincing evidence about this notion, for the reasons mentioned earlier: the people involved are a tiny proportion of the total population and the temptation to rationalize behavior is strong. Moreover, public opinion polls are unsuited to such precise measurement because the margin of error in a conventional survey is about 3 percent for the entire sample and considerably larger for parts of the sample.

Troublesome Solutions

It is one thing to show that early network verdicts affect turnout, and quite another to conclude that something should be done about it. The networks' early calls do not seem to provide much benefit to society. As Berkeley political scientist Peter Sperlich asks, "What advantage is there to anybody in knowing the election outcome several hours earlier rather than several hours later?" The networks might answer that it is not their business to ponder the social benefit of each news item they broadcast. The producer of NBC's election coverage expresses a common industry viewpoint: "We don't think we ought to withhold information from people."[12]

Many people outside the television business have other opinions. In the aftermath of the 1980 election, a number of politicians, many of them Republicans, proposed various measures to "correct" the situation. The most popular approach is to close the polls at the same time all over the country. This supposedly would keep the networks from pronouncing the winner in individual states on the basis of returns from "sample precincts" in those states until all Americans had stopped voting. The returns could not be compiled until the polls closed and thus the networks would be deprived of the information needed for their statistical computations. A uniform closing requirement would mean that California, Oregon, and Washington could keep their 8 p.m. closing time only if East Coast polling places stayed open until 11 o'clock local time. The alternative would be to align western closing times with East Coast schedules, which would bring voting to a stop at 5 o'clock Pacific Time. Because this measure would prevent westerners from voting after work, it usually is combined with a proposal to open western polling places on Monday evening. This would not make western election officials very happy, since it would increase costs, double their problem in finding volunteers to staff precincts, and also require safeguarding the ballots overnight. And then there is the inconvenient fact of Alaska, where the polls close at 8 p.m. local time, and part of the state is six hours behind Eastern Time.

More ambitious and potentially mischievous is the idea that uniform closing hours be combined with moving election day to Sunday, as proposed in a bill introduced by Representative Mario Biaggi (D.-N.Y.). A *New York Times* editorial on January 19 suggested a "24-hour weekend voting period." Sunday voting presumably would give everyone more time to vote. This notion is superficially appealing, but has nothing much to do with reality. Research on what kinds of people vote on Tuesdays makes it clear that those with more free time are, if anything, *less* likely to go to the polls: working women vote at the same rate as housewives; farmers are heavy voters; the unemployed vote less than people of comparable age and education who work.[13] The risk of Sunday elections is that recreational alternatives might make voting less appealing.

Another notion is that election returns not be disclosed anywhere until the polls are closed everywhere. This does not appear to be unconstitutional, but as a practical matter it means that no results could be announced until 2 o'clock Wednesday morning on the East Coast, when Alaskans finally had stopped voting.

All these proposals to adjust voting hours and withhold news about the results are rooted in a belief that the networks need early returns to project the winner. This is *not* how NBC called the 1980 outcome, however. Like the other networks, NBC interviewed voters leaving polling places in a number of states which together accounted for more than a majority in the electoral college. These "exit polls" can be completed long before the voting is over and in fact half the interviews usually are conducted before noon. NBC scooped its competitors by processing and analyzing exit poll interviews more quickly, and by discerning in those figures the dimensions of Reagan's lead over Carter.

A few proposals have gone to the logical next step: restricting exit polling. The issues here are mostly constitutional. It is unthinkable that the news media could be prohibited from interviewing citizens on election day, or prevented from disclosing the results. In the weeks after the 1980 election, some network critics were talking about expanding the area around polling places in which exit polling would be banned. Most states presently forbid solicitations in the immediate vicinity of the polling place. The usual distance is 100 feet, although Florida has a 300-foot limit. If other states followed this precedent, exit pollsters would find the going rocky, although they do manage to live with the Florida law.

The Supreme Court has held that the states can "regulate conduct in and around the polls in order to maintain peace, order and decorum there." This is not a very clear clue to its likely reaction to an all-out offensive against exit polling. Its decision probably would attempt to balance the public interest in high turnout against the claims of the First Amendment.

Exit polling is not, however, the only way to interview voters. If it were made too difficult, the networks doubtless would revert on election day to the telephone interviewing technique they use all through the year for surveys of public opinion and voting intentions. This would have the disadvantage of including many people who claim to have voted when they have not in fact done so. These people—about one out of eight interviewed—would make the networks even more cautious about calling the election from the interview results than they have been with exit polls. That caution should be kept in mind when thinking about this problem. Avoiding mistakes is even more important to a network than an exclusive story. NBC dared to call the 1980 election because the results were so one-sided that prudent analysts could overcome their caution. If they had to rely on telephone interviewing, the networks would need even bigger margins before they would venture to call a winner in a state. Putting exit polling out of business would not keep the networks from calling an election, but would give them fewer that they could call safely.

A more fundamental point lies beyond these considerations. Why pick on election day projections when other events during the year also influence how many people vote? What the networks say on election day does not come out of a clear blue sky. Nixon's 1972 landslide was expected all during the campaign. Many people were sure that McGovern was a loser when election day dawned. Even if it could be shown that some of these individuals were deterred from voting by their conviction that the outcome was assured, would it be a good idea to prevent the research and reporting that provide the public with an idea about the two candidates' relative popularity? The answer to this question is scarcely in doubt. Singling out the networks' election day projections cannot be justified without also endorsing a more extensive hunting license for other events that might influence turnout.

Note: Christopher H. Achen generously advised on aspects of our data analysis. The computer work for this paper was done with the invaluable guidance of Margaret Baker, who also made many useful comments on an earlier draft of the manuscript, as did Herbert McClosky, Nelson W. Polsby, Steven J. Rosenstone, and Byron Shafer. The data, in the archive of the University of California State Data Program, were made available by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, which is not responsible for our analyses or interpretations.

[1] NBC pronounced Reagan the winner at 8:15 p.m. Eastern Standard Time. Carter conceded at 9:45 p.m. ABC called Reagan at 9:52 p.m. and CBS made it unanimous at 10:32 p.m., almost half an hour before the polls closed on the West Coast and in Hawaii.

[2] Hobart Rowen, "Turning Off the Tube," *The New Republic*, December 13, 1980, p. 6.

[3] Douglas A. Fuchs, "Election-Day Radio-Television and Western Voting," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 30 (Summer 1966), pp. 226-37; Kurt Lang and Gladys Engel Lang, *Voting and Nonvoting* (Waltham, Mass.: Blaisdell Publishing Co., 1968); Harold Mendelsohn, "Election-Day Broadcasts and Terminal Voting Decisions," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vol. 30 (Summer 1966), pp. 212-25; and Warren E. Miller, "Analysis of the Effect of Election Night Predictions on Voting Behavior," Hearings of the Subcommittee on Communications, Committee on Commerce, U.S. Senate, 90th Congress, July 18-20, 1967, pp. 211-19.

[4] Calculated from the 1972 Current Population Survey sample, which is described later in the text.

[5] Lang and Lang, *Voting and Nonvoting*, p. 80. This paucity of cases to analyze reflects a deficiency of the first three studies cited in note 3: based on samples of registered voters in California, they reported incredibly high rates of turnout, ranging from 96 to 98 percent.

[6] Weighting to achieve a representative sample of the civilian noninstitutional population yields 136,203 cases for analysis for 1972 and 141,289 cases for 1974. The Current Population Survey's advantages for the study of turnout are described at length in Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, *Who Votes?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), Chapter 1 and Appendix A.

[7] The first three states, all in the Pacific Time Zone, close their polls at 8 p.m. local time. Hawaii, two hours behind Pacific Time, stops voting at 6 p.m., and Alaskans keep voting until 8 p.m. local time. Most Alaskans are on the same time as Hawaii; a few, in the Bering Time Zone, are yet another hour behind Pacific Time.

The Pacific Time Zone also includes Nevada and parts of Idaho. Nevada polls close at 7 p.m. in three counties and at 6 p.m. in the rest of the state. Polls close at 7 p.m. local time in all but two states in the Mountain Time Zone.

[8] We also examined after-six turnout with a three-way grouping: (1) the five Pacific states; (2) the Mountain Time Zone states plus Nevada and Idaho; and (3) all other states. There were no differences between the latter two groups of states, hence our decision to combine them. By the same token, removing southern states from the "all other" group did not affect our results.

We could identify in both 1972 and 1974 six eastern and midwestern states that close their polls at 8:00 local time. Comparing the Pacific states with these six states yielded exactly the same finding as the comparison with all forty-five states reported in the text.

[9] Turnout for almost half the sample was reported by the respondent for another member of the household. This second-hand reporting does not result in misreporting the vote, nor does it affect the relationship between any demographic variable and turnout (*Who Votes?*, pp. 131-32). Knowing *when* a family member had voted might have taxed some respondents, however, and so we decided to limit ourselves to those who were reporting their own vote. In fact, this did not significantly alter the results obtained when we included all respondents.

[10] The margin of error for this difference is ±1.45. In other words, there is a 95 percent probability that the "real" difference ranges between 1.55 and 4.45 percent. This exceptionally small margin of error is one of the advantages of the immense samples.

[11] See Raymond E. Wolfinger, Steven J. Rosenstone, and Richard A. McIntosh, "Presidential and Congressional Voters Compared," *American Politics Quarterly*, vol. 9 (April 1981).

[12] Quoted in Elmer W. Lower, "Is Television Undermining Our Elections?" *TV Guide*, January 17, 1981, p. 33.

[13] Wolfinger and Rosenstone, *Who Votes?*, pp. 28-29, 49, 58.

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SELLING CAPITALISM

Michael Novak
John Kenneth Galbraith and George Gilder

Plus [illegible]

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CONTENTS

SELLING CAPITALISM

2 **THE VISION OF DEMOCRATIC CAPITALISM**
by Michael Novak
Why is it that Americans voice a sense of personal well-being, but pessimism about the nation? Michael Novak argues that this discrepancy results from our lack of a public idea or vision. Because our system has never been morally pretentious, America is unable to defend itself against competing ideas. Mr. Novak arms us with the intellectual ammunition.

8 **NEW ARGUMENTS IN ECONOMICS**
a conversation with George Gilder and John Kenneth Galbraith
Is the hot hand of capitalism taking fire around the world? Ought it? In this intellectual summit, two original thinkers grapple with these questions, debate the supply-side view of the world, and enter into a spirited discussion of the much-touted revolution in economic thought.

14 **BUSINESS BEWARE: EARLY WARNING SIGNS IN THE EIGHTIES**
by Joseph Nolan
An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. So says the old adage and the author. Mr. Nolan waves early warning flags for business, signaling trouble in the eighties.

18 **THE BOTTOM-UP SOCIETY: AMERICA BETWEEN ERAS**
by John Naisbitt
In this provocative piece, John Naisbitt paints a picture of America standing on its head. The trends he sees are moving society from the bottom up. He coaches us in ways to adjust to an uncomfortable posture.

20 **DIVINING THE DEVOUT: THE POLLS AND RELIGIOUS BELIEF**
by George Gallup, Jr.
The Moral Majority, the Evangelicals, the Christian right, and the Born Agains. There is probably more confusion than clarity about the religious revival. George Gallup, Jr., who heads the prestigious Princeton Religion Research Center, sifts through the data, revealing the beliefs of the religious.

21 **OPINION ROUNDUP**

42 **A MAJORITY FOR MORALITY?**
by Burton Yale Pines
Are the Moral Majority and the Christian right really only noisy lobbies for a moral minority? *This senior editor of* Time *magazine looks at evangelical activities, attitudes, and political practices and finds these "fringe groups" may be part of the mainstream.*

48 **PRIVATE OPINION/REPORTING THE POLLZZZZZzzzzzz**
by Irving Crespi
Question: What is your least favorite thing about public opinion reporting? Answer: It's boring. Irv Crespi kicks off a new column in the magazine and tackles the "dullness dimension."

50 **AN EDITOR'S REPORT ON THE YANKELOVICH, SKELLY AND WHITE "MUSHINESS INDEX"**
Pollsters are often called America's pulse takers. Now, with the help of the Yankelovich "Mushiness Index," they can take America's temperature as well. The editors take a look at this new method for determining whether a respondent feels strongly about a particular issue—or is only lukewarm.

by Joseph Nolan

Business Beware: Early Warning Signs in the Eighties

The most formidable management challenge of the 1980s will be managing the new business environment. The decisive issues will be external rather than internal, social and political rather than economic.

"The acid test of making profits for the stockholders and quality products at reasonable prices will come primarily from the impact of laws and public opinion," said the CEO of one *Fortune* 500 corporation, mirroring the views of many of his peers.

The challenge of this new social and political environment—of the "impact of laws and public opinion"—is already abundantly evident.

- Recent polls show a growing body of opinion that sees big business as a threat because it has become more active politically.
- On the trade front there has been a pronounced swing toward protectionism.
- Legislative proposals emphasizing job ownership, employee rights and corporate governance are attracting new adherents.
- "Product stewardship," an idea that would hold a manufacturer responsible for products in perpetuity, is gaining.
- Litigation such as the Weber reverse discrimination case is reshaping the ground rules of the workplace.

To understand this new business environment, corporations must sharpen their perceptions of social and political trends. To deal with these trends effectively, businesses must develop more reliable methods to identify and anticipate changes in the business climate. They must develop a capacity to act with dispatch rather than waiting for the courts to enforce the public will.

Business should not allow itself to be lulled into complacency just because the political players in Washington have changed. It may get a more sympathetic hearing on some issues from the Reagan administration, but there will be no retreat from federal—and state—scrutiny of business activities. Government looking over the corporate shoulder has become a fact of life. The election results did not, as some have suggested, signal a change in the public's view of business responsibilities. (See Figure 1.)

Figure 1
RESPONSIBILITIES, PERFORMANCE OF BUSINESS



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-1), December 6-13, 1980.

"Early warning" flags signaling trouble for business in the 1980s are already flying, but business leaders still have time to do something about them if they heed the costly lessons of the 1960s and 1970s.

Lessons of the Past

Business's experience over the past two decades suggests that if public issues are sized up correctly at an early stage, they can be handled much more effectively. If they are permitted to reach an advanced stage where the courts and legislatures get involved, business's ability to achieve a satisfactory outcome is greatly reduced.

Examination of public issues of the 1960s and 1970s reveals certain readily identifiable phases in the emergence of issues affecting business.

First, there is the *Latent Phase* when the issue is recognized by relatively few. If caught here, it can frequently be handled through the private actions of individual businesses.

A good example is the large corporations' response to demands that they broaden representation on their boards of directors. As soon as this issue surfaced, several corporations actively sought out talented black, consumer, minority, and women representatives for positions as directors. New faces began turning up in boardrooms: Patricia Harris, Catherine Cleary, Margaret Bush Wilson, Reverend Leon Sullivan, Mary Gardiner Jones, William Coleman and others. Before long, the steam went out of this issue—at least temporarily—and activists turned their attention to more promising areas.

A second phase is one that might be described as the *Opinion Development Phase*. The issue has come under scrutiny in the newspapers and on television, and has begun stimulating open debate. At this stage, voluntary cooperative action can often prove helpful.

The Business Roundtable's role in shaping legislation to deal with the Arab boycott of companies doing business with Israel offers an apt illustration. Through discussions with representatives of Jewish groups in the United States, a task force was set up to work out an accommodation giving American companies flexibility in dealing with Arab boycott pressures. Congressional and executive branch groups were kept fully apprised. The agreements reached by the task force were accepted and written into the legislation.

The business people involved had high stakes of their own on the table—trying to rationalize conflicting national laws into rules of conduct for international commerce. But they went about the task keenly aware of the broader public interest. In the end, the difficult issues posed by the legislation were resolved in a sophisticated manner.

A third phase is the *Institutional Action Phase*, when Congress, the state legislatures, and the courts move into the picture. By this time, it is usually too late for the private sector to exert much influence. Yet, amazingly, this is the stage at which most businesses wake up to the fact that something is going on. Only when proposals escalate to the level of congressional debate and legal action do some industries start talking seriously about self-regulation.

What they are doing, though, is proposing a Phase One solution for a problem that has already advanced to Phase Three. At that stage, the initiative has clearly been preempted by legislatures or the courts.

Industries' tardy recognition of public issues has all too frequently followed this dismal pattern of stubborn resistance to reality. Concern for the environment existed in the Latent Phase for twenty-five years or more, but the environmentalists were contemptuously dismissed as "fanatics" and "do-gooders." And then, almost overnight, Rachel Carson's book *Silent Spring* became a best seller, sharply increasing public awareness of threats to our air and water quality. The issue moved rapidly through the Opinion Development Phase, and soon Congress and the state legislatures were churning out laws aimed at controlling pollution.

Consumerism evolved in similar fashion. The federal government had begun taking steps against particular abuses as early as 1887 with passage of the Interstate Commerce Act. But for seventy-five years or more, isolated grievances had no common outlet. Ralph Nader spurred consumer concerns and became a vocal champion of the movement. Again it was a book, *Unsafe at Any Speed*, that provided the main impetus for nudging consumerism into the Opinion Development Phase, and persuading consumers that somebody was listening. Like the environmental concerns, the transition from second to third phase was uncommonly swift.

On both issues, trade associations and individual companies badly miscalculated public reaction. Many organizations dismissed the environmentalists as ill-mannered gadflies. They looked upon Nader as a publicity-seeking guru, intent on making himself a nuisance. Having thus underestimated the gravity of public concern over consumer and environmental issues, the affected industries were hardly in a position to deal decisively with them.

Warning Signs for the '80s

What are likely to be the major issues challenging businesses in the 1980s?

One of the difficulties of peering into the future, as the Greek dramatist Aeschylus noted, is how to distinguish "the waking vision from the idle dream." In other words, how to tell the substantive issues that are going to be around for a while from those destined to flare briefly, then fizzle.

A study of public expectations, made in late 1979 by the Emerging Issues Committee of the Public Relations Society of America, offers some clues. This group, with which I served, set out to analyze public attitudes toward the philosophy of entitlement, and to interpret what these may signify in the short term. The survey, conducted with the help of Opinion Research Corporation, was based on a national probability sample of 2,054 individuals in private households in the United States.

Respondents were asked to categorize eighteen items which they felt people: (a) were entitled to have; (b) have now; (c) were entitled to and expect to have in the next ten years; (d) were entitled to but do not expect to have in the next ten years; (e) were not entitled to have at all.

For every one of the items, there was a yawning gap between the portion of the public that thought it was entitled to a particular benefit and the percentage that said it had this entitlement already. The Emerging Issues Committee saw these gaps as ominous signs that activists and special-interest groups could readily seize and exploit. (See Figure 2.)

This "gap analysis" pointed especially to those areas showing the greatest disparity between what the public wants and what it feels it has now. For example, prevention of crime in cities, 57 percent gap; adequate retirement income adjusted annually for inflation, 56

Figure 2
THE PHILOSOPHY OF ENTITLEMENT

Question: Most Americans believe that there are a number of economic, social, and political rights to which they as citizens are or should be legally or morally entitled. Differences in opinion arise in identifying just what these specific rights are (hand respondent shuffled pack of yellow cards). Here is a deck of cards which identify some of the specific things which have been debated as economic, social and political rights. Please sort them on this sorting board according to how entitled to these rights are people like yourself and your expectation of having them realized. You can put as many or as few cards in any box—there are not right or wrong answers, just your opinion that counts.



Source: Survey by Opinion Research Corporation, General Public Caravan, for the Public Relations Society of America, July 1979.

percent; adequate housing within each person's means, 53 percent; adequate public transportation, 52 percent; a guaranteed job for all those willing and able to work, 51 percent; a steadily improving standard of living, 49 percent; products certified safe and not hazardous to health if properly used, 36 percent.

The size of these differences boldly underscores what the public has been telling pollsters for years: that it is dissatisfied with the performance of both government and business, and wants to see substantial improvements. The improvements most frequently mentioned in this survey, as well as in other studies of emerging issues, fall into three broad categories: people issues; work issues; and issues related to health, safety and general well-being.

People Issues

In the 1980s, the people issues facing corporations are likely to be more numerous than ever. "Worker rights," "employee constitutionalism," and "due process" issues will predominate.

The proposed Corporate Democracy Act offers some clues to the debates of the '80s, with its "Employee Bill of Rights." Because of the proposal's sponsorship by Ralph Nader and his associates, and the flawed character of some provisions of the proposed act, many business people are inclined to dismiss the entire package out of hand. A more prudent course would be to examine the content and the rationale behind it.

Certainly the idea itself is hardly new. Thomas Jefferson, writing to James Madison in 1787, noted that "a bill of rights is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or particular."

Employee climate surveys are increasingly turning up evidence that workers—correctly or not—feel they don't have the same rights on the job as off. In their leisure hours, they perceive themselves as enjoying freedom of speech and assembly, due process, privacy, and choice of leisure activities and associations. On the job, they doubt that these rights prevail to the same extent. And these doubts are reinforced when they see fellow workers disciplined or discharged without what they regard as just cause or adequate right of appeal.

In the 1960s and 1970s, with little fanfare, a number of pioneering corporations began experimenting with innovative approaches to this problem. Some adopted commendable policies to insure employee privacy. Others set up high-level appeal boards to hear employee grievances. Now the courts, legislatures, unions, professional societies, and public interest groups are beginning to prod employers insistently to move faster on employee rights. The more perceptive ones are taking the hint, recognizing that the days of do-as-you're-told corporate loyalty are behind them.

In the more familiar sector of discrimination on grounds of race, creed, color, and sex, militancy can be expected to build steadily in the next decade, with age discrimination becoming the newest and perhaps most persistent equal opportunity complaint.

The trend toward an aging U.S. population will accelerate sharply in the years ahead. Today's 25 million persons aged sixty-five or older comprise about 11 percent of the population. The sixty-five-and-older group's share is expected to top 14 percent by 1990, and rise to more than 18 percent by 2025—a total of nearly 55 million Americans.

With inflation eroding purchasing power, more and more older Americans will insist on having the *choice* of continuing in the work force, whether or not they exercise that choice. Legislative observers agree that the newly adopted age limit of seventy for mandatory retirement is simply a temporary stopping point. Eventually, the ceiling is likely to be raised, or eliminated entirely, as has already happened in California.

Companies are going to come under increasing legislative and regulatory pressure to make concessions to the over-sixty-five group, one of the fastest growing and most effective political lobbies in the United States. Not only does this group have a growing constituency within its own ranks, but it enjoys a strong public image of legitimacy and hence an absence of any consistent opposition to its programs.

The elderly have already translated their political clout into a series of legislative achievements such as Medicare, Medicaid, rapidly rising social security benefits, and the sweeping Age Discrimination Act of 1975. They will unquestionably be a formidable force to be reckoned with by corporations in the 1980s and 1990s.

Work Issues

Closely related to the people issues will be work issues. Foremost among them will be demands for a stronger voice in making decisions, more meaningful working assignments, pay schedules that help employees keep pace with inflation, and job security in an era of unusual economic turbulence.

The job security issue is getting fresh attention from recent plant closings in steel, rubber, and other industries. "Job ownership"—the notion that a worker is fully entitled to a job, and that nobody can take it away without giving something of genuine value in return—has become a popular rallying cry.

In Western Europe and Japan, this concept has been widely accepted for years and often explicitly stated in labor-management pacts. A U.S. company closing a plant in Europe expects to pay a hefty bill for severance. The only question is: "How much?" The notion that any company would close its doors abruptly and put workers on the street is inconceivable to the European or Japanese mind. Today that notion is finding a growing number of adherents in this country as well.

Many American business leaders scoff at the pro-

(Continued on page 57)

Nolan

(Continued from page 17)

posal, included in the proposed Corporate Democracy Act, for advance notice of up to two full years on any plant closing. They make the point—with considerable justification—that such a notice would immediately scare off customers and hasten the demise it is intended to cushion. Still, the idea of protecting workers from the sudden jolt of unemployment is one that is gathering momentum, and management will be pushed to devise sensible alternatives to the proposals now being floated by others.

Safety and Health Issues

A third set of issues likely to stir increasing public criticism of business in the 1980s, if they are not handled properly, are those relating to safety and health.

Public pressures can be expected to increase for severe punishment of corporate officers who refuse to comply with environmental regulations, for exclusion from the marketplace of products alleged to be threats to health or safety, and for "environmental taxes" to finance stricter government programs of surveillance, enforcement, and clean-up.

A series of incidents such as Love Canal and far-reaching product recalls in the automobile and tire industries has already prompted demands for constantly higher standards of "product stewardship."

It is not too far-fetched to assume that by 1990, if not before, the notion that companies are responsible for their products in perpetuity will be firmly embedded in the public consciousness—and to an increasing extent, in our laws. This mood was reflected in recent congressional deliberations on the Superfund legislation to clean up abandoned industrial waste dumps throughout the country. Several lawmakers expressed the opinion that companies had an "eternal responsibility" for their products that extended from the raw material stage through the manufacturing process to the ultimate disposal of wastes.

The scope of plant safety programs will be broadened to include not only the prevention of on-the-job injuries—important as this is—but also exposure to products and conditions that could have delayed effects on employees or their offspring.

Activist groups concerned with safety and health issues can be expected to take full advantage of the techniques they experimented with so successfully in the past decade—what Robert Nisbet calls "the techniques of contrived populism." These groups discovered that it is relatively simple—given our legal system and a little militancy—to delay virtually anything for a long time. The ability to delay a program is often tantamount to killing it. When the escalating costs of delays and uncertainties are added into the calculations, both government and private industry often find it pays to cancel projects that would otherwise be profitable.

Sohio's bid to move oil by pipeline from the West Coast inland vividly expressed the frustrations this process can entail. In January 1975, Sohio began securing the necessary permits and government approvals. Altogether, a total of 700 were required from 140 local, state, federal, and private agencies. Four years and $50 million later, Sohio threw in the towel. In the interim, it had obtained only 250 of the necessary 700 permits.

Economist Lester Thurow of MIT says at least one major environmental group has developed a comprehensive strategy based on "analysis paralysis." Laws are to be proposed, stipulating that every project must meet a host of complicated, time-consuming requirements. The idea, he says, is not to learn more about costs and benefits, but to make cost-benefit analysis so complex and expensive as to kill projects entirely.

Response for Business

What should business do about these "early warning" signs?

First, identify them earlier. Learn to read more accurately the signs in polls, forerunner publications, and frontier research papers, and to interpret them in terms of a company's business units. Social scientists are developing increasingly sophisticated tools for environmental scanning. Businesses should avail themselves of these tools and use them regularly.

Second, integrate "early warnings" into the management planning system. Social and political developments can often exert as profound an impact on business as economic factors, and should be treated in the mainstream of planning.

Third, act promptly to manage an effective response to emerging issues. Too often in the past, business people have tried to sink an issue by bombarding it with scornful broadsides, only to find that their rhetoric accelerated the issue's development.

"Business leaders must come forward with positives," says Du Pont Chairman Irving S. Shapiro. "By the time a congressional committee is laboring over a bill, it has long since been decided that: (1) there is a problem, and (2) government ought to be doing something about it. The decision may be in error on both counts, but it is an uphill battle for opponents to prove that. Experience shows that the best action is to offer some other steps to be taken by the people under pressure to 'do something,' steps they can take back to their constituents and defend in a practical way."

Some of these "other steps"—these constructive alternatives—may seem costly in the short run. But these costs should be weighed against the costs of a long drawn-out no-win war with activist groups or government agencies on a particular issue. They should be evaluated, too, against the far greater costs of radically altering our business system. This will likely be required unless individual businesses become more resilient in adapting their policies and performance to the emerging trends of the new business environment.

by George Gallup, Jr.

Divining the Devout: The Polls and Religious Belief

Long after the November elections, debate continues about the likely impact of conservative Christian groups on the political scene and on society as a whole. Some critics view with alarm the rise of these groups and their leaders' claims to have "enough votes to change history." The critics see in conservative Christian activities an attempt to encourage conformity along religious or ideological lines, and see in conservative Christian groups a serious threat to civil liberties.

Similarly, observers of the American religious scene worry that the debate will exacerbate tensions between religious groups and denominations on the "left" and those on the "right." Such a development might undermine what is generally viewed to be a trend toward greater goodwill among religious groups in the United States, and a growing belief in ecumenism.

In view of what appears to be growing suspicion and distrust between the religious "left" and "right," it is important to examine certain basic questions about evangelicals and the Christian right. The fact is, there is much misinformation circulating about persons who call themselves "born again." For example, contrary to a popular assumption, not all evangelicals can be categorized as part of what is called the "Christian right." Similarly, not all evangelicals are fundamentalists. Some people—totally ignorant of the evangelical movement and its important contributions to religion in America—simply dismiss evangelicals as "rednecks" and "Holy Rollers."

Certain questions that need to be examined are: "Who are the evangelicals, and who makes up the Christian right?" "How pervasive are evangelical beliefs in American life?" And, "How do the beliefs of evangelicals interact with their social, political, and ethical views?"

These questions *were* addressed in a survey undertaken by the magazine *Christianity Today*. The magazine commissioned the Gallup Organization and its affiliate, the Princeton Religion Research Center of Princeton, New Jersey, to survey Americans aged eighteen and older about their personal beliefs, practices, and attitudes. The survey, developed after considerable discussion with religious scholars and professional survey researchers, produced a figure of 20 percent of Americans who fell into one or the other of two rigid categories of evangelicals.

Two other independent Gallup measurements, although less detailed than the *Christianity Today* gauge, also produced a figure close to 20 percent, or one-fifth of the total adult population. In Gallup Poll surveys, evangelicals have been defined as those displaying three basic characteristics:

1. They describe themselves as "born again Christians," or say they have had a "born again" experience.
2. They have encouraged other people to believe in Jesus Christ.
3. They believe in a literal interpretation of the Bible (or come closer to this view than to the next closest view, "the Bible is the inspired word of God, but not everything in it is to be taken literally, word for word").

Nineteen percent answered all three questions in the affirmative.

Identifying the "Christian Right"

Identifying the Christian right, a coalition of conservative Christian groups, is as difficult as identifying evangelicals. The Gallup Poll recently attempted to identify this segment of the population by using the following criteria: persons who are Christian in their religious preference; who describe themselves as "very religious"; place themselves to the right on a liberal/conservative scale; and say they are biblical literalists.

It is not surprising that a high percentage of this group could be classified as evangelicals. But the Christian right, as identified in this experiment, tends to be considerably more Republican and more pro-Reagan than do the evangelicals as a group.

According to our definition, about one-fourth (23 percent) of the total adult population could be considered part of the Christian right. Our 23 percent figure, however, is likely to be higher than an actual figure for the whole population, since the "moderately right" as well as the "far right" were included in order to increase our sample base of analysis.

The Moral Majority

Probably the most prominent group among the Christian right is the Moral Majority. Some political observers believe the Moral Majority, started by the Reverend Jerry Falwell, was largely responsible for the defeat of key members of Congress in the November elections.

Less than half of the national sample (40 percent) had heard or read about the Moral Majority when the survey was conducted (late November), while even fewer were familiar with its objectives and goals. Among those familiar with these objectives and goals (26 percent of the sample), disapproval of the Moral Majority outweighed approval—13 to 8 percent respectively,

(Continued on page 41)

GALLUP

(Continued from page 20)

with 5 percent undecided.

While a relatively small proportion of the public was supportive of the Moral Majority at the time the survey was undertaken, it should be noted that the 8 percent in favor projects to 12 or 13 million adults nationally, a number large enough to be decisive in close congressional races.

Republicans and those who voted for Ronald Reagan are far more likely to hold favorable opinions of the Moral Majority than are Democrats and those who voted for President Jimmy Carter.

Church members, regular churchgoers, those who watch religious television programs, and persons who say religion plays an important role in their lives are more favorably disposed toward the Moral Majority than are their opposite numbers. Southerners are found to be more receptive to the Moral Majority than are persons living in other parts of the country.

Future Impact

Evangelicals and various groups on the Christian right can be expected to have a significant impact on the religious scene in the United States, since evangelicals in many respects are the energizing force behind the nation's religious renewal.

The likely impact of evangelicals on the political and social scene, however, is more difficult to assess. Collectively, evangelicals and the Christian right may have enough votes to "change the course of history," but their influence may be less pronounced than expected for the following reasons:

1. Discouragement over the state of morals in society has led evangelicals and conservative Christians—and probably most Americans—to give high priority to moral issues. At the same time, however, when Americans are asked to name "the most important problem facing the nation," inflation, unemployment, international relations, crime, and energy problems are all named ahead of "moral problems." Furthermore, in national elections the "bread and butter" issues of peace and prosperity tend to overshadow moral issues in the thinking of the electorate.

2. Evangelicals and conservative Christians tend to look to their leaders, some of whom have wide audiences on television, for guidance on problems facing society. According to the *Christianity Today*/Gallup survey, at least half the U.S. public thinks it is "very important" or "fairly important" for religious organizations to make public statements on political and economic matters as to what they feel would be consonant with the will of God.

At the same time, however, majorities of Americans of all faiths tend to draw the line at being told by their leaders how to vote; considerable resistance is found to being mobilized into a Christian voting bloc.

3. Evangelicals and conservative Christians, while tending to coalesce around certain religious and moral issues, are by no means monolithic in their views on other voter issues.

Gallup surveys taken last fall, for example, revealed that evangelicals and nonevangelicals have similar attitudes toward gun registration, building more nuclear power plants, the death penalty for murder, and government social programs.

Furthermore, the differences on other key issues are perhaps not so great as might be expected. For example, 70 percent of nonevangelicals favor the ERA, but so do a 56 percent majority of evangelicals. When it comes to increased defense spending, 61 percent of nonevangelicals and 65 percent of evangelicals are in favor of stepping up spending for the military.

In the case of issues pertaining to personal morality and religion, however, major differences are found between evangelicals and nonevangelicals. For example:

- Twice as many nonevangelicals as evangelicals favor allowing homosexuals to teach in the public schools.
- On the focal issue of banning abortions, 31 percent of nonevangelicals express support for such action while 43 percent of evangelicals do so—a pronounced difference, but, again, perhaps less than one might expect.
- The sharpest divergence is found in regard to prayer in the schools. Even when the issue is posed in terms of *requiring* prayer (the Supreme Court ruled that public schools may not *sponsor* prayers), the vast majority of evangelicals (84 percent) vote in support while 56 percent of nonevangelicals do so. For other issue comparisons, see pages 24 and 25 of Opinion Roundup.

A comparison of the views of those categorized as part of the Christian right and those who do not fit this categorization reveals a similar pattern except for certain issues related to personal morality and religion; little difference is found on most major voter issues.

VOTER ISSUES
(Percent in Favor)

	Christian Right	*Non-Christian Right*
Issues on which opinion is close:		
Registration of all firearms	60%	58%
Death penalty for persons convicted of murder	54	52
More nuclear power plants	49	41
Government social programs as a way to deal with social problems	50	53
The ERA	57	65
Issues on which opinion differs widely:		
A ban on all abortions	41	29
Increased spending for defense	80	68
Requiring prayer in public schools	78	55
Allow homosexuals to teach in public schools	17	31

4. Religious beliefs are certainly focal in the stance of evangelicals and conservative Christians on key voter issues, but the question must be raised—if it comes down to a question of religious principles or economic well-being, how will Americans vote?

The cumulative evidence suggests that efforts to create a Christian voting bloc will be blunted by the fact that while there is a wide divergence of opinion on issues related to personal morality and religion among the groups discussed in this article, surprisingly little difference is found on those issues which dominate national elections.

The debate on the impact of conservative Christians will undoubtedly continue unabated. Some religious observers would likely maintain there has been too much heat in this debate and not enough light. They are hopeful that further dissemination of information about the status of religion in America will enable both those on the "left" and those on the "right" to come to see more clearly not that which divides them, but that which unites them. ☑

Politics from the Pulpit

PUBLIC SAYS NO TO CHURCH INVOLVEMENT IN POLITICS . . .

Question: Do you think the churches and members of the clergy should be involved in politics, like backing a candidate for public office, or don't you think so?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 8-10, 1980.

. . . BUT YES TO EXPRESSION OF VIEWS ON SOCIAL MATTERS

Question: Should the churches and members of the clergy express their views on day-to-day social questions, or should they keep out of social matters?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 8-10, 1980.

IN THE VOTING BOOTH: CLERGY'S CLOUT DOESN'T COUNT

Question: If you were asked by a member of the clergy, such as a minister or a priest, to vote for a specific candidate in an election, would that make you more likely to vote for that candidate, less likely to vote for that candidate, or wouldn't it make a difference?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 8-10, 1980.

Question: Have you been contacted on behalf of any of the presidential candidates, by a labor union, a business group, a church or religious group, your local political party, or have you not been contacted by any of these groups?



Note: Responses total more than 100% due to multiple responses.
Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, October 22-24, 1980.

Question: In the presidential election who did you just vote for? . . . Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, John Anderson, Ed Clark, Barry Commoner, didn't vote for president, other.



Note: Among white born again Protestants, 35% voted for Carter, 61% for Reagan and 3% for Anderson. For those white Protestants not born again, 30% voted for Carter, 60% for Reagan and 8% for Anderson. 40% of Catholics voted for Carter, compared to 51% who voted for Reagan and 7% for Anderson. White born again Catholics split 35% for Carter, 58% for Reagan and 6% for Anderson. 39% of white not born again Catholics voted for Carter, 52% for Reagan and 8% for Anderson. 45% of Jews voted for Carter, 39% for Reagan and 14% for Anderson. Sample = 12,782 voters as they left the voting booths.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, November 4, 1980.

America's Evangelicals: Genesis or Evolution?

It is frequently argued that the evangelical movement in American Christianity represents an important *new* social force, and that evangelicals and nonevangelicals differ *sharply* on various issues. That evangelical Christianity is a strong social force is not in doubt. We can question, though, its newness and the singularity of its views. We need first to look at the thorny question of how, in survey research, an evangelical Christian is defined. The Gallup Organization's three-part definition* is used here.

E.C.L.



Note: Questions are "Would you say that you have been 'born again' or have had a 'born again' experience—that is, a turning point in your life when you committed yourself to Christ?" "Have you ever tried to encourage someone to believe in Jesus Christ or to accept Jesus Christ as his or her Savior?" (Hand respondent card) "Which ONE of these statements comes closest to describing your feelings about the Bible . . . **A.** The Bible is the actual word of God and it should be taken literally, word for word. **B.** The Bible is the inspired word of God but not everything in it should be taken literally, word for word. **C.** The Bible is an ancient book of fables, legends, history and moral precepts recorded by men."

Data above based on two surveys combined, with 3,086 respondents.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, August 1980.

Who Are the Evangelicals?

Protestant evangelicals by religious denominations:



Note: Among evangelicals, 89% are Protestant and 10% are Catholic. For the nation as a whole, 60% = Protestant, 29% = Catholic, 2% = Jews, 1% = Eastern Orthodox, 1% = Other, 7% = None. Among nonevangelicals, 26% are Baptist, 29% other Protestant, 19% Methodist, 8% Presbyterian, 12% Lutheran, 2% Latter Day Saints, 5% Episcopalian. 52% of nonevangelicals are Protestant, 34% are Catholic, 2% are Jews.

Evangelicals by Occupation



Note:

National	Nonevangelicals
25% = Professional/Business	28% = Professional/Business
42% = Manual workers	41% = Manual workers
8% = Clerical/Sales	8% = Clerical/Sales
3% = Farmers	2% = Farmers
21% = Nonlabor force	21% = Nonlabor force

Evangelicals by Region



Note:

National	Nonevangelicals
24% = Northeast	27% = Northeast
31% = South	26% = South
27% = North Central	28% = North Central
18% = West	19% = West

Evangelicals by Gender



Note:

National	Nonevangelicals
52% = Female	50% = Female
48% = Male	50% = Male

Evangelicals by Race



Note:

National	Nonevangelicals
87% = White	89% = White
13% = Black	10% = Black
	1% = Other

Note:*Evangelicals are defined as respondents who indicated they were "born again" or had had a "born again" experience and had "tried to encourage someone else to believe in Jesus Christ or to accept Christ as his/her savior" and finally, who believed "the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally word for word." Data based on two surveys combined with 3,086 respondents.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, August 1980.

How they Differ, How they Don't

In many policy areas, evangelicals and nonevangelicals hold remarkably similar views. This holds true for questions about the proper role of government, virtually all questions about taxing and spending, and many other salient issues like the use of nuclear power. On a limited set of social questions which touch directly upon family and home life and upon personal morality, there are consistent differences in outlook. On these issues evangelical Christians do consistently take a more conservative stance than nonevangelicals. In part, this difference reflects the regional and class makeup of the evangelical movement. Southerners and those of lower social and economic status (SES) are more conservative culturally, and are more inclined toward evangelical persuasions.

TAX CUTS

Question: All things considered, would you favor a 10 percent rate reduction in the federal income taxes people pay this year, or do you think it would be better not to cut income tax rates this year?



Note: Categories not shown are, "Reduce taxes more than 10% (vol.)" = 5% Evangelicals, 3% Nonevangelicals, 3% National. "Reduce less than 10%" = 0% Evangelicals, 1% Nonevangelicals, 1% National.

DEFENSE SPENDING

Question: Here is a card listing some of the things the federal government spends money on. For each one, would you please tell me whether you think the government should be spending more money than it is now, less money than it is now, or should the government continue spending about the same amount as now? . . . defense . . . welfare.



WELFARE SPENDING



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, August 1980.

Question: (Hand respondent card) This card lists various proposals being discussed in this country today. Would you tell me whether you *generally favor* or *generally oppose* each of these proposals . . .



Note: Evangelicals are defined as respondents who indicated they were "born again" or had had a "born again" experience and they have "tried to encourage someone to believe in Jesus Christ or to accept Jesus Christ as his or her savior" and believe "the Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken literally word for word."

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, August 1980

The Old Version

Although significant numbers of Catholics, Lutherans and members of other liturgical denominations are evangelicals, the denominational home of the evangelicals is pietistic Protestantism, especially the Baptist church. Fully half of all evangelicals are Baptists, according to the 1980 Gallup surveys. Not surprisingly, then, the evangelicals stand in a similar relationship—both in social background and in social out-

White respondents



DEATH PENALTY

Favor death penalty for murder



Note: For complete question wording, see *Public Opinion* August/September 1980, page 37.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys. Data combined for 1972-78, 1980.

ABORTION

Should be able to obtain a legal abortion if she is married and does not want any more children



Note: For complete question wording, see *Public Opinion* August/September 1980, page 39.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys. Data combined for 1972-78, and 1980.

# of the New Story

look—to the long-standing relationship of pietistic Protestants to other Christian denominations. In recent years, though, as the old tensions that long separated Baptists and Catholics have greatly diminished, the shared conservatism of members of these denominations on matters of personal morality, including abortion, has encouraged their cooperation in the evangelical movement.



Note: Occupational categories "Clerical/Kindred" and "Farmers" not shown.

PREMARITAL SEX

Premarital sex always wrong/almost always wrong



Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys. Data combined for 1972, 1974, 1975, 1977, 1978.

TOLERANCE

Person against churches and religion should be allowed to speak



Note: For complete question wording, see *Public Opinion* October/November 1980, page 26.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys. Data combined for 1972-74, 1976-77 and 1980.

THE RAVAGES OF INFLATION

Question: Think of your parents when they were your age. Would you say you are better off financially than they were, or not?

And what about your children? Do you think they will be better off than you are financially or not when they reach your age?



	Nov. 1979	March 1981
Better off than parents were at your age	81%	64%
Will not be better off	16	35
No opinion/inapplicable	3	1

	Nov. 1979	March 1981
Children will be better off than you are when they reach your age	66%	44%
Will not be better off	18	43
No opinion/inapplicable	16	10

Note: 1979 wording differed slightly. Sample in 1979 = 2,505, in 1981, 1,305.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, March 25-29, 1981.

MOMENTS OF PARTISAN CHANGE

Much attention has been given recently to polls showing an increase in the number of individuals identifying themselves as Republicans. Will this trend continue, or does it represent the first flush of enthusiasm and identification with the new Republican Administration?

The question has been asked before. In the charts shown on pages 30 and 31, we show other periods when speculation about major changes in partisan identification existed: the years following the introduction of Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, the early Eisenhower years when Republicans held the Presidency and both houses of Congress, the tumultuous LBJ years and finally, the beginning of the Reagan moment.

The polls show some movement in the Republican direction and away from the Democrats. But, when viewed against the Gallup timeline, they suggest that it may be too early to tell whether any long term shift in party identification is taking place.

K.H.K.

Roper	Dem.	G.O.P.	Ind.
Jan. 1980	52%	20%	28%
Feb.	50	22	28
March-April	46	23	31
April-May	49	24	27
June	50	23	27
July	47	24	28
Aug.	49	25	26
Sept.-Oct.	48	25	26
Nov.	46	25	30
Dec.	44	25	31
Jan. 1981	45	25	30

D/M/I	Dem.	G.O.P.	Ind.
June 1980	52%	30%	19%
Jan.-March 1981	42	38	21
Late March	40	35	25

California Poll	Dem.	G.O.P.	Ind.
July 1980	43%	36%	21%
Sept.	44	33	23
Oct.	46	35	19
Jan. 1981	41	35	24

Connecticut Poll	Dem.	G.O.P.	Ind.
June 1980	34%	22%	44%
July	30	22	48
Sept.	29	19	52
Oct.	35	19	45
Nov.	35	18	47
Jan. 1981	29	23	48
March	35	23	41

CBS/*New York Times*	Dem.	G.O.P.	Ind.
Jan. 1980	41%	24%	35%
Feb.	44	25	31
March	41	26	33
April	43	24	33
June	44	23	33
Aug.	43	24	33
Sept.	46	23	31
Nov.	46	24	30
Jan. 1981	39	27	34

Time/Yankelovich	Dem.	G.O.P.	Ind.
Jan. 1980	49%	26%	25%
March 19-20	51	30	20
March 29-30	49	28	23
May	53	26	21
August	53	27	20
Oct.	52	28	20
Jan. 1981	51	31	18

GALLUP	Dem.	G.O.P.	Ind.
Jan. 4-7, 1980	48%	19%	33%
Jan. 25-28, 1980	46	20	34
Feb. 1-4, 1980	47	21	32
Feb. 29-Mar. 3, 1980	47	25	28
Mar. 7-10, 1980	45	21	34
Mar. 28-31, 1980	45	22	32
Apr. 11-14, 1980	45	25	30
May 2-5, 1980	46	22	31
May 16-19, 1980	48	22	30
May 30-June 2, 1980	47	22	31
June 13-16, 1980	49	24	27
June 27-30, 1980	46	25	29
July 11-14, 1980	47	25	29
Aug. 1-4, 1980	48	23	29
Aug. 15-18, 1980	51	24	25
Sept. 12-15, 1980	47	33	20
Oct. 10-13, 1980	45	26	29
Nov. 7-10, 1980	42	26	32
Nov. 21-24, 1980	43	25	32
Dec. 5-8, 1980	42	27	31
Jan. 9-12, 1981	42	27	32
Jan. 30-Feb. 21, 1981	43	25	33

A REPUBLICAN REVIVA

ROPER

Question: Regardless of how you may have voted in the past, what do you usually consider yourself—A Democrat, a Republican, some other party, or what?



Note: For comparison purposes "other specific party" calculated out. Independent includes "independent" (vol.) and "No particular party" (vol.).

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization, latest that of Roper Report 80-2, January 20-24, 1981.

TIME/YANKELOVICH

Question: Are you a Democrat, Republican or what?



Note: "Other" calculated out for comparison purposes.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of January 1981.

CBS/*NEW YORK TIMES*

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually consider yourself a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: Independent includes "other."

Source: Surveys by CBS News/*New York Times*, latest that of Jan. 26-29, 1981.

Question: In politics as of today, do you consider you







Note: *Slight variation in question wording. In earlier years asked "Do you consider yourself: (A Republican, Democrat, Socialist, or Independent/Democrat, Republican, Progressiv
For comparison purposes "Other," "Socialist," and "Progressive" calculated out.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January 30-February 2, 1981.

? TOO EARLY TO TELL

CONNECTICUT POLL

Question: Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Democrat, a Republican or an Independent or what?



Note: "Other" calculated out for comparison purposes.

Source: Survey by the Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, latest that of March 4-8, 1981.

CALIFORNIA POLL

Question: Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Democrat, Republican, Independent or what?



Note: "Other" calculated out for comparison purposes.

Source: Surveys by the Field Institute, latest that of January 16-23, 1981.

DECISION/MAKING/INFORMATION

Question: In politics today, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?



Note: The January/March 1981 figure represents the aggregate data of four surveys conducted during the months of January-March 1981. The sample size for the June 1980 survey was 1,500, and 5,465 for the January-March 1981 survey.

Source: Surveys by Decision/Making/Information, latest that of March 1981.

elf a Republican, a Democrat, or an Independent?"







or Independent)?"

The State of Race Relations - 1981

When discussing a social problem where there is a sense that great progress has been made and yet, at the same time, where great difficulties remain, a commentator runs the risk of misplaced emphasis. If he stresses the former dimensions, he sounds like Pollyanna; if the latter, like some combination of Cassandra and Malthus. Race relations in the United States in the early 1980s, and specifically the way black and white Americans view recent developments in their interrelations, present precisely this challenge to the analyst. For the survey data, some of which are presented in the pages that follow, show emphatically that whites and blacks alike believe great progress has been made, and that the present climate is indeed one of greater tolerance than in the past. They also show that tensions remain.

Whites and blacks alike, by large majorities, now believe that the position of black Americans is better than a decade ago. Very few in either community think race relations in the area where they live have been deteriorating; many, especially among blacks, see the climate improving. Few blacks or whites (only 4 and 5 percent, respectively) think there is now "a dangerously high level of racial tension and hostility . . ." in their area. Related to this, the white public shows itself far more inclined to accept full citizenship for blacks than, say, two decades ago—measured by such diverse variables as a professed willingness to vote for people qualified for high office without regard to race, and acceptance of the principles of school and residential integration.

Yet if the proportion of whites holding negative images of blacks has declined sharply over the past fifteen to twenty years, it is still disturbingly high. And whites are now inclined to think tnat the black populace no longer confronts general discrimination, for example, in jobs and housing, while many blacks themselves see discrimination persisting.

The common view that the two racial communities hold to widely differing assessments of policy issues and program needs is both right and wrong. There are policy areas where blacks and whites differ sharply—especially and not surprisingly, those like busing and affirmative action. But on all manner of important social and political issues in the contemporary United States—from many questions of governmental economic policy to the reintroduction of the military draft, from environmental and energy policy to abortion—the lines of cleavage do not have significant racial dimensions.

Black and white Americans clearly have differing needs and interests, just as they entertain some negative views of one another. But our review of recent data, while recognizing that tensions remain, gives ample reason for rejecting the vision of the Kerner Commission thirteen years ago, of an America "moving toward two societies, one black, one white."

Everett Carll Ladd

A DECADE OF PROGRESS IN THE NATION . . .

Question: Compared to ten years ago, do you think blacks in America are a lot better off, a little better off, about the same, a little worse off, or a lot worse off?



Note: In a survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post* (February 26-March 6, 1981), 1% of whites and 3% of blacks said that race relations/civil rights/problems of blacks was the most important problem facing the country today.

Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, May 28-30, 1980.

AND AT HOME

Question: Would you say that relations between whites and blacks in this area are better than they were a couple of years ago, worse than a couple of years ago, or just about the same as a couple of years ago?



Note: In a survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post* (February 26-March 6, 1981), 38% of whites and 43% of blacks thought that "the chances of a violent protest by blacks in the United States today" were greater than four or five years ago. When asked about the chances of violence "in your own area close-by," only 10% of whites and 19% of blacks thought the chances were greater.

In response to a July 1980 Roper question, only 5% of whites and 4% of blacks thought that "there was a high level of tension and hostility between whites and blacks in this area."

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-7), July 7-13, 1980.

Tolerance Has Increased

SCHOOL INTEGRATION MEETS WITH APPROVAL

Question: Do you think white students and Negro students should go to the same schools or to separate schools?



Note: Question not asked for blacks by NORC until 1972.

Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, 1956-1970; National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972, 1976, 1977, 1980.

CLASSROOM MAKEUP

Question: (Asked of white parents) Would you, yourself, have any objection to sending your children to a school where a few of the children are colored? Where half of the children are colored? Where more than half of the children are colored? 1958, 1965 (In 1980, the word "black" was substituted for "colored.")



Note: Respondents who had no objection to sending their children to a school where a few children are black were asked if they had any objection to sending their children to a school where half of the children are black. Respondents who had no objection to sending their children to a school where half of the children were black were asked if they had any objection to sending their children to a school where more than half of the children are black.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of December 5-8, 1980.

8 OUT OF 10 WOULD VOTE FOR BLACK PRESIDENT



Question: There's always much discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates—their education, age, race, religion, and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a Negro would you vote for him? (1958-1971). Between now and the time of the convention in 1980 there will be more discussion about the qualifications of presidential candidates—their education, age, religion, race and the like. If your party nominated a generally well-qualified man for president and he happened to be a black would you vote for him? (1978)

Note: For data, see *Public Opinion*, December/January 1980, page 39.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 21-24, 1978.

BLACKS IN THE NEIGHBORHOOD

Question: Would it upset you personally a lot, some but not a lot, only a little, or not at all if blacks moved into this neighborhood?

Note: For comparison purposes the response "already in neighborhood (vol.)" which appeared only in 1978 was calculated out.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, conducted for *Newsweek*, 1963 and 1966; Louis Harris and Associates, conducted for the National Conference of Christians and Jews, October 6-November 8, 1978.



Progress, But...

STEREOTYPES REMAIN

Question: Now let me ask you some questions about blacks as people, leaving aside the whole question of civil rights and laws. I'd like to know how you feel as an individual. Here are some statements people sometimes make about black people. For each statement, please tell me whether you personally tend to agree or disagree with that statement. . . .



Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, conducted for *Newsweek*, 1963; Louis Harris and Associates, conducted for the National Conference of Christians and Jews, October 6-November 8, 1978.

STILL A WAY TO GO

Question: In your area, would you say blacks are generally discriminated against or not in: (Read statements)



Note: The sample size is 1,872 with a black oversample of 446. "Don't know/no opinion" calculated out for comparison purposes. The highest "don't know/no opinion" response = 13%.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981

What Response? The Races Split

VIOLENCE AND DEMONSTRATIONS

Question: I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to *agree* or *disagree* with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement?



Note: The sample size is 1,872 with a black oversample of 446.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981.

TENSION AND CONSPIRACY

Question: I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement.

Percent agree



Question: Have you heard or read anything recently about incidents in several places around the country in which black people were victims of apparently related acts of violence?

If yes, asked: Do you think these acts of violence against blacks were committed by isolated criminals acting on their own or as part of a conspiracy by some group to attack blacks?



Note: 63% of whites and 70% of blacks had heard of violence. "Don't know" calculated out for comparison purposes.

Note: The sample size is 1,872 with a black oversample of 446.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981.

The Reality of Discrimination

EDUCATION MAKES A DIFFERENCE

Question: Have *you personally* ever experienced racial discrimination against blacks in terms of applying for a job, or not?



Note: The sample is 1,146 blacks. In response to another question by this same survey organization, 35% of blacks responded to the question "As a black person, in which ways, if any, do you personally experience discrimination" that they had not experienced discrimination personally. The next largest category was 30% who had experienced discrimination in jobs/employment.

Source: Survey by Dresner, Morris and Tortorello Research conducted for Data Black Public Opinion Polls, November 23, 1979-January 2, 1980.

NOTE ON OPINION ROUNDUP

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

The reader may note that in some cases a "no opinion" column is shown while in others it is not. This reflects a common practice in the publication of polls: when the "no opinion" or "undecided" responses are relatively small, on the order of 10 percent or less, one reports only the answers of those who have a definite opinion. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they *are* reported because they reveal a substantial degree of unawareness or uncertainty within the populace on the issues in question.

Differences in racial attitudes by educational background and age are often sharp within both the black and white communities. Consider questions involving the motivation and abilities of blacks. Indeed, as the data below indicate, there is much more agreement between young, college-trained blacks and whites on such issues than there is within either racial group between the younger cohorts who have had college training and the older ones with only high school or grade school educations. Younger, better educated whites are much less inclined to profess negative impressions of blacks than are older whites without college training; this same relationship can be seen within the black population.

E.C.L.

Blacks and Whites by Education and Age

Question: I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement. . . .



Note: The sample size is 1,872 with a black oversample of 446.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981.

Question: Most people agree that, on the average, blacks have worse jobs, income and housing than whites. Do you think the differences are: (Read list)



Note: The sample size is 1,872 with a black oversample of 446.



Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981.

Where the Races Differ

BUSING

Question: Do you favor or oppose busing children to achieve a better racial balance in the schools? (1980)



Note: In 1970, in response to a Gallup question about busing of "Negro and white school children" from one school district to another, 44% of blacks were in favor, 12% of whites.

Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, December 5-8, 1980.

SELLING YOUR HOME

Question: Suppose there is a community-wide vote on the general housing issue. There are two possible laws to vote on. One law says that a homeowner can decide for himself who to sell his house to even if he prefers not to sell to blacks. The second law says that a homeowner cannot refuse to sell to someone because of their race or color. Which law would you vote for?



Note: The sample size is 1,872 with a black oversample of 446.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981.

AFFIRMATIVE ACTION

Question: I am going to read you a few statements and for each I'd like you to tell me whether you tend to agree or disagree with it, or if perhaps you have no opinion about the statement. . . . Because of past discrimination, blacks who need it should get some help from the government that white people in similar economic circumstances don't get.



Note: The sample size is 1,872 with a black oversample of 446.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*The Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981.

Where Similarities are Striking

ENERGY OVER ENVIRONMENT

Question: There is continuing talk about an energy crisis and the idea that there won't be enough electricity and other forms of energy to meet consumer demand in the coming years. Some people say that the progress of this nation depends on an adequate supply of energy and we have to have it even though it means taking some risks with the environment. Others say the important thing is the environment, and that it is better to risk not having enough energy than to risk spoiling our environment. Are you more on the side of adequate energy or more on the side of protecting the environment?



Note: "Don't know" calculated out for comparison purposes. Highest "don't know" response = 15%.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-9), September 27-October 4, 1980.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT BALANCING BUDGET

Question: Now here are some amendments to the Constitution that are currently being talked about. (Card shown respondent) Would you read down that list, and for each one tell me whether you would favor or oppose such an amendment? . . . an amendment to require a balanced national budget—to prevent the government from spending more money than it takes in, except in certain specified cases of crisis or emergency.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-8), August 16-23, 1980.

IN STEP ON THE DRAFT

Question: Do you think we should return to the military draft at this time, or not?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, February 1-4, 1980.

THE VOUCHER SYSTEM

Question: In some nations, the government allots a certain amount of money for each child for his education. The parents can then send the child to any public, parochial or private school. This is called the "voucher system." Would you like to see this idea adopted in this country?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 21-24, 1980.

COURTS AND CRIMINALS

Question: In general, do you think the courts in this area deal too harshly or not harshly enough with certain criminals?



Note: Data combined for 1972-78, 1980.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-78, 1980.

MARIJUANA

Question: Do you think the use of marijuana should be made legal or not?



Note: Data combined for 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1980.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1973, 1975, 1976, 1978, and 1980.

ABORTION

Question: Please tell me whether or not you think it should be possible for a pregnant woman to obtain a legal abortion if . . . she is married and does not want any more children?



Note: Data combined for 1972-78, 1980.
Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1972-78, 1980.

centrate on writing a lively story.

Here is how this model for reporting sports news could be applied to reporting poll results: Essential factual documentation, the actual questions asked (a not unimportant point), and the percent distribution of answers, would be presented in a compact tabular form. As in the *Post*'s sports statistics page, expensive and space-consuming graphics would not be needed. Clarity and conciseness would be the primary concerns. This would give serious poll watchers—be they politicians, academics, or political activists—the information they want within a small space. Any accompanying story would focus on the interesting and important job of discussing what it all means.

In effect, the writer would become a "poll columnist," directly analogous to the sports columnist. While some political columnists and by-liners do on occasion devote an entire column to interpreting a single poll, the pressure of competing topics prevents them from doing this regularly or systematically. Readers are often left with, at best, a vague impression of what "the polls are showing." Also, few political columnists have the technical expertise necessary for the kind of in-depth analysis that the better pollsters provide in confidential reports to their political clients. Background analyses by poll columnists comparable to those confidential reports would make far more interesting reading than what is now served to the public.

Another value of the proposed format is that it would counteract the all-too-common practice of treating polls as unqualified expressions of the will of the people. Public opinion is far too complex and dynamic to be fully encompassed in mere percentages. Constrained by the precept that they must report "the facts," journalists have unwittingly abetted the use of polls as plebiscites. By stressing percentages to the virtual exclusion of interpretive analysis, they give the raw numbers an apparent significance out of all proportion to their real meaning. The proposed format, in contrast, would relegate the numbers to their correct role, that is, back-up data for thoughtful analysis.

If poll reporting is to become more interesting and responsible without sacrificing the journalist's commitment to documentation, separating statistical reporting from interpretive analysis as proposed here is essential.

To The Editors

Dear Sirs:

"Tuning In and Turning Out," *PO*, February-March 1981 concluded that voting after 6:00 PM in the Pacific time zone in the 1972 presidential election was depressed by televised projections of a winner before the polls closed on the West Coast. This analysis rests on some questionable assumptions, and a reanalysis shows that in fact these data support the opposite conclusion.

(1) The use of a single year (1974) as a benchmark makes differences between 1972 and 1974 uninterpretable; would a difference reflect something about 1972 or about 1974? The choice of 1974 is especially inopportune because it is not even a presidential election year. There may have been regional contests of varying interest in 1974, and the overall rate of turnout is so much lower in 1974 that it is not an appropriate baseline for generalizing what the distribution of voting before and after 6:00 PM should be.

(2) There is no evidence in this study regarding the exposure of registered voters who did not vote in the 1972 election to the election calls on the networks prior to the poll closings, nor that these voters were any less likely to vote as a result of such exposure if it did occur. These are simply assumptions which are not measured in this study.

(3) The authors project expected total voter turnout from turnout prior to 6:00 PM as though turnout after 6:00 PM is independent of turnout before 6:00. Yet, if there is a high turnout before 6:00, there are fewer voters left to vote after 6:00.

(4) A more appropriate base for analysis of voter turnout after 6:00 PM is the registered voters who had not voted before 6:00 PM. Using this base, it is clear that the turnout among those who had not already voted was *highest* after 6:00 PM in the Pacific time zone in 1972.

RATE OF VOTING AMONG REGISTERED VOTERS WHO HAD NOT VOTED BY 6:00 PM

	Pacific		**Other States**	
	1972	**1974**	**1972**	**1974**
Total turnout	70.6%	51.5%	64.8%	46.3%
Voting before 6	60.3	41.6	57.2	40.1
Not voting by 6	39.7	58.4	42.8	59.9
Voting after 6	10.3	9.9	7.6	6.2
Rate after 6	26.0	16.9	17.7	10.3

This table should be read as follows: 70.6% of Pacific voters voted in the 1972 election. Table 1 in the article gives the figure of 14.6% of them voting after 6:00, which is 10.3% of the registered voters (14.6% of 70.6%). Therefore, 60.3% of the registered voters had voted by 6:00 PM (70.6% − 10.3%). Only 39.7% of the registered voters were left to vote after 6:00 PM (100% − 60.3%). And 26.0% of these remaining voters did vote after 6:00 PM (10.3% divided by 39.7%).

Very truly yours,
BARRY COOK, Ph.D.
Director
News and Methods Research
NBC

An Editors' Report on the Yankelovich, Skelly and White "Mushiness Index"

In the interest of clarity, the firm of Yankelovich, Skelly and White has introduced a "Mushiness Index." The Index is designed to help determine the firmness of opinion on foreign and domestic issues. "Many public policy issues, especially in the foreign policy field, are not 'thought through' by the public," explained Daniel Yankelovich, the firm's chairman. "Answers to survey questions on such issues are often top-of-the-head and subject to change." "Mushiness" describes the volatility and changeability of the public's views.

The creators of the Index are careful to distinguish volatility of opinion from intensity of opinion. They point out that a person can feel very strongly about something and still be likely to change his mind. Conversely, one whose opinions are quite definite on an issue might not feel particularly intense about it.

The Index is the product of an extensive review of previous work on opinion stability, two years of pilot tests, and $150,000 of Yankelovich expense.

Earlier attempts to determine the solidity of opinion were both costly and time consuming. On a given issue, survey researchers used a battery of custom-made questions to probe the public's views. Yankelovich's new approach can be used uniformly, thereby reducing cost and complexity. The technique, which involves a favor/oppose question followed by four six-point scale questions, applies to all types of interviews (in-person, telephone, and self-administered). Because the follow-up questions are the same for all issues, comparisons among issues can be made easily.

Further work will be necessary before the Index can be applied to election polling. However, its sponsors believe that much of the confusion in Election '80 could have been eliminated through a device to assess the public's firmness about the candidates.

How the Mushiness Index Works

The Index is compiled this way. A respondent is asked whether he favors or opposes a particular issue. He is then asked the following four six-point scale questions about the issue:

- On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 means that the issue affects you personally *very little* and 6 means that you really feel *deeply involved* in this issue, where would you place yourself?
- On some issues people feel that they really have all the information that they need in order to form a strong opinion on that issue, while on other issues they would like to get additional information before solidifying their opinion. On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 means that you feel you definitely need more information on the issue and 6 means that you do not feel you need to have any more information on the issue, where would you place yourself?
- On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 means that you and your friends and family *rarely, if ever,* discuss the issue and 6 means that you and your friends and family discuss it relatively *often,* where would you place yourself?
- People have told us that on some issues they come to a conclusion and they stick with that position, no matter what. On other issues, however, they may take a position but they know that they could change their minds pretty easily. On a scale of 1 to 6, where 1 means that you could change your mind *very easily* on this issue, and 6 means that you are likely to *stick with your position* no matter what, where would you place yourself?

The respondent's scores to these four questions are added, with the lowest possible score being four and the highest twenty-four. Within that range, the scores can fall into any of the following three categories.

	Score
Very volatile/mushy	*4-10*
Moderately volatile/ mushy	*11-18*
Firm	*19-24*

Yankelovich also developed a procedure for classifying the mushiness of the issues themselves.

- For an issue to be very mushy, fewer than 50 percent of respondents are firm and 20 percent or more are very mushy.
- For an issue to be moderately mushy, fewer than 50 percent are firm, but fewer than 20 percent are very mushy.
- For an issue to be firm, 50 percent or more of the respondents are classified as firm.

Domestic vs. Foreign Policy Findings

In December 1980 Yankelovich initiated its first nationwide test of the new index. They interviewed a national sample of 1,000 individuals on eleven foreign policy issues and four domestic policy issues. As expected, Yankelovich found that opinion on domestic issues was less mushy than opinion on foreign policy issues. Americans generally have firmer views about issues which affect them directly. Of the eleven foreign policy issues presented, all but one were found to be mushy. This particular question had a strong domestic flavor and dealt with restricting immigration from countries such as Cuba, Haiti and Vietnam.

How the Index Works in Practice

One of the issues generating a great deal of interest recently has been the protection of the American automobile industry from Japanese imports. Most of the public opinion polls show a strong protectionist sentiment in this country. But the Yankelovich researchers, using the newly developed Index, found that protectionism is a Very Mushy question in the public mind. Yankelovich posed the question in the following way: "Do you favor or oppose restricting imports of foreign goods such as Japanese cars, textiles and steel, which are less expensive than American products?" Fifty-four percent of Americans said they favored restricting imports; 41 percent opposed. But a more thorough examination of the public's view on the issue produced the results shown above. Thus, on the question of auto imports, opinion is volatile and highly susceptible to change.

—KHK and VS

ISSUE: RESTRICTING IMPORTS OF FOREIGN GOODS, SUCH AS JAPANESE CARS, TEXTILES AND STEEL, WHICH ARE LESS EXPENSIVE THAN AMERICAN PRODUCTS

	Total	Mushy	Moderately Mushy	Firm
I. Public Opinion Information				
Favor	54%	39%	51%	62%
Oppose	41	37	45	37
Not sure	5	24	4	1

	Total[1]	Favor	Oppose
II. Mushiness Information			
Mushy	10%	7%	9%
Moderately mushy	45	42	50
Firm	45	51	41

[1] The "not sures" are included in the total.

DEGREE OF MUSHINESS OF PUBLIC POLICY ISSUES

	Degree of Mushiness		
	Very Mushy	Mushy	Firm
The Firm Public Policy Issues (50% or more of sample are firm)			
Making all abortions illegal except where the life of the woman is in danger	6%	31%	63%
Using the death penalty for certain crimes such as murder and kidnapping	8	33	59
Conducting sex education classes in high school which include information on birth control	8	37	55
Building nuclear plants in your area	10	36	54
Letting fewer immigrants into the United States from other countries such as Cuba, Haiti and Vietnam	9	37	54
The Very Mushy Public Policy Issues (20% or more of sample are very mushy and fewer than 50% are firm)			
Establishing diplomatic relations with Cuba	25	53	22
Cutting back United States military aid to Israel if Israel continues to oppose a separate Palestinian state	25	49	26
Selling arms to communist China	23	51	26
Giving military support to anticommunist allies, such as South Korea, even if they violate human rights	20	45	35
The Mushy Public Policy Issues (Fewer than 50% of the sample are firm and fewer than 20% are very mushy)			
Continuing our grain embargo against the Soviet Union, even if it hurts American farmers	15	53	32
Refusing to sign an arms limitation treaty with the Soviet Union unless they get out of Afghanistan	16	47	37
Using military force, if necessary, to insure that we get enough oil for our needs from the Middle East	13	47	40
Reestablishing normal relations with Iran, once the hostages are released	9	46	45
Increasing our defense spending enough to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union, even if it means more inflation and neglect of other problems	10	46	44
Restricting imports of foreign goods, such as Japanese cars, textiles and steel, which are less expensive than American products	10	45	45

NOTE

ONLY THE FOLLOWING PAGES OF THIS

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Our new index tells us how we're doing—

The Gross National Spirit

Walter Berns
Everett Ladd
The Editors

also:
Levine, Martin, Taylor, Clymer,
Frankovic, Mann, Ornstein
and Crewe



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CONTENTS

THE AMERICAN SPIRIT

2 THE STATE OF THE NATION'S MORALE
by Walter Berns
What are the ingredients that make leadership worth following? Walter Berns, a distinguished AEI scholar, says that our greatest leaders demanded sacrifice, a virtue noticeably absent in political life today. Will President Reagan rise to the challenge?

7 205 AND GOING STRONG
by Everett Carll Ladd
How strong are the historical props underlying our idea of nation? Everett Ladd looks at our roots and what nourishes them, concluding that they are strong and deep.

13 SPIRITS IN AMERICA: THE BIRTH OF DEMON RUM
by Harry Gene Levine
Do America's good spirits come out of a bottle? The author distills the evidence of a major revolution in public opinion which transformed alcohol from a "good creature of God" to "Demon Rum." Levine gives a brief history of America's largest, longest-running special interest group—the temperance lobby.

16 SCIENCE AND THE SUCCESSFUL SOCIETY
by L. John Martin
While Americans are proudest of their freedoms and opportunities, they give credit for our success to our science and technology. In the first public release of a major study of attitudes toward science, John Martin examines our opinions, how they have changed, and what's in store as science probes the unknown.

20 PRIVATE OPINION/REFLECTIONS OF AN EXPATRIATE
by Humphrey Taylor
A British pollster who now plies his trade in the States evaluates the industry on both sides of the Atlantic. There is praise and blame, it seems, deserved by motherland and offspring alike.

21 OPINION ROUNDUP

42 THE REALITIES OF REALIGNMENT
by Adam Clymer and Kathleen Frankovic
The numbers are moving in the Republican direction, but it may just be beginner's luck. Will the Republicans hit the jackpot in 1982? The authors examine the odds for a Republican realignment.

48 THE 1982 ELECTION: WHAT WILL IT MEAN?
by Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein
November 1982 is months away, but the Democrats, still smarting from their marks on last fall's exams, are beginning to study for their midterms. Will they make the grade, or will the Republicans go to the head of the class? The authors suggest history provides some lessons worth studying.

51 BRITAIN'S NEW PARTY: CAN IT MAKE IT?
by Ivor Crewe
A new party is testing the political waters in Britain. Ivor Crewe, a respected British political scientist, describes its origins and speculates on its future. The evidence suggesting a realignment rests on many of the same clues in the United States.

58 SNAPSHOTS
by Karlyn Keene

by L. John Martin

Science and the Successful Society

Traveling in the United States at the turn of the century an emissary of Pope Leo XVIII wrote: "This is the country of invention. Gigantic innovations have gradually changed the conditions of everyday life, made realities of hopes that once seemed only suited to fairy tales. But more important, everyone is in some degree an inventor." Visitors from all over the world are struck by the mechanization and the automation that characterize the American way of life. Americans are proud of their successes in harnessing the forces of nature. "America is a civilization founded on science and rooted in its achievements," wrote Max Lerner in his *America as a Civilization*. "Without science the whole ribbed frame of American technology, and with it American power, would have been impossible."

There is much evidence that the American public attributes U.S. influence in the world to its technological know-how. A plurality of 46 percent of adults picked it as one of the top two factors and another 22 percent listed scientific creativity as contributing most to American prestige abroad. With unusual consistency, these two factors were listed last (by fewer than 10 percent each) as being *least* responsible for U.S. influence abroad.* Louis Harris, too, has found in a series of surveys since 1973 that scientific research and industrial know-how rate among the top factors contributing to American greatness in the minds of the American people.

The survey data in this article (publicly released here for the first time) are based on a study designed by the National Opinion Research Center for the National Science Foundation. Interviewing was conducted by the Institute for Survey Research at Temple University between October and December 1979, with a national probability sample of 1,635 adults, 18 years old and over in the 48 contiguous states. The three previous NSF surveys were conducted by the Opinion Research Corporation in Princeton in 1972, 1974, and 1976, and are used here to establish trends. Other surveys, both in the United States and abroad, are cited for purposes of comparison.

This is not to say that science and technology first leap to mind when people are asked what makes them proudest about being Americans. They distinguish between what they see as the reasons for U.S. influence and the source of their personal pride in being Americans. Our freedom and opportunities—especially the former (see page 30 of Opinion Roundup), our economic prosperity, and our system of government are more likely to be mentioned without any prompting. *But credit for our global prestige and influence is given first to our technological know-how.* By contrast, more than half of the French public, in a similar study conducted in 1973 by the National Foundation for Political Science, attributed French international prestige to its language and culture. "Scientific achievements" was mentioned fifth, after France's standard of living, its economic development, and its tradition and history.

This explains why Americans put such stock in remaining ahead of other countries in science and technology, and why, regardless of education or occupation, three out of four Americans think it is "very important" that the United States be a leader in scientific growth and development. This is what Roper found in a March 1979 survey. One leads from a position of strength.

Nor is it surprising that better than six in ten Americans told Cambridge Reports interviewers in a 1978 Union Carbide study that the United States should spend at least as much on research and development as do such other countries as Japan and Germany, if not

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***Unless otherwise indicated, all figures are from the National Science Foundation studies.**

more. In the arena of world competition, having chosen its weapon, the American public believes in maintaining its advantage. A particularly disturbing development for most Americans, then, is that we have not been "maintaining our advantage." In a May 1981 survey Louis Harris and Associates found that by 59-27 percent, a majority of Americans do not think U.S. technology is better than Japan's. A narrow 46-45 percent plurality is not convinced that American technology is better than West Germany's. By 49-45 percent, a plurality is not convinced that our technology is superior to the Soviet Union's.

Despite these concerns, our confidence in our scientists and engineers remains strong. Next to physicians, scientists received the highest degree of confidence from a cross-section of the public in a 1980 National Opinion Research Center study. Confidence rises with education and income and appears to drop somewhat with age. In the latest National Science Foundation study, scientists and engineers were consistently considered to be the most qualified to deal with a variety of problems, such as the location of a nuclear power plant, whether or not to use food additives, and whether to send radio messages into deep space to try to communicate with other civilizations. Federal agencies were next most frequently picked as arbiters in specific problems of this type, except on the question of where to locate nuclear power plants. With the Three Mile Island incident still fresh in the public mind at the time of interviewing, a larger proportion felt that citizens should be involved in such decisions than was willing to entrust them to a federal regulatory agency. Much smaller proportions believed that the president, Congress, state governors, local governments, the courts, or the relevant businesses were qualified to decide for the public on these important questions.

Even when the public is practically invited to express its distrust of scientists, as in a 1979 NBC News/Associated Press poll which asked whether people agreed with the statement: "You can't trust what the experts like scientists and technical people say because often what they say isn't right"—48 percent of the public disagreed, as against 42 percent who agreed. This may be considered a strong vote of confidence in scientists, since studies have shown a general tendency in surveys toward assent rather than dissent.

Benefits of Science

Whether it is this faith in scientists that has led to belief in the benefits of science and technology, or man's sempiternal optimism that things always get better, Americans believe strongly in the benefits of science and technology. In fact, only 8 percent of the public disagrees (and no one disagrees strongly) with the statement that "Technological know-how is largely responsible for our standard of living in the United States." The rest of the public agrees or strongly agrees. Six out of ten Americans disagree that scientific research is "more likely to cause problems than to find solutions to our problems," and seven in ten believe the benefits of scientific research outweigh the harms. A 1979 Opinion Research Corporation study also found seven in ten Americans agreeing that science and technology "produce more good than harm"—up from 54 percent who felt that way in 1972.

This consistently upbeat view of science and technology also showed up in a 1972 Harris survey in which large majorities (80 to 90 percent of the public) agreed with such statements as "America could never have achieved its high standard of living without scientific progress," and "Modern life is much better off due to the wonders that scientific progress has brought," or "Without a strong scientific effort, the U.S. would become a second-rate power." And Roper determined in December 1978 that the proportion of those who appreciate the benefits of technology increases with income and education.

Most people believe that "Scientific discoveries are making our lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable,"; that, in fact, such discoveries are responsible for our high standard of living. Among the specific gains cited by people when Harris asked them to name the two or three biggest benefits in a 1972 study were medical research (34 percent); major appliances, such as refrigerators, television, and air conditioning (22 percent); and utilities, including telephones and electricity (18 percent). Only 27 percent of the public believes that scientific and technological changes cause unemployment, according to the 1978 study by Cambridge Reports for Union Carbide; 52 percent believe that, on the contrary, it opens up more job opportunities.

Dr. Jekyll, Mr. Hyde

It would be misleading, however, to think that science and technology are seen as unadulterated blessings for man. Rene Dubos (in *Reason Awake: Science for Man*) believes that until recently, "all scientists and most laymen had taken for granted the assumption that science was inherently good and that the technologies derived from it constituted the major agents of desirable change and social progress." Some doubts about this are being expressed today. " 'Science'," writes Rae Goodell (in *The Visible Scientists*), "got the credit for producing a bomb to stop Hitler, then better bombs to keep abreast in the cold war, then satellites to catch up with the Russians. But ultimately science could not meet the public's, or its own, rising expectations. By the 1960s, problems were evident for which science had no answers. Instead of curing problems, technology was blamed for causing them."

Concern about the impact of science and technology, not only on our way of life but on our moral values is nothing new. Protests against the "dehumanizing machinery" that was threatening familiar patterns of life in the early nineteenth century were not infrequent. Some questioned whether it was wise to emphasize the conquest and exploitation of nature. Samuel Butler, in *Erewhon,* described an imaginary society that had destroyed all its machinery. Leo Tolstoy warned that science led man to focus on the wrong things, on matters "wholly foreign to man."

In the National Science Foundation study in 1979, about a third of the public believed that scientific research would continue to cause problems. Some 25 years ago, according to the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center, 43 percent of the public believed that science makes our way of life change too fast, and 23 percent thought that science tends to break down people's ideas of right and wrong. Now, almost 25 years later, an even larger proportion (53 percent) thinks that scientific discoveries make our lives change too fast, and more than a third of the public (37 percent) agrees that they tend to break down people's ideas of right and wrong. In other words, in changing our course, we might have lost our compass. (See Table 1)

Table 1
Benefits and Harms of Science

	Percent Agree	
	1957	1979
Science is making our lives healthier, easier, and more comfortable	94%	81%
All things considered, benefits outweigh the harmful effects of science	88	70
One trouble with science is that it makes our way of life change too fast	43	53
One of the bad effects of science is that it breaks down people's ideas of right and wrong	23	37

Source: Survey by the University of Michigan, Survey Research Center, 1957; NORC for the National Science Foundation, 1979.

In Western Europe, a nine-country survey conducted by the Commission of the European Communities in 1978, found that 87 percent of the public agreed with the statement that "Nowadays, some scientific discoveries are put into practice before a sufficient study has been made of the future consequences." In a similar vein, three in four Americans believed (according to a 1972 Harris poll) that scientific progress had gotten way beyond our progress in managing our human problems, and that it was time we concentrated on the human side. Almost the same proportion thought that we had become too dependent on gadgets and machines. According to the same study, by far the largest proportion (45 percent) considered the greatest problem created by science and technology to be pollution of the environment. In spite of the many improvements that people recognize they owe to science and technology, "The public mood," Dubos notes, is "changing, as evidence accumulates that technology is forging new shackles for man from which he seems unable to escape."

Yet amid the concerns expressed by the public, there continue to be signs of optimism and confidence in future scientific achievements. While "old myths, with science as panacea" are being replaced by "new myths, with science as powerful juggernaut," as Rae Goodell puts it, people are asking themselves why science can-



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'Eureka! I've created another new life form!'

not direct its efforts toward feeding man on earth, when sustained technological effort was able to put man on the moon.

The Human Side

The expectation, in 1979, was that scientists could certainly accomplish many of the public's goals. Close to half (46 percent) of the public was confident that within the next twenty-five years or so, a cure for common forms of cancer would be found. More than half of the public (57 percent) expected scientists to come up with more efficient sources of cheap energy within twenty-five years, and close to that number thought they would be able to predict when and where earthquakes would occur.

People are much less sanguine about advances in the social sciences. Arnold J. Toynbee (in *Science in Human Affairs: An Historian's View*, 1968) had warned that "the object of study that will be the least amenable to scientific treatment is the non-physical facet of human nature." And the general public tends to agree. A mere 14 percent believes that within the next twenty-five years new ways will be found to reduce the crime rate effectively. This view is held regardless of educational level, although skepticism appears to drop with age (from one-half of the eighteen-to-twenty-four-year-olds to one-third of those over 65).

In fact, two out of three adults believe that only certain things about human behavior are amenable to scientific study. Only about one in four (23 percent) believes that everything is, and this represents a substantial growth in skepticism since 1957, when Michigan's Survey Research Center found 63 percent of the adults believing that most things about human beings can be understood through scientific study.

Science As Entertainment

If human problems are not subject to the laws of science, as a growing number of people seem to feel, where do we turn for guidance? A fairly sizable number of people are turning (or are they turning back?) to astrology. They consult their horoscopes. Almost one in five (18 percent) say that they frequently change their plans because their astrological signs suggest it, and another 65 percent say they do so occasionally.

There is some evidence that when people do take an interest in science and technology, whether social, natural, or physical, it is to be entertained and dazzled rather than to be educated. Physicist Jeremy Bernstein ("Can TV Really Teach Science?" *The Dial*, June 1981) points out that in spite of the boom in the popularization of science, as evidenced by the proliferation of new scientific magazines such as *Omni*, *Science Digest*, and *Discover*, and television programs such as "Cosmos," "Connections," and "The Search for Solutions," we can be skeptical about their effect. "In trying to make science 'interesting'," he says, "these publications seem determined to transform it into a kind of entertainment." Public support for scientific investigation is quixotic, he says. It expects staggering and entertaining discoveries every step of the way.

Whatever the public's interest in science and technology, it considers itself insufficiently informed to help set goals for scientific research or to decide which technologies should be developed. Astronomer Carl Sagan's call for the widespread popularization and understanding of science, and his valiant efforts through his television program, "Cosmos" notwithstanding, it is unlikely that people will feel better informed. Philip Converse of the University of Michigan's Survey Research Center has shown that, although people are inclined and even anxious to give their opinions on public affairs topics when asked by a pollster, fewer than one in five has an informed opinion. The most recent National Science Foundation study similarly found that only 9 to 20 percent of the public feels very well informed about a dozen policy questions. (See Table 2)

Table 2
How Well Public Claims to Be Informed on Various Issues

	Very Informed	Moderately	Poorly
Foreign policy	9%	54%	37%
Agriculture	10	44	45
New scientific issues	10	52	37
New inventions	10	50	39
Economics and business	14	55	31
Space exploration	14	57	29
Women's rights	17	53	30
Minority rights	18	53	29
Energy policy	18	58	23
Food additives	18	63	19
Nuclear power plants	18	60	22
Local schools	20	48	32

Source: Survey by NORC for the National Science Foundation, 1979.

In the various science and technology areas, the degree of perceived ignorance is no different from other fields. Only about one in five members of the public believes he or she has a clear understanding of what it means to study something scientifically. Knowledgeability naturally increases with education. Men (28 percent) and women (16 percent) differ significantly in this regard.

Specific Issues

The 1979 National Science Foundation study examined three specific areas to determine how well informed the public believes it is about these topics, its attitudes, and its willingness to participate in public debate. The topics are the exploration of outer space, the use of food additives and colorings, and the location of nuclear power plants. These subjects were selected because of their wide media coverage and probable interest to the public. (See Table 3)

(Continued on page 55)

Martin

(Continued from page 19)

Table 3

Interest, Level of Information, and Participation

Very interested in	
Space exploration	15%
Food additives	32
Nuclear power plants	33
Well informed about	
Space exploration	9
Food additives	17
Nuclear power plants	17
Would definitely participate in controversies about	
Space exploration	7
Nuclear power plants	24

Note: Percentages based on those who have heard of controversies = 60% space exploration, 92% food additives, 91% nuclear power plants.

Source: Survey by NORC for the National Science Foundation, 1979.

Space Exploration. In spite of the global impact, the visibility and the drama of space exploration, only 15 percent of those who said they had heard about the controversies regarding the exploration of outer space expressed a great interest in this topic and only 9 percent said they were well informed about it. Only 7 percent said they were likely to participate actively in a discussion of how to resolve a space exploration problem. Almost seven in ten said the main reason they would stay out of the debate is that they had insufficient knowledge about it.

Interest in the other two topics—food additives and nuclear power plants—is twice as widespread as interest in space exploration. Fully one-third of the public claims to be interested, although only half as many people (17 percent) feel they are well informed about these subjects. More people say they would participate in controversies involving nuclear power plants (24 percent) than would bother with space controversies. And while the question of participation in matters relating to food additives was not asked in the National Science Foundation study, 46 percent of the public in a 1979-1980 Harris poll for the Marsh & McLennan Companies said they would rather decide for themselves whether or not to use a substance linked with cancer. Another 43 percent said they would like the federal government to ban some substances and to let the public decide on others—evidence of a clear desire to participate in decision making on a matter of such vital consequence to the public.

Nuclear Plants. The nuclear power plant issue is especially revealing in tracing public opinion on a highly emotional topic. Both in the United States and abroad, people generally favor the building of nuclear plants, except possibly in their immediate community. In the United States, Harris surveys showed the public willing to build such plants in the community until at least the late summer of 1977. Nuclear power did not begin to lose favor until March 1978. However, only in October and November 1979—more than six months after the Three Mile Island incident—was opposition to nuclear power plants greater than approval of them (47 percent against versus 42 percent for, at its point of greatest divergence).

In April 1979, following the Three Mile Island incident, 45 percent of people in France said they would be uneasy but would not move to a different location if it were announced that a nuclear power plant was to be built in their neighborhood; only 11 percent said they would move. A couple of months later, in Japan, half the population said they supported nuclear power as a future energy source as against 29 percent who opposed it. However, two-thirds of the public opposed the building of a plant in the vicinity of their homes, according to an *Asahi Shimbun* poll. At about the same time, the Allensbach Institute determined that six in ten Germans thought atomic energy could perform a great service for mankind if we learn to handle it reasonably.

Three Mile Island was not the first name to cast a shadow on the glamour of science and technology. "The age of innocent faith in science and technology may be over," wrote Barry Commoner in *Science and Survival* in 1966. He was referring to the night in November 1965, when all electric power in an 80,000 square mile area of the northeastern United States and Canada was knocked out because of a relay failure in Queenston, Ontario. The algorithm built into the U.S.-Canadian power grid had blacked out the huge area before the scientists who had designed it could figure out how to countermand their brainchild.

Limitations on Inquiry

But concern about possible sorcerer's apprentice-like chain reactions following from the spectacular feats of scientists had been expressed much earlier by scientists themselves. Thus, Leo Szilard, the Hungarian-born physicist who had first alerted President Roosevelt to the potentials of an atomic bomb, joined forces with Albert Einstein in 1945 to warn about the possible consequences of its use. Biologist Rachel Carson drew attention in 1962 to the dangerous effects of chemical pesticides upon the environment, and many prominent scientists have been involved in campaigns against nuclear energy and experiments involving recombinant DNA.

In past centuries, interference with scientific inquiry has generally come from established authority, when the conclusions reached conflicted with accepted views. More recently, scientists themselves often have served as the final arbiters of what may or may not be investigated. However, in the Spring 1978 issue of *Daedalus*, devoted to the "Limits of Scientific Inquiry," *Science* editor Barbara Culliton wrote: "The once widespread feeling that scientists alone should have domain over the scientific enterprise is being replaced by a philosophy that calls for public involvement in science, irrespective of the fact that many of the elders of science find the idea abhorrent." While the public generally considers itself uninformed about scientific matters, it has very definite views about what problems scientists should study, and which ones they should leave alone. On the whole, the majority of Americans do not want to limit scientific inquiry, and, in fact, would encourage by a two-to-one margin the study of such topics as weather control and modification, and, by a four-to-one margin, methods for the early detection of criminal tendencies in children. However, almost two-thirds of the public is opposed to studies "that might allow scientists to create new forms of life."

Opposition to genetic research also appeared in several European countries in a 1978 study by the Commission of the European Communities. In the nine Western European countries, about a third of the public believed experiments on hereditary transmissions were worthwhile and another third believed they involved unacceptable risks. But a country-by-country breakdown showed only Denmark and Germany to be significantly more opposed than in favor. Britain, France, and the Netherlands had slightly more opposition than favorable sentiment, while Belgium, Ireland, Italy, and Luxembourg were generally more in favor than opposed to genetic experiments. In an earlier (1972) French study conducted by the National Foundation for Political Science, almost nine in ten opposed building machines capable of thinking and acting like human beings or reading the minds of individuals; the public also was about evenly divided on developing techniques for transplanting human brains. In other words, sensitivity exists when science encroaches on moral or personal issues.

The type of scientific study that the smallest proportion of the public wants to restrict also happens to be the kind that the fewest people think will be successful in the next twenty-five years. Only 16 percent are willing to restrict studies to reduce the crime rate, and only 14 percent of the public believes that it is very likely that within the next twenty-five years effective new methods will be discovered.

This does not mean, however, that the public is unwilling to invest its tax dollars in trying to find ways to reduce crime. Of fourteen different science and technology areas that receive funding from the federal government, reducing crime is the fourth most frequently mentioned as deserving to be funded. Preceding it are "improving health care," "developing energy sources and conserving energy," and "improving education." This order of priority is noteworthy because it is an index of the relative importance to the public of various kinds of science and technology.

Throughout the 1970s, Americans consistently placed health-related problems ahead of all other areas for tax support. Similarly, in nine Western European countries, the 1977 study by the Commission of the European Communities found that medical research was placed first for funding among all areas listed by the pollsters. While European publics put developing food and agricultural resources next, followed by pollution control, developing energy sources, and the prevention and control of drug addiction, the American public had a different order of priorities (See Table 4).

Table 4

Rank of Area Most Desired for Government Funding

		Rank	Order
	1979	**1972**	**1979**
Improving health care	50%	1	1
Developing energy sources*	46		
Improving education	39	5	2
Reducing crime	36	3	3
Developing better food production methods*	23		
Reducing/controlling pollution	22	2	4
Developing national defense	16	11	5.5
Preventing drug addiction	16	4	5.5
Better public transportation	13	7	7
Improving auto safety	10	6	8
Better birth control methods	9	8	9
Discovering new basic knowledge about man	8	9	10
Exploring outer space	6	11	11
Predicting/controlling weather	4	11	12

Note: Not asked in 1972.
Source: Survey by NORC for the National Science Foundation.

In comparing priorities at the end of 1979 with those in 1972, 1974, and 1976, when comparable studies were done for the National Science Foundation, three areas are especially noteworthy. Improving education has inched its way up from fifth place in 1972 to second place in 1979 (it is in third place only because developing energy resources was not included in earlier years). At the same time, pollution control has been losing its importance to the public since 1972—a fact that appears to have been sensed by the Reagan administration. Another area that has risen in urgency for the public is national defense. Once again the Reagan campaign and administration correctly sensed the climate of opinion on this issue.

Conclusion

A report of the National Science Board entitled *Science at the Bicentennial* (1976) noted that during the nineteenth century "American scientists were successful in convincing many private and public patrons that science was useful in a very practical sense." By the turn of the century this country had a technological system "not exactly matched outside this country." Yet during the Bicentennial, another attitude was expressed: "It has become a popular game of the uninformed to state that we have all the science and technology we need and that many of our current problems stem from past technological advances." While the present National Science Foundation study does indicate pockets of concern, there is absolutely no basis for pessimism about public support for science and technology or for its scientists and engineers.

TAKING OUR MEASURE AT YEAR 205

The history and flavor of an era can sometimes best be understood by listening to the slogans and clichés that dominated the discourse of the time.

Consider, for example, some of the phrases we heard in America during our most recent epoch: "Crisis of confidence," "malaise," "sick society." Or consider the echo of those phrases we heard from abroad. It was said, "America has lost its way," a sad and harsh indictment, and one that—if true—would have massive policy implications.

But were these phrases and the attitudes they connoted indeed reflective of what Americans thought at that time? And how accurate are they for the America of 1981?

These are important questions for many reasons, particularly when viewed in the context of a new political moment in America. A new administration is now purposefully trying to rekindle American optimism. Indeed, much of President Reagan's proposed economic plan is based precisely on national psychology, rather than straight economics. One aspect of the supply-side idea suggests that a new attitudinal buoyancy can play a major role in pulling America out of the economic doldrums. Reaganomics presupposes a "can-do" attitude.

These are not new speculations for the staff of this publication. From the time the first memorandum was written proposing that AEI begin a magazine dealing with public opinion, the editors have been speculating about a strange circumstance. In this nation of statistical virtuosity we could measure GNP, M_1 and M_2, DJIA, CPI—you name it. But there was no good way to try to answer regularly, broadly, and historically the questions, "How are we doing?", "What do we think of ourselves?", "What do we think about America?"

We had a Gross National Product, but not a "gross national spirit" as if the latter didn't have an enormous effect on the former.

We have approached this matter in this issue in two ways.

I. The Gross National Spirit Index

With all this going through our minds, this spring we began talking to our colleagues at the Roper Center to see if some rough index could be created to provide a sense of where we've been and where we are.

As it turns out, it could.

Herewith we present the first public unveiling of the *Public Opinion* Gross National Spirit Index.

It is not a perfect product. We expect it will change over time. It is a first effort. The editors of this magazine and our colleagues at the Roper Center solicit guidance and suggestions from the survey research community to make this tool more precise, more comprehensive, and more regular as the years go on. Indeed, we have some model questions we'd like to see asked, a subject that the Roper Center researchers will be addressing in subsequent issues.

But, for now, what we have is what you see. We believe it is intelligently constructed, and that it tells a story worth knowing about.

The apparent story: Sisyphus-like, from the depths of deep recession and political scandal in 1974, the boulder was pushed up the mountain to the Bicentennial celebration and beyond. Then, decline. The Carter years, as President Carter pointed out, were indeed years of growing malaise. We leave unasked and unanswered the questions whether the president was not only an identifying agent but a causative agent of the decline. So far in 1981 we have seen a big bounce in an optimistic direction. It is coincident with President Reagan's election. Again, unasked and unanswered—for the moment—is the president's role in this.*

II. The Broader View

The index, of course, is limited by the relevant data for which there are lengthy time series. But those limits do not apply regarding the situation today. And so, much of the rest of this magazine is devoted to a broader examination of what Americans think of themselves and their nation—ideologically, institutionally, personally. The data section on pages 24-36 deals with our national vision, our institutions, our ideology, and our sense of personal well-being. Again, an interesting story comes forth. It is, as the reader will see, a robust tale of national health.

An important contribution to this section has been made by Civic Service, Inc. of St. Louis. Their questions were originally suggested by *Public Opinion*'s editors and our colleagues at the Roper Center in Storrs, Connecticut. The same questions were then asked by the University of Connecticut poll. A remarkable degree of consistency was noted.

And all that is only data; elsewhere in this issue we are proud to offer two distinguished interpretations of our present national circumstance, one by Walter Berns, one by Everett Carll Ladd.

Happy Fourth of July. Long may it wave.

Ben Wattenberg
Co-editor
Public Opinion

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*Except, of course, insofar as presidential popularity, in both Carter and Reagan instances, is one of the weighted variables in the index.

THE GROSS NATIO



GROSS NATIONAL SPIRIT METHODOLOGY

Respondents' answers to the six questions we used were combined to create the GNS Index. Each item was weighted equally so that a change in any individual item would produce the same change in the overall Index. If every respondent gave the most confident and approving answer to all six questions, the GNS Index would stand at 2400; if every respondent gave the *least* confident and *least* approving answer, the Index would have a value of 0.

Four of the questions we used had answers that fell very neatly into the categories "very positive," "less positive," and "negative or not at all positive." One question had four possible responses—two positive and two negative. The two negative responses were combined so that we could use the same three categories. The sixth question—presidential popularity—had only two categories which we treated as very positive and not at all positive.

In actually computing the GNS Index, the first step was to recalculate the percentages giving the most positive, less positive, and negative responses to omit those with no opinion. Suppose, for example, that 48 percent were very positive about conditions in the country, 32 percent were less positive, and 16 percent were not at all positive (total = 96 percent). The recalculated percentages would be 50 percent very positive, 33 percent less so, and 17 percent not at all positive. (E.G. 48 percent is 50 percent of the 96 percent who gave an answer.)

For each question, we assigned the most positive answer four points, the less ppsitive answer (if there was one) two points, and the negative or not at all positive answer zero points. In May 1981, for example, 6 percent (recalculated) said things were going "very well" in the country, 44 percent said "fairly well" and 49 percent said either "pretty badly" or "very badly," which we collapsed into a single negative category. Thus, this item contributed 6 percent times four points (twenty-four points) plus 44 percent times two points (eighty-eight points) plus 49 percent times zero points—for a total of 112 points—79 percent times four points for those who approved, and 21 percent times zero points for those who disapproved.

Each individual item thus contributes somewhere between zero and 400 points for a total that ranges from zero to 2,400 points. If there was a net shift on any one item of 10 percent from the not at all positive category to the most positive one, the Index would go *up* forty points. A shift of 35 percent from the most positive to the less positive would mean a *drop* of seventy points in the GNS Index.

Questions:

1. Taken all together, how would you say things are these days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy? (NORC)
2. We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all? (NORC)
3. How do you feel that things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, pretty badly, or very badly? (*Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White)
4. Do you have a lot of confidence, some confidence, or no real confidence that in a few years from now our country will be strong and prosperous? (*Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White)
5. Now turning to business conditions in the country as a whole—do you think that during the next 12 months we'll have good times financially, or bad times, or what? (University of Michigan/Institute for Social Research)
6. Do you approve or disapprove of the way (name of incumbent) is handling his job as President? (Gallup)

NAL SPIRIT INDEX



1974	Very Positive +4	Less Positive +2	Negative/ Not at all Positive 0
1.	152	98	0
2.	124	92	0
3.	16	50	0
4.	140	92	0
5.	120	22	0
6.	120	—	0

Grand Total
1,026

1975			
1.	132	108	0
2.	124	84	0
3.	20	70	0
4.	180	82	0
5.	152	26	0
6.	184	—	0

Grand Total
1,162

1976			
1.	136	106	0
2.	124	92	0
3.	20	94	0
4.	148	92	0
5.	220	26	0
6.	216	—	0

Grand Total
1,274

1977	+4	+2	0
1.	140	106	0
2.	136	88	0
3.	24	118	0
4.	132	104	0
5.	224	20	0
6.	312	—	0

Grand Total
1,404

1978			
1.	136	112	0
2.	136	84	0
3.	16	90	0
4.	116	104	0
5.	188	10	0
6.	196	—	0

Grand Total
1,188

1979			
1.	*461		
2.			
3.	20	62	0
4.	112	96	0
5.	96	12	0
6.	188	—	0

Grand Total
1,047

1980	+4	+2	0
1.	136	106	0
2.	116	90	0
3.	8	38	0
4.	140	88	0
5.	56	2	0
6.	176	—	0

Grand Total
956

1981			
1.	*461		
2.			
3.	24	88	0
4.	128	96	0
5.	156	6	0
6.	316	—	0

Grand Total
1,275

Note: *Questions 1 & 2 were asked in 1979 and have not been asked in 1981. For these two years, we used an average of the scores for 1976, 1977, 1978 and 1980, an act which seemed especially defensible since these two measures have been unusually stable. For example, their composite point totals were 458 for 1976, 470 for 1977, 468 for 1978 and 445 for 1980.

Question 1	+4	+2	0
1974	38%	49%	13%
1975	33%	54%	13%
1976	34%	53%	13%
1977	35%	53%	12%
1978	34%	56%	10%
1979			
1980	34%	53%	13%
1981			

Question 2			
1974	31%	46%	23%
1975	31%	42%	27%
1976	31%	46%	23%
1977	34%	44%	22%
1978	34%	42%	24%
1979			
1980	29%	45%	26%
1981			

Question 3	+4	+2	0
1974	4%	25%	71%
1975	5%	35%	60%
1976	5%	47%	48%
1977	6%	59%	35%
1978	4%	45%	51%
1979	5%	31%	64%
1980	2%	19%	79%
1981	6%	44%	50%

Question 4			
1974	35%	46%	19%
1975	45%	41%	14%
1976	37%	46%	17%
1977	33%	52%	15%
1978	29%	52%	19%
1979	28%	48%	24%
1980	35%	44%	21%
1981	32%	48%	20%

Question 5	+4	+2	0
1974	30%	11%	59%
1975	38%	13%	49%
1976	55%	13%	32%
1977	56%	10%	34%
1978	47%	5%	48%
1979	24%	6%	70%
1980	14%	1%	85%
1981	39%	3%	58%

Question 6			
1974	30%	0%	70%
1975	46%	0%	54%
1976	54%	0%	46%
1977	78%	0%	22%
1978	49%	0%	51%
1979	47%	0%	53%
1980	44%	0%	56%
1981	79%	0%	21%

PROUDLY

Question: How proud are you to be an American . . . are you extremely proud, somewhat proud, or not proud?



Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981; Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, March 4-8, 1981 (Sample = 500 Connecticut residents.)

WE HAIL

NO HOLES IN OUR SWISS CHEESE

Question: Are you proud to be (an American/respondent's country named)?



Note: Sample was young men and women between the ages of eighteen and twenty-four. Approximately 2,000 respondents in each country.

Source: Survey by Nippon Research Center, Ltd. and Gallup International, November 25, 1977-January 6, 1978.

THE GOVERNED, CONTENT

Question: You notice that the ten boxes on this card go from the highest position of plus five—for a country you have a very favorable opinion of—all the way down to the lowest position of minus five—for a country you have a very unfavorable opinion of. How far up the scale or how far down the scale would you rate the following nations? United States.



Note: Categories shown represent the highest ratings, +5 and +4, combined. Question wording varied slightly over the years. The highest percentage offering unfavorable ratings of the country (—1 through —5 combined) was only 4 percent, in July 1973.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of January 25-28, 1980.

Americans See Special

Question: Do you think the United States has a special role to play in the world today, or is it pretty much like other countries?



Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981; Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, March 4-8, 1981 (Sample = 500 Connecticut residents.)

Role for their Country

Question: Do you think it would be best for the future of (this/the) country if we take an active part in world affairs, or if we (stay/stayed) out of world affairs?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, October 1945, August 1947; National Opinion Research Center, January 1950, March 1955, June 1965; National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, Spring 1973, Spring 1975, Spring 1976, Spring 1978; Gallup Organization for the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, November 1978; ABC News/Louis Harris and Associates, April 1980-November 1980.

GALLUPING PATRIOTISM

Question: What nation in the world do you have the most respect for?



Note: The category "chose other than own country" includes those who answered "all other" and "none." The entire list of countries included: England, U.S.A., Australia, France, Switzerland, Germany, Russia, China, Canada, Italy, Spain, Brazil, Israel, "All other," "None" and "Don't know." "Don't knows," not shown, ranged from a low of 14 percent for the U.S. to a high of 33 percent for West Germany.

Source: Survey by Gallup International Research Associates for the Charles F. Kettering Foundation: *Human Needs and Satisfactions—A Global Survey;* Fall/Winter 1974-1975 and Spring 1976.

NOTE ON OPINION ROUNDUP

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

The reader may note that in some cases a "no opinion" column is shown while in others it is not. This reflects a common practice in the publication of polls: when the "no opinion" or "undecided" responses are relatively small, on the order of 10 percent or less, one reports only the answers of those who have a definite opinion. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they are reported because they reveal a substantial degree of unawareness or uncertainty within the populace on the issues in question.

AMERICA: LOVE

Question: Earlier on in American history, many people around the world thought the United States was the very best place in the world to live. Do you think it still is, or not?



Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981; Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, March 4-8, 1981 (Sample = 500 Connecticut residents.)

IT AND LIVE IT

Question: Thinking back over the past ten years, do you think the United States is a better place to live now than it was ten years ago, a worse place to live, or is it about the same?



Ten years from now, do you think the United States will be a better place to live than it is now, a worse place to live, or will it be about the same?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, November 27-28, 1979.

GREAT EXPECTATIONS

Question: Some people think that the United States will never again have it as good as we did in the past; others disagree. How about you? Do you think the country has already seen the best times we are going to, or not?

	Seen best times	Best times ahead
By race:		
White	37%	63%
Black	47	53
By education:		
Grade school	52	48
Some high school	43	59
High school grad	42	58
Some college	30	70
College grad	31	69
Post-college	34	66



Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981.

STATUTES OF LIBERTY,

Question: What are you proudest of about America? Just tell me briefly in your own words.



Note: Categories not shown: Science and technology = 1%; military strength = 1%; culture, art = 1%; Other = 6%; None = 1%. The things of which Americans were least proud were Crime = 12%; Iran = 10%; Economic inequality, poverty = 7%; Materialism = 6%; Corruption = 6%. All remaining categories were 5% or less.

Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981.

BLESSINGS OF LIBERTY SECURE

Question: I'm going to read you a list of rights and freedoms which some people consider important in this country. How much do you feel you have the (Read list)—fully and completely, partially but not fully, or not at all?



Note: *Response = less than 1 percent.

Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, December 27, 1977-January 10, 1978.

WITH NO BUSINESS LIMITATIONS

Question: Do you agree or disagree: The private business system in the United States works better than any other system yet devised for industrial countries.



Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981; Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, March 4-8, 1981 (Sample = 500 Connecticut residents.)

NO MUTINY ON BOUNTY

Question: Do you agree or disagree: There should be a top limit on incomes so that no one can earn more than $100,000 a year.





Note: A survey conducted in 1940 by *Fortune* magazine revealed similar objections to the concept of an income ceiling. When asked "Do you think there should be a law limiting the amount of money any individual is allowed to earn in a year?", 74 percent answered "no" and 26 percent answered "yes."

Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981; Institute for Social Inquiry, University of Connecticut, March 4-8, 1981 (Sample = 500 Connecticut residents.)

NO KARL, NO GROUCHO

Question: Would you favor or oppose introducing socialism in the United States? How strongly?



Source: Survey by Civic Service, Inc., March 5-18, 1981.

INSTITUTIONS: CONFIDENCE EVEN IN DIFFICULT TIMES

Note to Readers: Both of these presentations show that support for American institutions remains strong even when they are severely tested. The upper half of the page traces public opinion during 1937 and finds that although there was dissatisfaction with the performance of the Supreme Court, Americans did not want to change its make-up. In a 1974 study, Wisconsin residents said they felt Watergate diminished their confidence in the presidency. But on broader questions dealing with the presidency, the Wisconsin surveyors found that Americans would still turn to the president for guidance.

SUPPORT FDR, BUT DON'T PACK THE COURT

Question: Would you vote for Franklin Roosevelt today?



Question: Do you think President Roosevelt is more popular or less popular today than at election time?



Question: Should the Supreme Court be more liberal in reviewing New Deal measures?



Question: The Senate is now debating a plan which permits the President to enlarge the Supreme Court by adding one new judge each year. Do you favor this plan?



Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 1937

1974

Question: To what degree has the Watergate situation reduced your confidence in the office of the president as an institution?



Question: The government institution in greatest need of reform is the office of the presidency. (Agree/Disagree)



Question: The office of the presidency has become too powerful for the good of the nation. (Agree/Disagree)



Question: The president should be able to use whatever means he thinks are necessary to protect the security of this nation. (Agree/Disagree)



Question: In times of crisis overseas, all citizens should rally to support the president. (Agree/Disagree)



Question: In times of crisis at home, all citizens should rally to support the president's programs for dealing with the crisis. (Agree/Disagree)



Note: Wisconsin residents only.

Source: Survey by Jack Dennis, University of Wisconsin with assistance from the National Science Foundation and the Wisconsin Survey Research Lab., March/April 1974.

THE BAD



Question: 1. Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people? 2. How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time? 3. Do you feel that almost all of the people running the government are smart people, or do you think that quite a few of them don't seem to know what they are doing? 4. Do you think that people in the government waste a lot of money we pay in taxes, waste some of it, or don't waste very much of it?

Note: Figures are recalculated for question 1 to exclude "other/depends/both" and "don't know." For question 2, "cannot" = "only some of the time" and "none of the time" combined; percentages recalculated to exclude "don't know." For question 3, figures recalculated to exclude "other/depends" and "don't know." For question 4, figures recalculated to exclude "don't know."

Source: Surveys by Center for Political Studies of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan Election Studies, latest that of April 1980.

NEWS IS...

Question: Please select the item on the scale on this card that best describes the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statement . . . As the government is now organized and operated, it is incapable of dealing with the crucial problems facing our country today. (The card the respondents were asked to use listed strongly agree/agree/not sure, but probably agree/not sure, but probably disagree/strongly disagree.)



Note: Agree = strongly agree/agree/not sure, but probably agree. Disagree = strongly disagree/disagree/not sure, but probably disagree.

Source: Survey by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Council of Life Insurance, April/May 1980.

Question: Now I'm going to read you several more statements. Some people agree with a statement, others disagree. As I read each one, tell me whether you more or less agree with it or more or less disagree with it. Now I'd like your opinion on a number of different things. . . . Most public officials (people in public office) are not really interested in the problems of the average man.



Source: Survey by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1980.

BUT A RAY OF HOPE

Question: How do you feel that things are going in the country these days—very well, fairly well, pretty badly, or very badly?

In commenting on how things are going in the country, some people tell us that the problems we face are no worse than at any other time in recent years. Others say that the country is in deep and serious trouble. Which comes closest to your own feelings—the fact that . . . problems are no worse than at other times . . . the country is in deep and serious trouble?



Note: From April 1976 on, sample = registered voters.

Source: Surveys by *Time*/Yankelovich, Skelly and White, latest that of May 1981.

ACCENTUATING THE POSITIVE... PERSONAL LIFE

Question: In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in the U.S. at this time? In general, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with the way things are going in your personal life?

Way things are going in the country



Way things are going in personal life



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, January 9-12, 1981.

Question: During the last few years, has your financial situation been getting better, getting worse, or has it stayed the same?

We are interested in how people are getting along financially these days. So far as you and your family are concerned, would you say that you are pretty well satisfied with your present financial situation, more or less satisfied, or not satisfied at all?



	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1980
Personal financial situation getting better/has stayed the same in last few years	82%	83%	79%	72%	77%	78%	82%	74%
Financial situation for you and your family satisfactory	78	77	77	73	77	78	76	74

Note: For present financial situation "pretty well satisfied" and "more or less satisfied" were combined to get "satisfied."

Source: Surveys by National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of 1980.

SPARE US

ONLY 944 DAYS TO GO BEFORE THE NEXT ROUND*

Question: Suppose there were a new presidential election being held today, and the candidates were Ronald Reagan, the Republican, and Edward Kennedy, the Democrat. Which one would you vote for, Reagan or Kennedy? . . . Reagan or Mondale?



Note: Category "Wouldn't vote/not sure" calculated out.
*July 1-February 1, 1984.

Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, April 20-22, 1981.



Democracy and its

Question: On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the way democracy works in (your country)?


Satisfaction with Democracy 1973 and 1980
Satisfaction increased 1973-80
Satisfaction decreased 1973-80
Ireland 55% (1973) 48% (1980)
United Kingdom 44% (1973) 51% (1980)
Belgium 62% (1973) 34% (1980)
Netherlands 52% (1973) 51% (1980)
Denmark 45% (1973) 60% (1980)
Luxembourg 52% (1973) 77% (1980)
Germany 44% (1973) 73% (1980)
France 41% (1973) 36% (1980)
Italy 27% (1973) 21% (1980)

Note: In 1973, the figure for the United Kingdom did not include Northern Ireland. The 1980 study is the first to include Greece.

Source: Surveys by Eurobarometer Public Opinion polls for the Commission of the European Communities, latest that of October 9-November 14, 1980.

Discontents Abroad

Question: (Show card) On this card there are three basic kinds of attitudes vis-à-vis the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion. **1.** The entire way our society is organized must be radically changed by revolutionary action. **2.** Our society must be gradually improved by reforms. **3.** Our present society must be valiantly defended against all subversive forces.



Source: Survey by Eurobarometer Public Opinion polls for the Commission of the European Communities, October 9-November 14, 1980. On January 1, Greece became the 10th member of the EEC.

Peeking at China

Question: What is your opinion of the socialist system?



Question: What is your wish?



Question: What sort of saying or motto do you like best?



Editors Note: The results of this survey appeared in the February 24, 1981 edition of the *People's Daily*. It was described as an opinion poll carried out in some factories, countryside schools and residential districts in the provinces of Fukien and Anhui. Sample = 987. Although public opinion polling in the People's Republic of China is not widespread, some discussions have taken place with American firms about future work.

by Adam Clymer and Kathleen Frankovic

The Realities of Realignment

"I just think we needed a change and Reagan was a change. The Republican party was a change. Inflation had gotten out of hand. The Democratic party wasn't getting anywhere." Frances, a housewife in Sandy, Utah, explained why she now thinks of herself as a Republican.

Another switcher, Chuck Flowers, a Garden Grove, California, taxi driver, said, "Republicans are a little bit more conservative, in the sense of trying to hold down expenditures."

A widow in Edinburg, Virginia, who didn't want even her first name used, complained of seeing a healthy woman use food stamps to buy asparagus and strawberries. "To me, those are luxury items," she said. Such incidents make her disbelieve what she learned as a child in the mountains, that "Democrats are for the working man."

These new Republicans are the flesh on the bone of polling figures that record what may be the most important political development in half a century: the Republican realignment. It has not happened yet, but may be developing. If the realignment materializes, it will transform a minority party that sometimes wins big into the dominant political party in the United States.

Democrats Dwindling?

Most major national polls show a narrowing of the Democrats' lead over Republicans in personal party identification—a narrowing that clearly followed rather than accompanied last fall's elections. (See *Public Opinion* April/May 1981, pages 29-31.) Most show a narrower gap now than before the 1980 campaign began. Some make it much narrower. But none consistently showed a slimmer margin than Richard Wirthlin, President Reagan's polltaker. He made it 40-35 percent Democratic, including independents who lean to a party, in several spring polls.

The figures from the CBS News/*New York Times* polls show that for all of 1980 (where the month-to-month changes were blips, not trends), 42 percent of the public called themselves Democrats and 22 percent said they were Republicans. Allocating the independents who confessed a partisan leaning, it was 53-34. (The April 1981 figures—shown on pp. 44-45—are almost indistinguishable from our January figures. April's figures are used in the table because they are the most recent and because the April poll was designed with realignment in mind.)

Ever hopeful, Charles T. Manatt, chairman of the Democratic National Committee, dismisses these changes as normal after a presidential landslide. But the Gallup findings for years like 1953, 1965, and 1973 do not support him. The Eisenhower, Johnson, and Nixon triumphs seemed to stimulate no major shifts in party identification, though each of them earned a greater percentage of the popular vote than Ronald Reagan received. The current shift seems to have a singular, ratifying, postelection quality to it. Yet there was no movement in the first few days after the election, when the excitement of a landslide might have been greatest. The shift appears to have paused after mid-February,* but it may have resumed in mid-May, as an NBC News/AP poll recording a 41-40 Republican edge suggests. Wirthlin's latest poll, taken about the same time, showed a 40-39 edge.

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*Polls differ on when the partisan shift began. Gallup, in both personal and telephone interviewing, finds evidence that the movement may have begun just after, or perhaps just before the election, and continued through the beginning of 1981. The November 7-12 CBS News/*New York Times* poll, for which we recalled and reached 87 percent of those called just before the election, found no change yet.

One of the difficulties in measuring this movement is that in-person interviewing and telephone interviewing produce different results, with in-person interviewing showing more Democrats and fewer independents. Gallup has found this in comparing its own telephone to in-person polls. Nonetheless, both methods yield increases in Republican numbers, and a narrowing of the gap between Democrats and Republicans.

Realignment is not only a matter of hope to the Republicans and dread to the Democrats, but it is a serious subject for polltakers, political scientists, and reporters. Whatever is going on is sure to be studied carefully and with devices, chiefly polls, never before available to students of partisan change. For his 1952 book, *The Future of American Politics*, Samuel Lubell had to reconstruct the development of the Democratic coalition in the '30s from voting records. The Gallup poll began in 1937, too late to be useful to him. Now, realignment—successful or failed—can be measured continually.

History's Uncertain Lessons

The concept of Republican realignment has received serious attention for some years. Some political scientists have been predicting it ever since Barry Goldwater cracked some southern states in 1964 (other observers saw in that year's results the extinction of his party). The Nixon victory of 1968 enhanced those hopes. But neither the election results nor polling data on party identification in the 1970s bore out those expectations. If any political group gained adherents, it was the independents—a move which could hint at diminished party allegiance. Beneath this increasingly chic label, though, one can easily discern strong partisan feelings and voting patterns.

The theorists who anticipated realignment, such as Walter Dean Burnham, Gerald Pomper, and Kevin Phillips, had more than instinct on their side. Historically, some of the conditions that set realigning periods apart from "normal" eras in American politics were present:

1. *Intense disruption of traditional patterns of voting behavior.* As Burnham put it, "majority parties become minorities; politics which were once competitive become non-competitive." At the same time, large numbers of individuals shift their own party allegiances.

2. *A rise in the intensity of intraparty competition (and even debate about the rules by which presidential nominations were made), accompanied by ideological polarizations, within and between parties.* Sometimes this increase in ideological intensity leads to the emergence of third parties, which may attract restless partisans on their way from one major party to the other.

3. *The cyclical pattern of realignment.* If the previous pattern of forty-year cycles held, one was expected by 1968.

The first two conditions, disruptions in voting patterns and intense intraparty competition, are even more obvious today than they were ten or fifteen years ago. Because the nature of American politics has changed, though, the presence of these conditions no longer insures that realignment will occur. The conditions, then, are more illuminating than they are compelling. Television, direct mail, the kinds of problems confronting leaders, and changing party structure present political conditions vastly different from those of fifty years



Benson. By Steve Benson of the Arizona Republic. Reprinted by permission of the *Washington Post* Writers' Group.

ago, let alone from the days of the decline of the Whigs. American politics doesn't have to change in the ways it used to.

Mobilizing Partisan Conversions

The rule against accepting the certainty of the historical rule surely applies to the way in which a realignment develops, and not just to the conditions that must precede it. But if similar opportunities are presented, parties may take advantage of them as they have in the past. Kristi Anderson, Lubell, and others have gathered data which argue that the dominant element of the change in party composition in both 1932 and 1896 was the mobilization of new voters, not the conversion of older voters from one party to the other.

Since party ties seem to mean less now, it should be easier to bring about a realignment through conversion than it once was. Even so, the potential for mobilization is vast and so the '30s pattern is worth thinking about. Those new voters and new Democrats of the '30s included women, who did not immediately use the franchise that was granted in 1920, northern blacks, and immigrants and their children. (Immigration all but ended in 1924, but naturalization took an average of ten years, though an enterprising Tammany captain could make it seem simultaneous with leaving Ellis Island.)

In 1980, there was only one significant, recently enfranchised group of voters—southern blacks—and they are the most solidly Democratic bloc in the electorate.

But when barely more than half the eligible voters turn out, there are still major opportunities for mobilization. The most obvious target is the young adults who constitute the post-World War II baby boom. They have voted very lightly since they came of age and in the last election, split fairly evenly between Reagan and Jimmy Carter. Suddenly, their political identification is shifting dramatically toward the Republicans. For all of 1980, the twenty-five to thirty-four-year-old group was 55 percent Democratic and 30 percent Republican, counting leaners. Now they are about evenly divided—44 percent Democratic and 43 percent Republican. No other age group has changed so much. There is a hint in the CBS News/*Times* data that this group, unlike others, is still in motion toward the Republicans. The potential impact of the electorally inactive members of this age cohort is immense. With just a little more movement and a higher rate of voting, they could cement a Republican plurality for a generation.

The Weakest Democratic Links

There are several other major changes detectable today, and big chunks of the Democrats' losses are coming from the groups they once could count on most, with one exception. Blacks, who provided President Carter

PARTY IDENTIFICATION—1980-1981

	Republican	**Ind., Lean Rep.**	**Ind.**	**Ind., Lean Dem.**	**Dem.**
Total	26%	15%	10%	15%	34%
	22	**12**	**13**	**11**	**42**
18-24	24	16	8	21	31
	21	**14**	**13**	**19**	**33**
25-34	23	20	13	16	28
	18	**12**	**15**	**16**	**39**
35-44	19	20	11	14	36
	23	**13**	**13**	**11**	**40**
45-64	26	11	10	15	38
	23	**10**	**12**	**9**	**46**
65 and over	38	7	9	6	40
	30	**7**	**13**	**6**	**44**
Liberals	15	11	10	19	45
	14	**9**	**13**	**15**	**49**
Moderates	22	15	10	16	37
	22	**11**	**11**	**13**	**43**
Conservatives	36	18	6	13	27
	31	**14**	**11**	**10**	**34**
Northeast	24	16	8	18	34
	24	**12**	**14**	**11**	**39**
Midwest	24	14	11	16	35
	24	**12**	**14**	**13**	**37**
South	27	14	10	11	38
	19	**10**	**12**	**10**	**49**
White southerners	30	16	10	10	34
	21	**12**	**12**	**10**	**45**
West	30	15	13	14	28
	25	**10**	**12**	**12**	**41**
Men	24	13	9	15	33
	23	**12**	**13**	**13**	**39**
Women	28	11	11	14	36
	22	**10**	**14**	**12**	**42**

with one out of every five votes he got last fall, remain loyal to the Democratic party.

The South, the region that was part of the Democratic coalition before the coalition itself was assembled, not only went for Reagan, but it is now the same as the nation as a whole in party preference. The lowest income group—Democrats outright by a five-to-two margin in 1980—is now only four-to-three Democratic. Among persons from union households, a three-to-one Democratic edge has slipped to two-to-one, and their votes in 1980 dismayed Democrats—Carter got 47 percent of the union household vote to Reagan's 44. Among Catholics, a 44-18 Democratic margin in 1980 has now slipped to 36-20.

Nor are the Republicans paying any price for these changes in terms of losing any of their old base. Protestants are more Republican than they used to be, and the high income and most educated groups are still closely divided, a bit more Republican than they were last year. If one wants to relate the changes measured lately to potential voting (with party identification still the best single predictor), it is important to note that most of the change is among registered voters. The unregistered have barely moved at all.

Explaining the Change

Polls cannot explain definitely why people are changing. (The CBS News/*Times* poll in April, incidentally, found that 18 percent of the public reported they had changed party preference, in one way or another, in the last year.) Wirthlin says his studies connect the change to confidence in Reagan and his economic programs, and there is nothing in the CBS News/*Times* poll to contradict him.

Follow-up telephone interviews, like those cited earlier, provide some further clues. They reveal widespread feelings that the Democrats concentrated too much on the poor, and a belief that it was time for a change. That belief may have been crystallized by some of the most effective television commercials of 1980, the party ads that proclaimed "Vote Republican—For a Change." Talking to poll respondents leaves the impression that this Republican identification is tentative. "They are letting us get our toe in the crack," is how Richard Richards, the Republican National Committee Chairman, describes it.

It cannot be proved one way or the other, but such tentativeness apparently characterized earlier realignments. Whatever the predictive value of knowing the mechanics of the 1930s realignment, it is important to remember that it took place over eight years, beginning with Alfred E. Smith's capture of several Republican cities in 1928; continuing as Franklin D. Roosevelt carried that trend forward and managed the return of a Solid South in 1932; going forward one more step with the since unequalled feat of expanding the administra-

	Republican	Ind., Lean Rep.	Ind.	Ind., Lean Democratic	Dem.
Less than high school graduate	24%	11%	11%	13%	41%
	20	**9**	**14**	**11**	**46**
High school graduate	25	16	7	16	36
	22	**11**	**13**	**13**	**41**
Some college	30	16	13	15	26
	24	**13**	**12**	**14**	**37**
College graduate +	30	21	7	14	28
	29	**15**	**12**	**11**	**33**
First income quartile	33	6	7	10	44
(Under $10,000)	**20**	**8**	**13**	**11**	**48**
Second income quartile	23	17	11	17	32
	20	**12**	**13**	**10**	**45**
Third income quartile	25	18	8	14	35
	23	**11**	**12**	**13**	**41**
Fourth income quartile	27	18	9	17	29
	28	**13**	**11**	**13**	**35**
White Protestants	34	15	11	12	28
	29	**13**	**13**	**11**	**34**
Catholics	20	16	11	17	36
	18	**11**	**13**	**14**	**44**
Blacks	7	7	4	16	66
	8	**3**	**8**	**13**	**68**
Union households	19	13	10	17	41
	16	**11**	**10**	**12**	**51**
Registered adults	28	15	8	12	37
	25	**10**	**10**	**11**	**44**
Unregistered adults	20	15	17	23	25
	18	**13**	**19**	**17**	**33**

Source: CBS News/*New York Times* national surveys; 1,439 April 1981 interviews, 9,902 1980 interviews, conducted January-September 1980. The 1980 partisanship figures were calculated by Solomon Barr.

tion's House majority in 1934; and culminating in the 1936 landslide in which Jews, labor, and northern blacks joined up.

If the 1932 election was the key event, history made it so only because things kept on going Democratic after that, and did not roll back to Republicanism because the country considered Roosevelt a failure.

There was a relevant similarity between the 1932 election and last fall's. Consider Eugene Roseboom's description of the 1932 campaign in his book, *A History of Presidential Elections:*

> The difference between the two candidates was not so much in specific issues as in methods of approach. Hoover stood on his record and could promise little more than continuance along the same lines. Roosevelt, critical of the President's conservatism, could offer an open mind and a willingness to try new paths. The country had soured on Hoover, and felt that any change would be for the better.

While there were major differences in the 1980 campaign promises of Reagan and Carter, there is little evidence that people were voting for or against Kemp-Roth or in the hope or fear of any other very specific plans of action. Thirty-eight percent of the Reagan backers among the 12,782 voters interviewed in the CBS News/*Times* election day exit poll checked off "Time For a Change" as the only reason, or one of two reasons, for their votes. That was twice as many as checked any other reason, and far more than the 11 percent who marked "He's a Real Conservative." If there were real expectations on election day, other than that Reagan would be somehow quite different from Carter, they related to his trying to check inflation and to his ability in some unclear way, to curb the federal government. Above all, there was the hope implied when the television audience answered for itself Reagan's telling challenge in his Cleveland debate with Carter: "Ask yourself, are you better off now than you were four years ago?"

Reagan is operating against a background of critically important changing perceptions about his party, first measured by Market Opinion Research before last year's Republican convention. Then, the Detroit firm, in a poll for the Republican National Committee and the Republican Congressional Committee, found an essentially even split on which party could do a better job on unemployment—a sudden change from the previous November when it had been 39 percent favoring Democrats, and only 18 percent favoring Republicans. Gallup, in September, found the Republicans nearly even with 35 percent to 37 percent for the Democrats, on which party would "do a better job keeping the country prosperous." And that traditional Democratic issue advantage vanished this year in an April Gallup poll, when 41 percent favored the Republicans to 28 percent for the Democrats.

The CBS News/*New York Times* poll found that most of that economic advantage lies on the inflation side of the ledger. While 35 percent prefer the Republicans on unemployment to 31 percent thinking the Democrats would do better, those numbers are basically unchanged since August of last year, when it was 36-32. But 45 percent prefer the Republicans on inflation to 17 percent for the Democrats. Last August, a good time for Republicans in the polls, it was 42-26. In April of this year, even the declared Democrats only narrowly preferred their own party, 32 to 28 percent.

The latest CBS News/*New York Times* poll suggests that Mr. Reagan's current economic message enhances the effect of these recent trends. In the twenty-five to thirty-four-year-old group, and among white southerners, two groups with very large Republican gains, Reagan's handling of the economy got exceptionally high marks from those Republican-leaning independents who seem to be the leading edge of partisan change. In the population as a whole, the critical, perhaps growing group of independents who lean Republican is more enthusiastic about Reagan's proposed budget cuts and tax cuts than are ordinary Republicans. But,


BLOOM COUNTY
by Berke Breathed
HAVE A QUESTION, PRIVATE BLOOM?
A SMALL ONE, SIR. IS GOD A REPUBLICAN?
5-30
© 1981 Washington Post Co
HA HA HA HA... I TELL YA... THE QUESTIONS YOU KIDS ASK THESE DAYS..!
HA HA.. HOO HOO...
BREATHED
DARN TOOTIN', HE IS.

Bloom County by Berke Breathed. © 1981 the *Washington Post* Company. Reprinted with permission.

significantly, they look much more like Democrats than like Republicans on social issues such as the proposed Equal Rights Amendment and abortion. For example, 54 percent of them approve his budget cuts, compared to 48 percent of the Republicans and 23 percent of the Democrats. On the other hand, 59 percent of them approve of the Equal Rights Amendment, like 62 percent of the Democrats but only 46 percent of the Republicans.

This is a message both of opportunity and risk to the Republican party. The new Republicans, and the newly leaning independents, are counting on Reagan's economic policies not to produce the 25 percent inflation Tip O'Neill forecasts, but to lead to some economic improvement or at least sense of improvement—something that will keep Democrats from asking in 1982, "Are you better off than you were two years ago?"

There are many other factors to watch as realignment develops—or falls apart. These include the Republicans' advantages in money and technology, and the problems they are likely to have in reconciling the social issue aims of their bedrock conservatives, especially many of their senators, with the interests of the younger voters they want to attract. Those target individuals, the CBS News/*New York Times* poll shows, clearly want government to stay out of their private lives and not just out of their business affairs.

Redistricting and the religious right will have an influence on whether realignment occurs, as will Republican allies such as the National Conservative Political Action Committee. The 1982 House elections, where Republicans hope to repeat Roosevelt's 1934 triumph, could serve (if they pull it off) as a massive reinforcement that would certify Republican ascendancy.

But it is no sure thing. The new allegiances are not firm. Lloyd Trombly, an operating engineer in Orlando, is a new Republican, because he has abandoned his belief that "the Democrats will promote more work and help in the labor field." Carter soured him on that view, but Nixon had turned him off on Republicanism once before.

And there is Kathy Hatton, a Dayton housewife who voted for George McGovern in 1972 and Carter in 1976. Her current view is that "The way the economy is now, we need a more conservative approach. The Democrats have gone overboard. I think it's good to help the poor, and I like their programs, but it's gone to extremes." Her commitment to the Republicans is less than absolute.

Voters like these are, as Richard Richards puts it, "giving the Republicans a chance." Now, he says, "we have to prove that we can lead." If, by the fall of 1982, the public decides that Reagan and the Republicans have proved it, this spring's polls will only have measured a rising tide. But if it concludes that the administration has been a failure, April's 41 percent calling themselves Republicans in one way or another will probably have been a high-water mark. ☑

To The Editors

Dear Sirs:

In the February/March issue of *Public Opinion* we showed that Pacific Coast voter turnout in 1972 was 2.7 percentage points less than expected. This conclusion was based on the difference between the actual and expected percentage of Pacific voters who went to the polls after 6:00 p.m. We determined the expected turnout by looking at Pacific after-six voting in 1974 in the light of the 1972-74 contrast in the rest of the country. On the basis of these calculations we concluded that the early projections of the 1972 presidential election outcome by NBC and CBS discouraged many Westerners from voting in 1972.

In the following issue of *Public Opinion* Dr. Barry Cook of NBC took issue with our analysis and said that according to his calculations early network projections actually increased western turnout in 1972. This is an astonishing assertion. Unfortunately, Dr. Cook did not explain just how he thinks this effect was produced.

Dr. Cook's first criticism was that we should not have assumed that the 1974 election could be a baseline for 1972 turnout. In fact, we assumed only that the validity of the 1974 election as a baseline was the same in the West as in the rest of the country. Dr. Cook worries that even this is too much because "there may have been regional contests of varying interest in 1974." Why is he so coy? If he knows something about such elections why not come right out with it, and also explain why these elections would affect turnout differently before and after 6 o'clock in different parts of the country?

Next, Dr. Cook complained that we had no evidence about the media exposure of nonvoters. This is absolutely correct. We assumed that Westerners, who could listen to several hours of news while voting was going on, were more likely to be influenced by that news than were people who had no such opportunity because their polls closed before there was any news to broadcast. This does not require a very big leap of faith. The trouble with proving that nonvoters have heard network projections is twofold: There are not enough registered nonvoters in conventional survey samples and one cannot have much confidence about respondents' reports on this point. We would have been happier if the Census Bureau had asked its immense sample about listening habits, but we do not think that its failure to do so is a serious threat to the validity of our findings.

Turning to his own analysis, Dr. Cook showed that the Pacific states were ahead of the rest of the country in 1972 in the turnout rate of "registered voters who had not voted by 6:00 p.m." While our method of measuring the after-six vote is independent of the total turnout, Dr. Cook's method is not, and exposes his finding to the rebuttal that he has shown only that turnout was higher in the West in both 1972 and 1974. We grant him this and argue that he has offered no way to judge the significance of a turnout rate of 26 percent among those who had not voted before six. We can correct his omission, beginning with the ex-

(*Continued on page 60*)

by Thomas Mann and Norman Ornstein

The 1982 Election: What Will it Mean?

Only six months of the Reagan administration have elapsed and already talk is turning to the next round of elections. The memory of the Republican sweep is still vivid, and the possibility of a Republican realignment has captured the attention of politicians.

The approaching midterm elections appear to offer the first test of whether 1980 was, like 1952, a temporary setback for the Democratic party or, like 1932, a critical election which transforms the minority party into the dominant force in American elections.

We believe that the Republicans will pick up seats in the 1982 election, but probably not enough to take control of the House of Representatives. Several factors make the Republicans the odds-on favorites.

In every off-year election except one since the Civil War, the party of the president has lost ground in the House of Representatives. That exception, of course, was 1934. The president was FDR, the party was the Democrats. The election signalled a realignment in American politics, which pulled the Democrats into the majority status they enjoyed for the four-and-one-half decades since then. A repetition in 1982 of this historical anomaly would surely presage a new Republican majority, right? Not necessarily.

The evidence of pro-Republican shifts in party images and party attachments since the 1980 elections (see Clymer/Frankovic, page 42), suggests that a Republican realignment may be brewing; as far as we are concerned, the changes could represent either short-term adjustments or long-term developments. We do believe that interpreting a 1982 Republican victory as a realignment could be wide of the mark.

Table 1 presents the number of seats lost or gained by the president's party in the House and Senate in every midterm election since 1862. As we said above, only in 1934 did the president's party gain ground in the House.* But nothing is automatic or predictable about the number of seats that change party hands in midterm elections. They range from 116 seats lost in 1894 to the unique gain of nine seats in 1934.

Most of the elections at either end of this range took place during periods of upheaval in the party system. In the 1860s, with Lincoln and Johnson in the White House, the Republicans avoided significant losses in the House at least in part because they were putting together a new majority party. The Democrats suffered the worst midterm setback in American history in 1894, the midpoint of a realigning period which once again lifted the Republicans to majority party status.

But extreme results—massive reversals or very modest losses—are not limited to realigning periods. For example, most decades have had at least one midterm election in which the loss has been held below twenty seats. During the last thirty years not once has the president's party sustained a loss as deep as fifty seats, in great contrast with the preceding eighty-year period. In fact, in four of the last seven midterm elections, all of which occurred in the *first* term of presidents, the average loss was only twelve seats.

Surge and Decline

Just what determines the size of the midterm loss has been the subject of much debate in recent years. According to the "surge and decline" thesis articulated by Angus Campbell, midterm elections reflect predominantly the receding of tides running in the previous election. Hence, the larger the pickup of House seats on the president's coattails, the larger the loss two years later. Conversely, presidents who fail to carry many new party colleagues into the House with them face less of a setback.

There is some evidence to support Campbell's thesis. Although the Democrats captured the presidency with Kennedy in 1960, they actually lost a net of twenty-two seats in the House. The following midterm election registered one of the mildest losses for the president's party in history. Similarly, a slight Republican pickup of five House seats in the Nixon victory of 1968 was followed by a modest loss of twelve seats. Carter's win in 1976, which followed major Democratic gains in 1974, increased the Democrats' seats in the House by only one; two years later, the Democrats dropped fifteen seats. On the other side of the ledger, Lyndon Johnson's 1964 landslide increased the number of Democratic representatives by thirty-seven, only to be followed by an even greater Democratic *setback*.

Referendum on Reagan

Yet the "surge and decline" notion sheds little light on the 1958 and 1974 elections, both midterms in which the Republicans suffered major losses after only middling performances in the previous presidential elections. These and other counter-examples have led scholars (like politicians) to view midterm elections as referendums on the president's performance—especially his handling of the economy.

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*The 1902 election, in which the Republicans gained nine seats but saw their margin over the Democrats decline, is explained in the notes to Table 1.

One scholar, Edward Tufte, has developed a statistical model that predicts the vote loss of the president's party in any midterm election from the yearly change in economic conditions and in presidential popularity. Since, according to Tufte, the economy almost always performs less well in midterm than in presidential years, and since a president is more likely to be punished for bad times than rewarded for good, the president's party loses ground in midterm elections. The magnitude of this loss at the national level depends upon how badly the economy is doing and how unpopular the president is.

Gary Jacobson and Samuel Kernell have argued that these national economic and political conditions affect races for the House by shaping the climate in which potential candidates decide whether to run, and donors decide whether to give. When times are bad, the president's party has a difficult time getting its ablest candidates to run and its wealthiest contributors to give, thereby weakening its appeal at the local level, where votes are decided.

The U.S. Senate: Different Rules

The pundits generalize that, "The party of the president always loses seats in *Congress* in the off-year election." But the generalization holds true only for the House of Representatives, not the Senate. In both 1962 and 1970, to take two recent examples, the party of the president *gained* seats in the Senate. In the thirty midterm elections since the Civil War, the president's party actually gained seats in the Senate in ten of them, and broke even in another two. Why is the Senate different? There are several reasons, but the most important has to do with the fact that, with staggered six-year terms, only one-third of the Senate is up for reelection at a time. So the results of the off-year election depend most on what happened six, twelve, even eighteen years earlier.

That brings us to 1982. Its companion Senate elections—1976, 1970, 1964—have created an election cohort of twenty Democrats, twelve Republicans, and one Independent/Democrat. Like 1980, then, 1982 is a tougher year for Senate Democrats. They have more to lose in overall numbers, and just as significantly, they have a higher proportion of vulnerable seats up than the Republicans. The same forces that brought President Richard Nixon a small gain in the Senate in his off-year election of 1970 could easily bring Ronald Reagan a Senate seat gain in 1982. But these results will be no more a referendum on the Reagan presidency or the Republican party than were the 1970 numbers on Nixon and the GOP.

Why the GOP Will Gain

House races are different than Senate contests. But Republicans have a real shot at picking up seats there, too, in the off-year, regardless of any long-term, cosmic trends. Why do we see the likelihood of Republican gains in 1982 quite apart from any massive realignment? The first factor is *reapportionment.* Reapportionment comes along once a decade, and this is the year for the 1980s. So the changes made in state delegations and congressional district lines will affect the 1982 races. Careful observers of the process, assessing state-by-state who will gain and who will lose, place the redistricting-related gain for the Republicans at five to ten seats. This GOP plus comes about because of the regional nature of population shifts, the coalitions being built by Republicans in state legislatures, and the large number of GOP-financed computerized district plans being pushed in

Table 1

LOSSES BY PRESIDENT'S PARTY IN MIDTERM ELECTIONS, 1862-1978

	Party Holding Presidency	President's Party Gain/Loss of Seats in House	President's Party Gain/Loss of Seats in Senate
1862	R	−3	+8
1866	R	−2	0
1870	R	−31	−4
1874	R	−96	−8
1878	R	−9	−6
1882	R	−33	+3
1886	D	−12	+3
1890	R	−85	0
1894	D	−116	−5
1898	R	−21	+7
1902	R	+9*	+2
1906	R	−28	+3
1910	R	−57	−10
1914	D	−59	+5
1918	D	−19	−6
1922	R	−75	−8
1926	R	−10	−6
1930	R	−49	−8
1934	D	+9	+10
1938	D	−71	−6
1942	D	−55	−9
1946	D	−55	−12
1950	D	−29	−6
1954	R	−18	−1
1958	R	−48	−13
1962	D	−4	+3
1966	D	−47	−4
1970	R	−12	+2
1974	R	−48	−5
1978	D	−15	−3

*Although the Republicans gained nine seats in the 1902 elections, they actually lost ground to the Democrats, who gained 25 seats following the increase in the overall number of representatives after the 1900 census.

Note: Each entry is the difference between the number of seats won by the president's party in that midterm election and the number of seats won by that party in the preceding general election. Because of changes in the overall number of seats in the Senate and House, in the number of seats won by third parties, and in the number of vacancies, a Republican loss is not always matched precisely by a Democratic gain, nor vice-versa.

Source: *Statistics of the Congressional Election of November 7, 1978,* compiled from official sources by Benjamin J. Guthrie, under direction of Edmund L. Henshaw, Jr., Clerk of the House of Representatives (Washington, 1979), pp. 44-45.

various states.

A direct net gain of five or ten seats from redistricting isn't much, given the average loss in House seats for the president's party. But reapportionment helps the Republicans *indirectly* as well. Overall, any change which shuffles voters out of or into districts damages incumbents. It adds an element of uncertainty to their formerly stable coalitions, and it weakens the name and resource edge of incumbency. Since the Democrats have more incumbents, and will have more running for reelection in 1982, the process of redistricting *per se* hurts them.

Moreover, the state-by-state assessments of gains and losses look at clear winners and losers. They do not show that, among the many incumbents who are damaged slightly—but not destroyed—by the likely district changes in their states, there are many more Democrats than Republicans. Overall, then, reapportionment casts a larger shadow over the Democrats, dampening their hopes of big gains in 1982.

War Chests

A second factor in favor of the Republicans is *money*. The GOP expects to have a vast war chest for 1982, exceeding its congressional campaign expenditures in 1980. Early in March, Republican congressional leaders announced plans for a $13.5 million fund for *direct* contributions to House and Senate candidates in 1982, with overall campaign-related expenditures by GOP House and Senate campaign committees to exceed $45 million. Democratic plans have not been announced, but by all accounts, fundraising is not booming. Much to the Democrats' dismay, these GOP plans are not inflated or overly optimistic—in the 1979-80 election period, individual donors gave a whopping $61.2 million to the Republican National Committee, $27.2 million to the House campaign group, and $20.5 million to the Senate panel. The comparable Democratic figures are $15.1 million, $1.6 million, and $2 million—barely a sixth as much!

The money gap does not perceptibly narrow when we look beyond parties to PACs. Democrats did better—by about $6 million—in the 1979-80 PAC contributions, but there were some disturbing trends for them. More money than ever before was going to *challengers*—a clear warning signal to Democratic incumbents—and, for the first time, corporate PAC contributions exceeded those of labor. If the 1980 trends continue, Republicans will outspend Democrats overall in House races in 1982. Money is not everything, of course. But it does mean a lot to challengers.

Candidates

A third advantage to the Republicans is *candidates*. The GOP did well in 1978 and 1980 because it fielded an attractive, aggressive, and capable team of congressional candidates. With lousy candidates in 1974 and 1976, it did poorly. The GOP learned its lesson and from 1977 on, built an impressive grassroots candidate recruitment operation. All signs point to a good crop of Republican candidates for 1982. Few signs point to an outstanding crop of Democrats.

Psychology

Of course, it isn't just the party mechanism that brings good candidates to the fore, or that elicits tens of millions of dollars for party campaign coffers. A large part of the candidate and money advantage of the Republicans comes from the overall political mood. Thus, the fourth factor operating in the Republican's favor is *psychology*. Republicans these days are ebullient, optimistic, happy, outgoing. They have rebounded impressively — incredibly — from the nadir of Watergate, and the future looks even better. Democrats are downcast, negative, introspective. They don't know where their party is going, what they ought to do, what "new" philosophy they should articulate.

If the political climate is favorable for a party—if the future looks good—it can have a self-fulfilling effect. Better candidates clamor to run, more money flows in, and incumbents from the down party thus face much tougher challenges than they otherwise might. If the climate is chilly for a party, potentially good candidates hunker down and wait for better times to run, fundraising is difficult, and many of the up-party's incumbents get free rides. The climate was good for Republicans early in 1980, and they undoubtedly had more success in the House elections as a result. The climate remains balmy for them now. Granted the weather can change, and abruptly so, in a short time (late this year, say November/December, can be crucial, for that is the time when many potential candidates for Congress make their "go" or "no-go" decisions). But the longer that psychology favors the Republicans, the more they can stockpile money, bankroll their candidates, and delay the better Democrats from getting under way. One caveat here: the climate can be *too* good for Republicans. More GOP congressmen might decide to take the chance and run for the Senate—thus making a greater number of Republican House seats vulnerable.

Conclusion

Add these four factors together and you get an impressive Republican barricade against a Democratic assault in 1982. Without a GOP cataclysm—which to be sure, is not entirely out of the question—the Republicans have every hope and expectation of making gains *in the House*.

In the Senate, the combination of more Democratic seats up, and more with vulnerability means a strong chance of GOP gains as well, anywhere from two to five or more.

The gains could and would occur in the absence of any sharp "turn to the right" by the electorate. Indeed, we believe that the major pitfall facing the Republicans is their tendency to overinterpret the 1980 results and the current mood, to translate the public's pragmatic, "cut government spending to reduce inflation" mood into a broader, right-wing "cut government out of our lives" policy. The same danger exists in the social arena of abortion, family planning, chastity, and morality. The public remains in the center, and we doubt that the likelihood of GOP gains in 1982 will demonstrate otherwise. Moreover, such gains could and would occur without any assistance from an electorate changing its fundamental party allegiances, rejecting the Democrats, and embracing the Republicans.

But it is clear already that the TV networks and the print press will gear up to cover the basically boring off-year elections with one peg and one alone—will the Republicans break the ages-old pattern? A GOP gain of seats, House *or* Senate, will be *interpreted* as an ironclad sign of realignment à la 1934. To whatever extent Republicans, Democrats, political observers, and the public digest and accept the interpretations, they will enhance the Republicans and deflate the Democrats—and move the chance of a realignment a bit closer to reality. ☞

by Ivor Crewe

Britain's New Party: Can It Make It?

Since March of this year, the British have had a new, national political party, the Social Democratic party. There is nothing very remarkable about a new party; the far left and the far right spawn half a dozen each year. But this new party is different. It occupies the ideological mainstream, not the ends of the political spectrum. It has been formed by dissidents from the Labour party's leadership, not by a group of unknowns or novices. Its leaders—Roy Jenkins, David Owen, Bill Rodgers, and Shirley Williams (Britain's Gang of Four)—have all had major cabinet responsibilities. With 14 Members of Parliament, it is the largest of the minor parties in the Commons. In its first two months, it has recruited 50,000 individual members (despite the most expensive annual subscription fee—at £9 [about $18.00]—of any party). And, it is doing extraordinarily well in the polls.

Ten nationwide polls have been conducted since the new party was first seriously debated in January. Their average gives Labour 30 percent, the Social Democrats 29 percent, the Conservatives 27 percent, the Liberals 12 percent, and others, 2 percent. For a brand new party without proper financial backing, organization, or policies to be on equal terms with the two big parties, is remarkable. More remarkable still are the figures for an alliance between the Social Democrats and the other, long-established centrist party, the Liberals: the Alliance gets 41 percent, Labour 30 percent, Conservatives 27 percent, other parties, 2 percent. At a general election, this would sweep the Alliance into power with a clear majority of seats. Center party support of this magnitude has not been recorded since the polls began in the 1930s.

How seriously should these figures be taken? *Polls do not predict.* An alliance with the Liberals does not exist and the next general election could be as much as three years away. *Polls describe.* But what? The groundswell of a genuine realignment in British politics, or merely a media-blown electoral bubble?

The answer is probably a bit of each. Since its launching, the Social Democratic party has commanded less media attention and has slipped correspondingly in the polls: thus, the sheer novelty of a new party, and the attendant publicity, undoubtedly explains a small part of the poll figures. But only a small part: for back in 1972, an Opinion Research Centre poll had already reported that 35 percent agreed that "if well-known moderates of the Labour party . . . joined up with the Liberals" they would vote for it. Potential support for the Social Democrats has existed for many years, reflecting the electorate's gradual "dealignment" from the two main parties. The party's first test (for which Roy Jenkins will stand) will come soon, in the "safe" Labour seat in Warrington.

Dealignment, British Style

Disaffection from the two main parties has been growing steadily since the mid-1950s, and at a quickening pace since the 1970s. (See Table 1) Individual membership of the two parties combined has slumped from three million to one million in the last thirty years—despite a growth in the electorate of fifteen million. The number of "very strong" Conservative and Labour identifiers—the unswerving loyalists who would turn out for their party at every election, whatever the weather—has dropped from 40 percent of the electorate in 1964 to 20 percent in 1979. The combined Conservative and Labour vote has steadily fallen from 80 percent of the total electorate in 1951 to 61 percent in 1979 (and was even lower, at 55 percent, in October 1974). The two big party icebergs have been slowly but continually melting.

Table 1

THE DECLINE IN SUPPORT FOR THE TWO MAJOR PARTIES SINCE 1951

Percent of all electors voting either Conservative or Labour at General Elections

1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970	February 1974	October 1974	1979
80.0%	73.8%	73.3%	67.5%	68.2%	64.4%	56.5%	54.7%	61.0%

Percent Liberal Share of Vote* in Same Elections

1951	1955	1959	1964	1966	1970	February 1974	October 1974	1979
2.5	2.7	5.9	11.2	8.5	7.5	19.3	18.3	13.8

Percent of Electors with a "Very Strong" Conservative or Labour Identification**

1964	1970	February and October, 1974 (average)	1979
40	39	26	20

*Not adjusted for the number of Liberal candidates which varied from election to election.

**Source: Election Studies by David Butler and Donald Stokes (1964, 1970) and by the British Election Study at the University of Essex (1974, 1979).

As a result, British voters have become more fickle. By the 1970s, almost 40 percent voted differently (if abstention is counted) between two successive elections, and an increasing number did not make up their minds until late in the election campaign. The swing of the two-party pendulum at general elections has grown steadily sharper. There have been more and more voters "up for grabs."

Until now the beneficiaries have been the Liberals (and in Scotland, the Nationalists) whose support has gradually risen—not unremittingly, but cyclically. Each Liberal peak—always occurring under a Conservative government—has topped each earlier peak; each Liberal trough has formed a higher springboard for its subsequent recovery. (In the May 1981 Gallup poll, Liberal support is already well ahead of the level it reached at the same stage of the previous Conservative government, despite the new rivalry of the Social Democrats). All this suggests that the Social Democrats are not simply tapping a fleeting protest vote but have moved into an electoral vacuum created by the public's dealignment from the two big parties. The question is: can they turn this *de*alignment into an enduring *re*alignment?

Is Realignment Possible? The Lessons of History

Hard-bitten politicos with long memories remain deeply skeptical. Social Democratic breakaways in other countries—for example, the Democratic Labour party in Australia, the PSDI in Italy, and the DS '70 in the Netherlands—have all petered out after an initial flurry of enthusiasm. In Britain, there have been clear signs of realignment before. In spring 1962 and autumn 1973, the Liberals reached 30 percent in the polls. Yet, at the following general elections of 1964 and February 1974, they polled well below these levels. Won't the Social Democratic bubble burst in the same way? It might well. But 1981 differs from 1962 and 1973 in one important respect. In the past, the Liberal party's surges of support subsided because it could not convince electors it had a serious chance of forming the government, or even part of one. But this problem of credibility, which has long plagued the Liberals, could now be solved by an alliance which would be seen to be ahead of both major parties in the opinion polls.

Organization and Money

But, the skeptics continue, organization and money, not polls, deliver votes. How can the new party compete in the big league? In fact, the Social Democrats are unlikely to be short of volunteers, including experienced ones defecting from the Labour party, or to lack finances. To be sure, they will not benefit from large contributions of the kind the Labour party receives from the trade unions, and the Conservatives from big companies (although both sources are becoming much less reliable). But a membership of 100,000, for which the new party is well on target, will yield an annual national budget of £1m ($2,000,000)—quite adequate for Britain's statutory low-cost elections. Moreover, modern elections are fought in the media, especially television, and not on doorsteps. Media coverage can be guaranteed by the sheer news value of a possible third party breakthrough; indeed, a Social Democratic/Liberal alliance could well be the main issue around which the next election campaign revolves.

Program

But, the doubters persist, the Social Democrats have so far confined themselves to vague statements of general principle. They therefore serve as an all-purpose wish fulfillment machine; voters read into them what they hope to take out of them. Once their policies are spelled out, public enthusiasm will quickly wane.

However, it is a fallacy to imagine that voters go to the polls with any clear notion of the sides they and the parties take on a series of specific issues. It is a party's overall record and broad position, not its detailed platform, that attracts (or, just as or more often, repels) voters. And in this respect, the Social Democrats have little to fear. Almost all the things the new party advocates—strengthening parliamentary (as opposed to direct) democracy, maintaining the mixed economy, retaining a nuclear defense, commitment within NATO, constructing an incomes policy, raising public expenditure, instituting industrial democracy, and changing to a system of proportional representation—have majority support in the electorate. Only in its insistence on keeping Britain in the European Economic Community is it seriously out of line. The electoral damage that incurs depends on whether Europe becomes an important election issue. It has not been in the past.

Image

Other skeptics detect problems in the party's social image, variously portrayed as "elitist," "London dominated," "Oxbridge," "establishment," and "highbrow." As a description of the Social Democrats' leadership these phrases have a ring of truth. (However, they could equally well be applied to the leadership of the Conservative party and the left wing of the Labour party.) The fact that Roy Jenkins and Shirley Williams are unusually popular politicians, whereas Michael Foot and Tony Benn, Labour's leading left-wingers, are almost equally unpopular, suggests that a party's social image has little impact on its support—as countless earlier surveys confirm.

The Rank and File

Further doubts relate to the social characteristics of the new party's ordinary supporters. As Table 2 shows, a Social Democratic/Liberal alliance draws its sympathizers with remarkable evenness from across the demographic and social spectrum. Men and women, young and old, blue collar and white collar, declare their support in almost equal proportions. In this sense the Alliance represents all interests and none. And, the doubters argue, major parties cannot be created, or survive for long, without a distinctive social base. But, there is no inexorable law to this effect. Such parties do exist in the United States, Canada, and in Eire. For that matter, the Conservative party's voters (as opposed to its activists) are not socially distinctive. Indeed, with the erosion of class identities in Britain, it is arguable whether there are any major social bases left in Britain. The conventional wisdom of electoral sociology, based on the near dichotomous party system and social structure of the early 1950s, has lost its force.

Except in two crucial respects. Socially uniform support means geographically uniform support. The Social Democratic/Liberal vote is likely to be spread much more evenly across constituencies than that for the two main parties—and will be mercilessly penalized by Britain's simple-plurality electoral system as a result.

Exact calculations are bedeviled by the possibility of "tactical voting" and are dependent on the relative proportions of Conservative and Labour supporters defecting to the Alliance. But, assuming these proportions are roughly equal (by far the most probable outcome) a 25 to 30 percent vote would put the Alliance into second place almost everywhere—yet give it only 30 to 35 seats out of 635. A 30 to 33 percent vote would produce a mere 20 or so more seats, leaving the Alliance savagely underrepresented but with an odds-on chance of holding the balance in the Commons.

Table 2

A SOCIO-DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF SUPPORTERS OF THE SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY AND OF A SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC/LIBERAL ALLIANCE

	Percent who would vote Social Democratic if four major parties contested elections	Percent who would vote for a Social Democratic/ Liberal alliance
Men	29%	42%
Women	23	41
18-24	26	40
25-34	27	43
35-44	25	42
45-64	28	44
65 and older	22	37
Social Class		
Professional and managerial	31	44
Routine non-manual	28	45
Skilled manual	26	42
Semi- and unskilled; welfare dependents	22	38
Trade unionist household	28	43
Non-unionist household	25	41
House owner	28	43
Council house tenant	23	39

Source: Merged Gallup surveys for February 1981 (N = 7,571). Undecided excluded from percentage base.

Take-off begins only at the 34 percent mark.* Still badly underrepresented, the Alliance would nonetheless be virtually guaranteed the balance of power and strength to bargain for proportional representation from the minority party it kept in office. (Whether this could be successful is another matter; I have my doubts.) Above 37 percent, the Alliance would be the second largest party; above 39 percent large enough to form a government on its own. In other words, once off the ground, the Alliance would achieve near vertical take-off: every percentage point in the 34-40 percent range would be crucial.

Problems for the Alliance

The second major obstacle to the Social Democrats' success is the very condition for it: the alliance with the Liberals. Recognizing the logic of the electoral arithmetic is one thing; implementing a workable agreement quite another.

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* Editor's note: "Take-off" here means the proportion of popular votes the Social Democrats would have to win nationally in order to win a number of parliamentary seats large enough to prevent either the Conservative or the Labour party from winning a majority of all the seats. The author here is saying that 34 percent of the popular vote is the lowest threshold for the Social Democrats to win that many seats.

In a neat and tidy world the party leadership would sit around a table and divide up the electoral map: "You stand down [don't run] in constituency X and we will stand down in constituency Y." But political realities are less convenient. For one thing, there is no obvious division of the constituencies: the best prospects for the Social Democrats happen to be the best ones for the Liberals, too. And it is in these constituencies, not surprisingly, that Liberal associations have already selected candidates for the next general election. They will not stand down willingly. For another, local Liberal associations are autonomous: headquarters cannot force them to withdraw their candidates. And third, there are acute problems of timing. The Liberals have an incentive to stake out their best territory by selecting candidates soon. But the Social Democrats want to delay selection, partly to allow time for their organizations to grow, partly to give the fifty or so Labour MPs still contemplating defection, time to decide. Any electoral pact, therefore, is likely to be patchy, and to lose the Alliance some of the public credibility it so badly needs.

Prospects for the Alliance

The Alliance is unlikely to sustain its current level of support. But how far will it fall? An early April Marplan poll found that the main reason for Conservatives switching to the Social Democrats was "the Government's economic policies" whereas the main reason behind Labour defections was that "Labour was too left wing." Thus, an economic upturn would probably retrieve for the Conservative party many of its deserters. But there is no forecast yet of a decline in unemployment, the key indicator of economic recovery for most British elections. A return by Labour to the ideological center might retrieve some of its defectors. But that would require a decisive comeback by the Labour right, anything less merely redoubling the efforts of the left. Today, there is no sign of any such seachange within the Labour party. Thus, the Social Democrats' prospects depend not only on their own—and the Liberals' efforts—but on the incompetence and misjudgments of the two main parties. It is just possible that the Conservative and Labour parties will do enough to ensure the demise of the party system they have dominated since the 1920s.

THATCHER TO DATE

Question: Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister?



Note: For complete data, see *Public Opinion* February/March page 34.

Source: Surveys by Social Surveys (Gallup Poll) Ltd., London, atest that of May 6-11, 1981.

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

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Attitudes toward work in Germany, Sweden and at home

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Good News and Bad News from France— Jean-Francois Revel

plus

Is NATO in Trouble?
Polling the Poles
and
Seymour Martin Lipset on Labor Unions

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CONTENTS

2 **GOOD NEWS, BAD NEWS FROM FRANCE: THE COMMUNISTS LOST, MARXISM WON**
by Jean-Francois Revel
Everyone loves Paris in the springtime. But for the French Socialists this spring was particularly glorious. Jean Francois Revel, one of Europe's foremost journalists, examines the demise of the French Communists and takes a critical look at the Mitterrand agenda.

5 **POLLING THE POLES: A REPORT FROM SOLIDARITY HQ**
by Ludwik Dorn
The birth of Poland's independent trade union, Solidarity, is a revolutionary event—yet pragmatism characterizes the reformers' views. The existence of a substantial amount of survey data—largely unknown in the West—enables us to look at how the Poles view their political institutions and Solidarity.

8 **IS NATO IN TROUBLE? A SURVEY OF EUROPEAN ATTITUDES**
by Ken Adler and Douglas Wertman
The shadowy specter of neutralism in Europe is haunting the United States. Is it a phantom of the media's imagination, or is European public opinion possessed by the spirit of non-alignment? The authors examine survey data to provide some answers.

14 **WHAT DOES THE 1980 CENSUS SHOW? LOOKING AHEAD AND LOOKING BACK WITH BRUCE CHAPMAN, DANIEL LEVINE AND RICHARD EASTERLIN**
Demographics play an influential role in the formation of public opinion and vice versa. The editors sat down with three experts to review the big "census" stories of the decade and to speculate on future trends.

21 **OPINION ROUNDUP**

41 **WORKING LESS AND ENJOYING IT MORE IN SWEDEN**
by Hans Zetterberg

46 **WORKING LESS AND ENJOYING IT LESS IN GERMANY**
by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann
To complement the material on American attitudes toward work which appears in Opinion Roundup, two eminent West European survey researchers look at the state of the work ethic in Sweden and Germany. As values shift and the attractions of leisure time increase, work, it seems, is becoming less and less appealing.

52 **ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE PUBLIC: A TROUBLED UNION**
by Seymour Martin Lipset and William Schneider
Declining membership and changes in the composition of the workforce spell trouble for American labor unions. Public attitudes have undergone some major changes in recent years—not all of them positive. Will labor unions be able to polish their tarnished image?

57 **THE GROSS NATIONAL SPIRIT INDEX: EARLY REVIEWS**
by G. Donald Ferree, Jr.
Early reviews of the Gross National Spirit Index, which made its debut in the June/July issue of Public Opinion, *are in. Don Ferree, who helped design the index, answers the critics and offers our readers a more detailed explanation of this measure of national performance.*

by Kenneth Adler and Douglas Wertman

Is NATO in Trouble? A Survey of European Attitudes

Resistance against the nuclear madness has become necessary for the survival of all mankind. We therefore declare that we will use all our strength to help prevent the stationing of new U.S. medium range missiles in our country.

From a call for a peace
demonstration at the 19th
annual meeting of the West
German Protestant Church,
June 1981
(100,000 people are said to
have marched in the
demonstration)

Public opinion in Europe expects every possible step to be taken to stop the uncontrolled growth of nuclear weaponry, the dangers of which, if only for geographical reasons, are very real to us in the Federal Republic of Germany.

Helmut Schmidt
National Press Club speech
May 1981

The most urgent crisis is the impending collapse of NATO.
In all of Western Europe, a wave of public opinion that favors unilateral nuclear disarmament is gathering force. The governments oppose it, but ever more feebly and ineffectually. We deplore it, while consoling ourselves that it is a passing spasm of the kind we have lived through before. But it is not a spasm. It is a tidal wave that will sweep all before it, leaving NATO in ruins.

Irving Kristol
Wall Street Journal

[Neutralism] does exist in some places, but in an old nation like [Britain], it's stupefying. Yes, there is a danger of neutralism. It means giving up, the sign of immense fatigue.

Claude Cheysson
French Foreign
Minister

From London, Bonn, Brussels and the Hague come press reports of growing pacifist and neutralist sentiment in Europe. They tell of opposition to higher defense spending and to the new medium-range nuclear missiles (called long-range theater nuclear forces by the United States) NATO wants to station in Europe. Many church leaders, especially in West Germany and the Netherlands, have joined traditional left-wing opponents of NATO to protest the planned modernization of theater nuclear forces. At the same time, the Soviet Union is continuing its media campaign to convince West Europeans that stationing new nuclear weapons in NATO countries will renew the arms race and increase the danger of nuclear war in Europe.

Public opinion will play a key role in determining whether the NATO governments have the political will to increase defense spending and—in the case of Britain, West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Belgium—to go through with the planned deployment of the new nuclear weapons on their soil. In this situation it is useful to examine where West European publics—as opposed to governments, elites, and interest groups—stand on these questions today.

Are the Soviets Coming?

In March 1981, despite Afghanistan, Poland, and concern about increased tensions between the superpowers, majorities in West Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway were *not* concerned that the Soviet Union would "attack Western Europe within the next five years." Opinion in France and Britain was about evenly divided. Level of concern about political intimidation, that is the possibility that "the Soviet Union will pressure our country into adopting policies which are chiefly in the Soviet Union's interest," was roughly the same as concern over a military attack. Only a limited minority (one in five in Britain, fewer elsewhere) were "very" concerned about either a Soviet attack or political intimidation.[1]

Concerns about the Soviet threat are related to perceptions of Soviet military power. The days when the United States was seen as militarily superior are long gone. Except in Britain, however, most West Europeans today do not view the Soviet Union as militarily ahead of the United States. This is one reason why many see little need for a military buildup by NATO.

In March 1981, pluralities in France, Italy, the Netherlands, and Norway saw the two superpowers as about equal in "total military strength." But among those who saw a difference, the USSR was believed to lead the United States by ratios of five-to-one in Britain, three-to-one in the Netherlands, and two-to-one in France, West Germany, and Norway. Relatively few in these countries (between 10 percent in the Netherlands and 20 percent in Italy) considered the United States militarily superior.

The change in West Europeans' assessments of superpower strength appears to have occurred during the early and mid-seventies. Some time in that period, the view of American military superiority—which had prevailed in France, West Germany, and Italy—and the divided British opinion on superpower strength, started shifting in favor of the USSR.

The Reagan administration's well-publicized determination to redress the military balance, however, may already have made an impact. While surveys conducted during the 1970s show a tendency for West Europeans, especially in Britain and Germany, to believe that the balance of military power was shifting to the USSR, March 1981 data suggest that this trend has been halted. Those expecting the USSR to be strongest by 1986 declined in all six surveyed countries, and the proportions anticipating military parity rose.

It should be noted here that many West Europeans not only *perceive* (by pluralities in most cases) military equality, but most clearly *prefer* it to American superiority.[2] European publics tend to feel that equality reduces the risk of war. They are concerned that an imbalance could heat up the arms race, make negotiations more difficult, and tempt the inferior power to consider a first strike.

Support for NATO Continues to be Widespread

In the present situation, characterized by a relatively low level of fear of Soviet attack or intimidation, but the widespread perception of the USSR as at least the military equal of the United States, West Europeans still support NATO. Large majorities except in France, which belongs only to the political side of NATO, favor continued membership. In March 1981, NATO was considered "still essential" for their country's security by wide margins in Britain (70 to 15 percent), West Germany (62 to 20 percent), Italy (59 to 28 percent), Norway (66 to 21 percent), and the Netherlands (62 to 15 percent). In October 1980, Belgians (by a margin of 57 to 19 percent) also thought NATO membership essential to their security, while Danes favored continued NATO membership by 70 to 19 percent.[3]

Over the past decade, the level of support for NATO has remained constant in three countries for which trend data are available: Great Britain, Italy, and Norway. There has also been no change in France, where a plurality (44 to 34 percent) last October considered NATO essential. In West Germany, however, where support for NATO has been consistently high since the 1960s, backing appears to have declined between October 1980 and March 1981. During this period, the percentage considering NATO "not essential" rose from 8 to 20 percent. A May 1981 survey also found that support for NATO, while still high, had dropped since last year.[4]

Given this widespread and reasonably stable approval of NATO, why the warning by some experts that NATO is in serious trouble? One reason is the impression that neutralists are numerous and rapidly multiplying in Western Europe. Are they?

Neutrality or NATO

Neutralism is hard to define. The broadest definition would probably include all those who find it appealing to think that their country could sit in the bleachers and watch the big powers fight it out. A March 1980 survey, for example, showed that, at least in Britain and France (but not in Germany), majorities of those with an opinion wanted their governments to "do everything possible to stay out of arguments between the U.S. and the Soviet Union" rather than "back the U.S. against the Soviet Union more than it has until now."[5] And a December 1980 survey found that, if war threatened between the U.S. and the USSR, a majority of the French would have their government ask the Soviet Union to let France stay out of the conflict (63 percent) rather than side with the United States (22 percent).[6]

The desire to stay out of conflict or war is not necessarily the same as support for a policy of neutrality which eschews military alliances. In March 1981—in an attempt to test the extent of "hard-core" neutralists—USICA posed the following question: "All things considered, do you think it is better for our country to belong to NATO, the Western defense alliance, or would it be better for us to get out of NATO and become a neutral country?"

Replies showed that neutralist sentiments (by this definition) are not widespread, except in France. Large majorities in Great Britain (67 to 20 percent), West Germany (67 to 14 percent), Italy (60 to 31 percent), the Netherlands (62 to 17 percent), and Norway (74 to 15 percent) opted for NATO over neutrality. Only in France was opinion almost evenly divided between a preference for the Western alliance (45 percent) and becoming neutral (40 percent). Sizable minorities in West Germany (19 percent) and the Netherlands (21 percent), however, were undecided on this question.

In West Germany and Italy, where trend data are available, no evidence of any recent increase in neutralist sentiment exists.

- In 1973, as many favored remaining "militarily allied with the U.S." as preferred that the Federal Republic of Germany "attempt to be neutral" (42 to 41 percent). In May 1981, a majority favored a military alliance with the United States over neutrality.[7]
- In Italy, the public in October 1958 favored the Atlantic Alliance over neutrality by a margin of 50 to 25 percent compared to a majority of 60 to 31 percent this March.[8]

The Successor Generation

Even though "hard-core" neutralist sentiments are confined to a minority, there is reason for concern. In all six countries surveyed, such sentiments are more widespread among university-educated young people—the "successor generation" from which the future leadership of Western Europe will be drawn—than among those over fifty who have a university education. This older group, which supplies most of the current leadership, is overwhelmingly pro-NATO. The middle-aged, thirty-five to forty-nine year olds are generally midway between the young and the old on this issue. Even the youngest best-educated group, though, still tends to favor NATO membership over neutrality.

Figure 1

PERCENT OF BEST-EDUCATED WHO FAVOR NATO OR NEUTRALITY



Source: U.S. International Communication Agency, March 1981.

Better Red than Dead

Another concern among NATO supporters is the apparent growth of "pacifism"—or at least a reluctance to risk nuclear war. Both 1980 and 1981 findings give us a clear indication of the unwillingness of many West Germans to see their country defended with nuclear weapons. Although only West German data are available we might expect to find similar results in other countries.

In February-March 1980, a 64 to 19 percent majority said that the FRG should use "military weapons" to defend itself against a military attack on its soil. A 53 to 31 percent majority believed that the FRG should defend itself against a military attack "even if the war is fought primarily on the soil of the FRG." Only 15 percent favored the defense of the Federal Republic "if nuclear weapons have to be used on the soil of the FRG." Seventy-one percent were opposed.[9]

Survey data reveal that a desire to avoid nuclear war at all costs has increased since the 1950s. The question, "No one knows what will happen, but what do you think—if we are confronted with the choice of either letting Europe become Sovietized or resisting the move with every means at our disposal, which is more important—to defend democratic freedom, even if it leads to a nuclear war, or to avoid war above all, even though it means having to live under a Communist government?" produced these results:

	May 1955	July 1960	Dec. 1975	Mar. 1976	May 1981
Avoid war even if it means living under a Communist government	36%	38%	49%	52%	48%
Defend democratic freedom, even if it leads to a nuclear war	33	30	25	28	27
Impossible to say	31	32	26	20	25

Source: Surveys by the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy.

While many West Germans are willing to see a conventional defense of their country against any attack, they are clearly unwilling, and have been for some time, to see a nuclear defense of their soil. If these findings do not represent a feeling of "better red than dead," they do suggest a feeling of "better red than incinerated."

Limited Willingness of West European Publics to Take a Greater Share of the NATO Burden

Although most West Europeans believe NATO is essential, they are largely unwilling to pay the costs (financial and other) of NATO membership. This has become especially evident in relation to the two most important NATO decisions of the past several years: the 1977 NATO agreement calling for annual 3 percent real increases in defense spending by each member country, and the December 1979 NATO decision providing for deployment of new long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF) in Western Europe concurrent with arms control negotiations which would include LRTNF.

The United States has, with increasing public approval, undertaken a defense buildup in the past few years, but only a few of the West European countries have consistently met the 3 percent goal. West European governments have defended themselves against American criticism of this "failure" by pointing to their economic problems and to the period between the late 1960s and 1978 when their own defense spending generally increased while U.S. defense expenditures declined in real terms.

Survey results suggest that, should they try, the governments in the West European NATO countries would have great difficulty in rallying broad public support for increasing defense expenditures. For, contrary to the agreement made in NATO by their governments, six in ten in Britain and about seven in ten in West Germany, Norway, the Netherlands, Italy, and Belgium favor either keeping defense expenditures at present levels or reducing them.

In March 1981 a third in Great Britain favored larger outlays for defense, but no more than one in five in any other West European NATO country wanted increased defense expenditures (Norway 21 percent, Italy 16 percent, West Germany 15 percent, and France 15 percent). In the Netherlands and Belgium, one in ten or fewer supported this.

The prevailing view in Great Britain, West Germany, France, Norway, and Belgium (shared by half or slightly fewer) was to maintain defense spending at present levels. In the Netherlands, however, about as many (and in Italy somewhat more) preferred decreased spending as favored keeping spending at present levels. About one-third or more in Italy (43 percent), the Netherlands (35 percent), and Belgium (34 percent) opted for decreased defense spending. Fewer felt this way in West Germany (20 percent), Norway (16 percent), and Great Britain (15 percent).

Support for increased defense spending is lower in Britain than it was in 1979 and early 1980 (when about half wanted defense increases), but has changed very little over the past few years in West Germany and Italy. Overall, attitudes toward defense spending are substantially the same as a decade ago. This lack of public support in West Europe for increased defense spending is in strong contrast to the current broad backing the American public gives to greater defense expenditures.

Four often interrelated factors help to explain why increasing defense spending has such limited popular support in Western Europe: (1) the absence of a widely felt need for stronger defense, since many West Europeans (as already discussed) do not feel particularly threatened by the Soviet Union; (2) economic problems coupled with an unwillingness to cut spending for social services; (3) a sense of futility, particularly in the smaller NATO members, based on the feeling that their country's modest contribution will be of little importance to the overall NATO effort; and (4) a preference for arms control negotiations and détente rather than strengthening their armed forces.

Economic Problems and Competition with Social Services

Serious economic problems have forced West European governments to economize and even to seek reductions in government spending. Widespread public unwillingness to accept cuts in social services has made it difficult for many of these governments to implement the increased defense spending agreed to in NATO. A very recent example is the newly announced 1982 West German budget—in which there is *no* real increase (and possibly even a small real decline) in defense spending. On July 30, explaining why West Germany would fall well short of the NATO 3 percent goal, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt said that "we cannot, when savings are being made everywhere, protect one area of the budget artificially."[10]

When West Europeans are forced to weigh priorities between defense spending and social services, support for defense spending frequently diminishes. In March 1981, those favoring increased defense spending were asked whether they would continue to support such increases if this might mean a decline in social services in their country. Given this choice, support for increased defense expenditures dropped even further: from 33 percent to 17 percent in Britain, from 21 percent to 9 percent in Norway, from 16 percent to 5 percent in Italy, and from 15 percent to 4 percent in France. The already low levels of support for increased defense spending in West Germany (15 percent) and the Netherlands (11 percent) declined only slightly.

In Britain, even the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan did not substantially affect the budget priorities of the public. In March 1980 (only three months after the Soviet invasion), support was considerably greater for spending on social services than for defense expenditures. Majorities of between 59 and 68 percent believed that Britain was spending too little on education and schools, the National Health Service, or old age pensions. In contrast, far fewer (29 percent) thought defense outlays too little. This represented only a small change from the results of a similar survey conducted in November 1979 shortly before the Soviet invasion.[11]

Sense of Futility in the Smaller Countries

Many West Europeans, especially in the smaller NATO countries, seem to feel that their contribution to the total NATO defense effort is insignificant and that it is futile for them to make sacrifices in order to increase slightly NATO's overall capabilities—especially in the context of the superpower nuclear balance.

In *Belgium*, for example, a plurality (by 41 to 30 percent) believed in June-July 1980 that what their country does for defense does not seem useful. At the same time, fully one-third (35 percent) thought Belgian defense should use only non-violent means.[12]

In *Denmark*, a 56 to 19 percent majority last fall believed that Denmark could not stave off an attack long enough for help to arrive from its NATO allies. Understandably, those who considered a temporary holding action impossible were much less likely to support increased defense spending (13 percent) than those who thought a Danish defense possible (37 percent). Even among those believing a temporary Danish defense possible, a majority (by 52 to 37 percent) opposed increasing defense expenditures to meet the NATO goal.[13]

Preference for Arms Control and Détente

West Europeans generally prefer arms control negotiations and conciliation to strengthening NATO and firmness. In March 1981, pluralities or more in Italy (by 60 to 22 percent), France (by 50 to 18 percent), the Netherlands (by 44 to 21 percent), Britain (by 40 to 31 percent), and West Germany (by 35 to 21 percent) said that the best way for their country to improve its security was "by pushing harder for arms control negotiations to try to reduce military forces on both sides" rather than "by strengthening its military forces to help NATO maintain a balance of military power with the East." In West Germany, a quarter (25 percent) volunteered that both should be done simultaneously. In Norway, equal proportions (38 to 35 percent) favored pushing for arms control and strengthening NATO.

The importance of this pro-arms control sentiment was underlined in March 1981 when, presented with a list of actions which might be taken if the Soviets invaded Poland, only about one in ten in West Germany, Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Norway, or Italy favored suspending arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union.

Further evidence of the importance given to détente by the West European publics comes from early 1981 surveys. They found that two-thirds of the West Germans (by 67 to 28 percent) and half of the French (by 52 to 35 percent) thought that their country should follow a policy of conciliation rather than a policy of firmness toward the Soviet Union. By contrast, more than half the Americans, when asked the same question at the same time, favored firmness over conciliation (by 57 percent to 34 percent). In addition, far more West Germans (65 percent) and French (54 percent) than Americans (34 percent) believed that the Western countries have benefited as much from détente as have the Communist countries. This difference between the West European and American publics is in line with their contrasting attitudes toward defense spending. It is clear that the recent disagreement between the American and West European governments on the priority of strengthening military capability versus arms control negotiations, is mirrored in the opinions of the general public.[14]

Widespread Opposition to LRTNF Deployment

The December 1979 NATO "two-track" decision in response to the Soviet SS-20 buildup called for two concurrent actions: deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF)—mostly ground-launched cruise missiles—in Western Europe beginning in 1983 or 1984; and the initiation of arms control negotiations on these types of weapons. It was tentatively planned that the deployment would take place in five NATO countries. The British, Italian, and West German governments agreed to future deployment of the weapons on their soil around the time of the NATO decision. The Belgian and Dutch governments, however, postponed their decision on stationing in their countries to depend upon the progress of arms control negotiations. In September 1980, the Belgian government gave a qualified acceptance of deployment in Belgium, dependent upon arms control negotiations. The Dutch said in December

(Continued on page 50)

(Continued from page 12)

1979 that they would make their decision in late 1981.

In the countries where stationing is planned, there is much public opposition to deployment of these new weapons on their soil:

In *Britain*, the public, by a 50 to 41 percent margin, was opposed to its "government's decision to allow the American government to base cruise missiles on British soil," according to an April 1981 survey. This is a change from September 1980 when Britons, by a 49 to 43 percent margin, favored the government decision to accept deployment. [Marplan survey]

In *West Germany*, in an Allensbach survey, a 39 to 29 percent plurality in May 1981 opposed LRTNF deployment on German soil. A third were undecided. But if deployment is linked directly in the question with concurrent arms control negotiations (as Allensbach did in the same survey), opposition to deployment decreases substantially. The question, "The NATO two-part decision was made some time ago. According to this decision, the NATO countries have agreed, on the one hand, to station missiles in Europe to offset the Soviet medium range missiles, and on the other hand, to take the initiative in disarmament talks with the Soviet Union. All in all, do you think this two-part decision is good or not?" produced these results: Fifty-three percent of the population felt the decision was good; 20 percent said it was bad.

In yet another measure of TNF feeling in the same survey, Germans were asked whether the NATO plan "to station American medium range missiles in European member countries of NATO, for example, the FRG, to counterbalance Russian medium range missiles should be prevented," 33 percent said the plan should be prevented, but 37 percent said it should not. Seventy-seven percent of the Greens said it should be prevented, compared to 21 percent of CDU/CSU members, 36 percent of SPD members, and 45 percent of FDP members.

In *Belgium*, a 42 to 26 percent plurality in September 1980 opposed "the installation of American missiles on its territory." [INUSOP]

In *the Netherlands*, a 68 to 28 percent majority in April 1981 opposed the siting of cruise missiles in their country. Last fall, the Dutch public, by a 53 to 39 percent margin, did not think that "nuclear weapons should be present on Dutch soil." [NIPO]

One aspect of the opposition to LRTNF deployment, at least in Britain and the Netherlands where relevant data are available, is a generalized opposition to all nuclear weapons among a segment of the population. In *Britain*, five surveys over the past year indicate a solid core of about a quarter of the British public which supports unilateral nuclear disarmament. Most recently, in April 1981, 23 percent thought that Britain should "abandon nuclear weapons altogether, no matter what other countries do."[15] In *the Netherlands*, last fall the public was evenly divided (48 to 46 percent) on the general question of whether Western Europe should "possess nuclear weapons." And in April 1981, 38 percent agreed that the West should disarm unilaterally.[16]

Conclusion

What does it all add up to? Is NATO in trouble?

We must emphasize that all the data reported in this paper deal only with mass publics, not with elites. On many foreign policy issues, general public opinion acts primarily as a constraint, not as the decisive factor. Both defense spending and the deployment of long-range theater nuclear forces, however, and the broader issue of how best to avoid war, are questions on which large segments of the public have strong opinions and on which West European publics will have influence.

NATO as a formal organization is not in trouble among the mass publics, at least not yet. But West Europeans increasingly appear to doubt that more money for defense will buy greater security or that new missiles in their backyard will keep nuclear war from their front door. The people of Western Europe want to see a strong—but not militarily superior—United States. They would welcome strong U.S. leadership in world affairs. At the same time, they want evidence of a continuing U.S. effort to reduce tensions and renew arms control negotiations. Unless West Europeans come to believe that the United States is making a genuine effort to reduce the level of nuclear armaments, their governments will find it difficult to win public support for improving NATO's military capabilities.

The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the U.S. International Communication Agency or of the United States Government.

Footnotes

(1) The data used in this paper—all representative national samples—come from a variety of sources. Some of the surveys were sponsored by USICA, others by West European newspapers and periodicals. Fieldwork was normally conducted by commercial local research institutes. Data are usually based on about 1,000 in-home personal interviews with a probability or quota sample of adults. *Unless otherwise noted, all surveys cited here are USICA surveys.*

(2) See Leo [illegible]spi in U.S. Advisory Commission on Information. *28th Annual Report to Congress*, May 1977, pp. 120-124.

(3) The Danish survey was conducted by the Danish Gallup Institute. All other surveys cited in this paragraph are ICA surveys.

(4) Conducted by Infas Institute for the Press and Information Service of the West German government, May-June 1981, 1,600 interviews.

(5) Gallup International, March 1980. Reported in *Washington Post*, April 17, 1980.

(6) Conducted by SOFRES and reported in *Actuel*, Paris, January 1981.

(7) Trend surveys by Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy. May 1981 results reported in *Capital*, August 1981.

(8) Conducted by DOXA, Milan. Reported in Pierpaolo Luzzato Fegiz, *Il Volto Sconosciuto Dell'Italia*, Second Series, 1966, p. 1063.

(9) Surveys conducted by the German Armed Forces Institute for Social Research, reported in Mathias Schoenborn, "Perceptions of National Security of the U.S. and the Federal Republic of Germany: Stability and Change in Public Opinion," AAPOR Conference, May 1981.

(10) See Bradley Graham, "West Germans Reveal New, Tight Budget," *Washington Post*, July 31, 1981, pp. E1 and E3.

(11) Survey by British Gallup.

(12) Survey by INUSOP.

(13) Survey by the Danish Gallup Institute.

(14) Surveys by BVA for France, EMNID for Germany, and Gallup for USA.

(15) Surveys by Marplan for Britain, NIPO for the Netherlands.

(16) Support for unilateral nuclear disarmament tends to fluctuate with events. For example, two surveys conducted in September 1980 showed 21 and 28 percent, respectively, supporting unilateralism for Britain. In October and November—following last fall's Labour Party Conference resolution advocating such a policy and a major effort by the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, which was the most extensive in Britain since the "ban the bomb campaign" of the early 1960s—support for unilateral nuclear disarmament jumped to 35 and 41 percent, respectively.

Much Ado About Nothing

What follows are excerpts from an article by Dr. Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann which appeared in the August 1981 issue of CAPITAL, *a German business magazine. The survey described in the article was taken in May of this year.*

Survey research has presented itself in a new role in the last few weeks. When the Allensbach Institute was established, we had thought that survey research would play the role of an early warning system. Surprises such as the 1930 Reichstag Election, when the ranks of the National Socialists swelled from 12 to 107 seats overnight and could no longer be contained, were not supposed to happen again. But we had not thought of the reverse situation: one believes a powerful groundswell exists, but when the matter is actually investigated by means of survey research, nothing can be found to confirm it.

This is the situation in Germany today. Impressive pictures on television, reports in the newspapers, pictorials in magazines—all stir one's memory and confirm the reality of the new peace movement. But the questions posed in our surveys over the last three decades, most recently in May of 1981, speak a different language.

The fear of not being able to defend ourselves against the East has long dominated the mood in the Federal Republic of Germany. These fears are not linked to pacifism. (See article by Ken Adler and Doug Wertman for a further discussion of this point.)

What is perceived as growing anti-Americanism in West Germany appears to be a combination of media coverage and the younger generation's critical attitude toward the United States; it is particularly widespread among those who, as Environmentalists (Greens), also capture public attention.

There is in the Federal Republic of Germany today more hesitance toward *unconditional* backing of the United States. The number saying that in matters of foreign policy Germans should decide on a case by case basis whether to follow the Americans rose from 56 percent in May 1980 to 65 percent in May 1981. When presented with two alternatives regarding American policy, 68 percent of Germans agreed with the statement: "we should naturally show solidarity with the Americans as far as possible, but when they adopt an unreasonable policy, they can't expect it of us that we follow with measures that harm our own interests," up from 49 percent the year before. (See table below for additional data on German feelings about America.)

The political core of German sympathy for the United States is shown in the statement, "No other country stands up for democracy again and again as does the United States or is such a strong bastion against Communist dictators." Fifty-six percent of the population agreed.

PERCEPTIONS OF AMERICA

		By Party Preference			
	Total	CDU/ CSU	SPD	FDP	The Greens
Question: There are various words printed on these cards. These words are capable of arousing both pleasant feelings and unpleasant feelings in different people. Could you please distribute the cards onto this sheet according to how you feel?					
"U.S." pleasant, likeable	65%	75%	63%	62%	25%
"U.S." unpleasant	17	10	17	20	46
Question: If someone says that the American consumer society and throw-away mentality serves as a warning example to the rest of the world, would you agree with this, or not?					
Agree	60	55	62	62	81
Disagree	23	26	20	24	12
Question: If someone says that the U.S. is heading for a "cold war" and is making the world uncertain again, would you agree or disagree with this person?					
Agree	27	19	32	26	56
Disagree	53	62	49	51	26
Question: If you heard the following: the U.S. today has finally again become a reliable leader for the Western world, seeing our security vis-à-vis the East from its position of strength—would you say that's true, or don't you see it that way?					
True	47	61	40	36	15
Don't see it that way	26	17	30	29	56

Note: Unknown/Don't Know not shown. **Source:** Survey by Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy, May 1981.

cline. In some occupations, such as bank tellers, there's been a big improvement. But that occupation—because it is largely computerized—has become an unskilled occupation. Many educated women are still taking jobs that make it possible for them to leave the labor force and then reenter. Computer programming is that kind of job. I agree with Dan that they tend to reenter and will tend to reenter after their children get in school. But, they are interested chiefly in jobs that can be combined with the raising of children. The fact that fewer women are going into traditional teaching jobs doesn't mean they are opting for the traditional male types of jobs. They are seeking substitute jobs where they can come in and out the way they did in the past.

* * *

Wattenberg: *Dick, much of your work, much of the work the Census Bureau tries to do is to project and predict—to look into the future through the use of this demographic material. Putting ourselves at this table in the year 2000, let me ask each of you first, are you optimistic or pessimistic? And, second, if you were looking back from the year 2000 to today or to the decade of the seventies what would you say has changed in the nature of our national being?*

Chapman: I am an optimist. If I were looking back from 2000 I would say that in the sixties and in the early seventies, we had a loosening up of a number of different standards followed by a tightening up. The pendulum swung.

In education you are going to see a reevaluation. The 1980s approach of educational institutions will be more sophisticated because it is going to be harder to get students. There are going to be fewer children, particularly teenagers, and a shrinkage in the number of students available to colleges. They are going to have to be competitive. There are going to be more and more of us who stretch the idea of education past childhood and young adulthood.

In terms of migration, you will see more rural growth which necessarily means a reevaluation of what cities do and how they operate, and what makes people want to live in them.

The issue of crime is going to continue to be very important. People are less tolerant about crime than they were a decade ago.

In terms of the economy, as the baby boom generation matures and gains experience, it will help fuel economic prosperity and a number of other breakthroughs in the eighties. I was born in 1940 and I've been surfing at the head of the crest of the baby boom all my life. We were constantly being told, this is the first generation to do this and the first generation to do that, the first McLuhan generation, the first generation to see technology as a means of development. That sense of expecting change and creating change will have a tremendous economic effect. You are going to see more thirty-or-forty-year-old people starting novel technological companies.

Easterlin: To take your second question first, it seems to me that looking back from the year 2000 to the present, one would tend to emphasize the continuity of traditional American values, and see that the notion of ever-rising economic aspirations and improving standards of living continued to be a governing factor in people's behavior. This is contrary to the anticipations that arose in the late 1960s and early 1970s, when there was much talk about communal living and similar radical lifestyles.

Family values, the nuclear family as the ideal, will continue. There are going to be some modifications. There has been a relaxation of sexual standards. Unmarried couples living together as a premarital arrangement will probably continue to grow. Some of the barriers to women in the marketplace will break down, and therefore, there will be a modest improvement in the kinds of jobs they do.

My views about the importance of generation size in shaping individual welfare, would imply an optimistic outlook for the coming two decades because the baby bust generations of the last twenty years will be reaching adulthood. The scarcity of young adults will be increasingly pronounced. For this reason, I am inclined to feel that the economic circumstances of young adults in terms of employment and income, relative to their parents' situation will show by 2000 a marked improvement compared with the present situation. Because of this, there will be some movement toward early marriage again, though this will be tempered by the trend toward growing college education. This may mean larger families among young households by the year 2000. The general rise in divorce rates will be considerably moderated over the next twenty years. The psychological stress young adults have been evidencing—the figures I mentioned on mortality among young adults due to violence are good indicators—is likely to take a turn for the better. Crime rates among the young are not likely to continue to rise as they have. Reports of alienation among the young are likely to decline, so that the general improvement in the circumstances of the young will contribute to a happier economic and social environment over the next twenty years, just as in the last twenty years it has contributed to a deterioration and the feeling of social malaise—that things are going to hell.

Levine: I am an optimist, which is unusual for me because on most things, I'm not. But as far as the country is concerned, I am a *real* optimist. I differ a little with Dick. Looking back from the year 2000, you are going to see significant changes in the position of women; it is going to be dramatic, much more dramatic than Dick predicts. The birth rates are going to stay down. Women are still going to have difficulties adjusting to the dual role of wanting to participate in the labor market and also wanting children and families. That is going to be a problem in the year 2000. But women are going to make significant inroads into male-dominated occupation groups. I am still concerned about what I called the growing confederation of minorities. That's the one big problem from my view. Will they assimilate fast enough; will the economic situation allow them to assimilate?

I agree with the others' assessment of traditional factors. We are not going to become a hedonistic society completely, with wild sexual mores, or anything else. We are going to have significant changes in our industrial base and the way our economic base is organized. A lot of this is going to be outside our control. It's going to be affected by what happens in the rest of the world. We won't be able to compete in the manufacturing sector to the same extent we once did. We are going to see significant changes in economic organizations which will bring about, through technology, tremendous changes in occupations and industries, and in the way we service the rest of the world. We are going to be more externally oriented in the year 2000.

Looking back, those will be the major changes. Overall, I am an optimist. I expect good things for the country, both economically and socially. ◼

AMERICANS AT WORK

It is 2:30 on a splendid Sunday afternoon in late July, and from the bay window of my cottage on a Maine lake I can see scores of people cooking out, swimming, canoeing, and waterskiing. Amid all this, I am sitting alone *inside*, writing a thousand words on *work* for *Public Opinion* magazine. It is not inappropriate to inquire why—especially given the data on attitudes toward one's job and toward work itself that we are reviewing in this issue.

It would be easy to say that my sticking to business, even when tempted to do otherwise, is yet another expression of the much-vaunted work ethic. This just isn't the case, however. Oh yes, I think I appreciate hard work as a good thing and a sign of character, but my attitudes toward work have little to do with why I am working. More to the point here, I suspect that the "work ethic" generally has much less to do with why people work, how well, or how hard, etc., than is often suggested in commentaries on the subject; and that the "work context" often is of decisive importance. I am writing these thousand words on a Sunday afternoon not because I "like to work" but because I am the editor of the center section and we are about to close it. The *context*, not the *ethic*, determines the action.



"Give me a W. Give me an O. Give me an R. Give me a K. I want an E. I want a T. Give me an H and an I and a C."

Drawing by Booth; © 1972, The New Yorker Magazine, Inc.

Over the last eighty years, there have been some extraordinary changes in the *context* in which work takes place in the United States—changes which dwarf any which have occurred in underlying *attitudes* toward work as a social value. The demographic data that we present in this issue show some of the contextual changes most dramatically. Two-thirds of all Americans are now employed in white collar occupations.

As social attitudes and expectations concerning married women working outside the home have changed over the last quarter century, there has been an explosive growth in the size of the labor force and a big jump in the representation of married women in it. The 27 percent increase in the total labor force between 1970 and 1980, fueled by the rush of women into it, was by far the largest in this century. In 1950, just 24 percent of married women worked outside the home; by 1979, however, the proportion had doubled to 49 percent. These developments seem to have had little to do with underlying attitudes toward work—and much to do with the extension of the individualistic claim to having "a job and a career of one's own."

Various pollsters have sought to measure possible shifts in the work ethic by asking respondents, through differing question wording, whether *work* or *pleasure* is the more compelling value. The results are inconclusive. When the Roper Organization, to take one example, led into the subject by inviting respondents to agree or disagree with the proposition that "people should place more emphasis on working hard and doing a good job than on what gives them personal satisfaction and pleasure," it got pro-work agreement about *two-thirds* of the time—more actually from the lower-income than from the affluent. In another instance, though, the *Los Angeles Times* did not place positive emphasis on the value of "hard work," but rather asked "which . . . is more important in life: working hard and doing what is expected of you . . . or doing the things that give you personal satisfaction and pleasure?" It got a very different set of answers. The "hard work" response this time was given by just a bit more than one-third of respondents (see page 25 of Opinion Roundup). The fact of the matter seems to be—and this is borne out by many of the survey data presented here—*that work is a very important value but still only one of a number of competing values.* It shares the stage with other commitments, like that of seeking "personal satisfaction and pleasure." As always in cases where the public is ambivalent, question wording is critical. The tone and emphasis of the questions, favoring one value or another, account for large swings in response *that should not be thought of as actual swings in sentiment on work.* We simply don't know if there is a declining or increasing commitment to work as an abstracted value, although we do know that the work context is changing in a variety of consequential ways.

Americans do worry about the degree of the nation's commitment to work and job-related achievement. Again and again when asked, they profess to see a decline in willingness to work hard and in the inclination to take pride in one's labor. But it is not clear what should be made of this finding. People regularly express concern about the health of almost all values that are of deep importance to them—as work surely is to Americans. It may be, in other words, that the public actually sees a decreasing commitment to hard work and to quality workmanship; or it may be that the public is simply anxious when it considers the status of a value that is so important to it and whose context is so dramatically changing.

In reading through these data on American attitudes toward work, the reader is advised to exercise more than a little caution. There are a number of excellent questions and, in their accumulation, the findings are both interesting and important. But there is so much ambivalence surrounding work—which looms so large in our lives and in our values—that one cannot, and here does not, arrive at a neatly defined and unambiguous set of opinion survey answers.

Everett Carll Ladd, Consulting Editor

THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF WORK IN AMERICA

LABOR FORCE 1890, 1950, 1980

	1890	1950	1980
Total labor force	23.3 million	63.9 million	104.7 million
Total women of working age	23.1 million	54.3 million	86.4 million
Percent in labor force	(17.3%)	(33.9%)	(51.6%)
Total men of working age	24.4 million	52.4 million	77.7 million
Percent in labor force	(79.9%)	(83.6%)	(77.4%)
Total women in labor force	4.0 million	18.4 million	44.6 million
Women as percent of labor force	(17.2%)	(28.8%)	(42.6%)
Total men in labor force	19.3 million	45.4 million	60.1 million
Men as percent of labor force	(82.8%)	(71.2%)	(57.4%)

Source: 1890 and 1950: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970;* 1980 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.



Two major demographic developments are changing the context of work in America. The first, which began earlier in the century, was the shift from farming to manufacturing as the focus of employment. The second major shift has been from the manual to the service sector.

SERVICE IN AMERICA



	Agriculture	Blue Collar/ Manufacturing	White Collar/ Service workers
1910	31%	38%	31%
1920	27	40	33
1930	21	40	39
1940	17	40	43
1950	12	41	47
1960	6	40	54
1970	3	37	60
1980	3	30	67

Note: For 1910-1970, agriculture = farmers; farm laborers/foremen. Blue collar = craftsmen/foremen; operatives; laborers except farm and mine. White collar/service workers = professional/technical; managers/officials/proprietors; clerical; sales; household; service workers. 1980 figures based on employed persons.

Source: For 1910-1970, *Historical Statistics*, part 1, p. 139, based on census data; for 1980, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, January 1981, pp. 180-181.

Note: Some of the data in this section comes from the Census Bureau and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. The figures on employment status from the decennial censuses are generally comparable with similar data collected in the *Current Population Survey* used by BLS. Some differences may exist due to variations in enumeration and processing techniques.

DEMOGRAPHICS

Discussions of Americans' commitment to their work often focus on the work ethic, a concept which is difficult to measure in survey or demographic data. Because of the difficulty in measuring this dimension, economists have been skeptical about citing it as a major factor influencing productivity decline.



Note: Average of individual years in decade.
Source: For 1909-1970, *Historical Statistics*, part 1; for 1971-1980, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.



Source: For 1890-1960 figures, National Bureau of Economic Research; for 1970 and 1979, Bureau of Labor Statistics.



Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, *1980 Supplement to Economic Indicators.*



Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, May 1981 (1948-1980); *Historical Statistics*, part 1, D9.

Women Count More than Ever

Peter Drucker recently observed that we are "busily unmaking one of the proudest social achievements of the 19th century reformers, which was to take married women out of the work force so they could devote themselves to family and children." The increase in the number of women in the work force in the last quarter century has been dramatic. In the survey data in Opinion Roundup, we have tried to show how this development has affected commitments to the twin American ethics of work and family.

FEMALE LABOR FORCE AS PERCENTAGE OF FEMALE POPULATION



	Total	Single	Married	Widowed or Divorced
1910[1]	25%	51%	11%	34%
1920[1]	24	46[4]	9	—[4]
1930[1]	25	51	12	34
1940[2]	26	46	14	30
1950[2]	29	46	23	33
1960[2]	35	43	32	36
1970[3]	42	51	40	37
1979[3]	51	63	50	40

Note: [1] Based on persons age fifteen or older.
[2] Based on persons age fourteen or older.
[3] Based on persons age sixteen or older.
[4] Single includes widowed or divorced.

Source: For 1910-1970 figures, U.S. Bureau of the Census; for 1979, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES OF MARRIED WOMEN, HUSBAND PRESENT, BY PRESENCE AND AGE OF CHILDREN

	Total	With no children under age eighteen	With children under age eighteen	With children under age six
1950	23.8%	30.3%	18.4%	11.9%
1960	30.5	34.7	27.6	18.6
1970	40.8	42.2	39.7	30.3
1979	49.4	46.7	51.9	43.2

Note: Children are defined as "own" children of the women and include never-married sons and daughters, stepchildren, and adopted children. Excluded are other related children such as grandchildren, nieces, nephews, and cousins, and unrelated children.

Source: *Perspectives on Working Women: A Databook,* U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics Bulletin 2080, October 1980.



Grow Old Along With Me

United States Population 65 and older, 1930-2050



Source: 1900-1970, *Historical Statistics of the United States Colonial Times to 1970;* Series A119-134. 1980-2050, *Current Population Reports: Population Estimates and Projection;* Series P.25, No. 74, Table 4 and Table 8.

West German Population 65 and older, 1950-2020



Source: 1950-2000, *World Population and Its Age-Sex Composition by Country, 1950-2000:* Demographic estimation and projection as assessed in 1978. Prepared by the Population Division, Department of International Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat ESA/P/WP.65. January 2, 1980, p. 172. 2010-2020: *World Population and Its Age-Sex Composition by Country 1950-2025,* Demographic estimation and projection as assessed in 1980. United Nations Population Division unpublished computer printout.

Japanese Population 65 and older, 1930-2020



Note: Figures for 1980-2020 are based on estimates, Ministry of Health & Welfare.

Source: National Census, Bureau of Statistics, Prime Minister's Secretariat.

WORKING IN AMERICA

IS THE WORK ETHIC WORKING?

Question: Now here are some statements about marriage, work, divorce, etc. (Card shown respondent) Would you please read each one and tell me whether on balance you tend to agree with it or disagree with it? People should place more emphasis on working hard and doing a good job than on what gives them personal satisfaction and pleasure.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

Work attitudes is one of the many areas in survey research where responses are highly susceptible to question wording. The *Los Angeles Times* question shown below appears to tap a different sentiment than the Roper question shown above.

Question: Which do you think is more important in life: working hard and doing what is expected of you . . . or doing the things that give you personal satisfaction and pleasure? (Accept "both equally" as a volunteered response)



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 15-22, 1981.

FAMILY STILL COMES FIRST

Question: What's the most important thing in your life? (Code as work or work-related, family or family-related, or anything else.)



Note: In 1940 the Gallup Organization asked: "If you could be sure of only one of the following, which would you choose—wealth, a happy home, or an interesting job?" Sixty-nine percent responded "a happy home." In a series of surveys by Yankelovich, Skelly and White for the American Council of Life Insurance, latest that of April 25-May 23, 1981, the question, "Would you please tell me which of the choices listed on this card is most important to you?—A happy family life, a fulfilling career, the opportunity to develop as an individual, making a lot of money" was asked. Those responding a "happy family life" = 1973, 80%; 1975, 80%; 1978, 74%; 1981, 77%.
Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 15-22, 1981.

NEW RULES

Question: Ideally, which of the following four lifestyles would you prefer? . . . *A traditional marriage* in which the husband is responsible for providing for the family and the wife for the home and taking care of the children. An equal *marriage of shared responsibility* in which the husband and wife cooperate on work, homemaking and child raising. *Living with someone* but not marrying. Remaining *single.*



Note: *"Living with someone else" = 0.
Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc. for the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, September 1-November 15, 1980.

Work and Success

HARD WORK STILL COUNTS

Question: Some people say that people get ahead by their own hard work; others say that lucky breaks or help from other people are more important. Which do you think is most important?



Note: "Other" not shown.
Source: Surveys by the National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, latest that of February-April 1980, and the *Los Angeles Times*, March 15-22, 1981.

BUT WOMEN LESS SURE OF THE PAY-OFF

Question: Do you agree or disagree that it is true in this country that if you work hard, eventually you will get ahead?

"If you work hard, eventually you will get ahead"



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, March 25-29, 1981.

SUCCESS CENTRAL

Question: How important is success? Is it very important to be successful in your work, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or very unimportant to be successful in your work?



Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 15-22, 1981.

HORATIO ALGER LIVES

Question: Do you think it's possible nowadays for someone in this country to start out poor, and become rich by working hard?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, May 22-26, 1981.

Why Working Isn't Productive

LESS PRIDE IN WORK

Question: Would you say Americans are taking more pride in their work now than ten years ago, less pride or about the same amount?



Source: Survey by NBC News/Associated Press, July 16-17, 1979.

MORE COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED

Question: In your own case, could you accomplish more each day if you tried? (Asked only of those now working)



Note: A 1973 Gallup national asking found that 52% agreed with this statement.
Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 15-22, 1981.

PERFORMANCE POOR

Question: Some people claim that American workers are not turning out as much work each day as they should. Do you agree or disagree with this? (Asked only of those now working)



Note: A 1973 Gallup national asking found that 63% agreed with this statement.
Source: Survey by the *Los Angeles Times*, March 15-22, 1981.

GOOFING OFF

Question: On an average workday, what percentage of the time, if any, would you say most of the people in your workplace spend "goofing off." That is, not working when they're supposed to be? (Asked of employed people)

Percent of time most people in your work place spend "goofing off"



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-6), June 5-12, 1980.

Satisfaction with Work Remains High



Question: On the whole, would you say you are satisfied or dissatisfied with the work you do? (Gallup 1949-1971) On the whole, how satisfied are you with the work you do—would you say you are very satisfied, moderately satisfied, a little dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied? (NORC 1972-1980) In general, how satisfied are you with the kind of work you do? Would you say you're very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied, or very dissatisfied with the kind of work you do? (If not now working, repeat question asking about satisfaction with the kind of work you used to do) (*Los Angeles Times*, 1981)

Note: *The 1981 *Los Angeles Times* sample includes both currently and previously employed. Reader should be cautioned that question wording and samples differ, possibly affecting results. Nevertheless, satisfaction with work has always been high.

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, 1949-1971; National Opinion Research Center, General Social Surveys, 1978-1980; *Los Angeles Times*, March 15-22, 1981.

WORK IS REWARDING

Question: I'm going to read a list of job-related activities and feelings. Please tell me whether each one is something that happens frequently, occasionally, or not at all in your job, and whether it is something that you would like to happen more or less often, or about the same in the future. First, how about (READ FIRST ITEM)? Is this something that happens frequently, occasionally, or never in your job? (Asked of employed respondents)



Note: * = 0.
Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc. for the Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, September 1-November 15, 1980.

Berry's World



"Hey, that's a good one — you're 'looking for FULFILLING work'!"

NOTE ON OPINION ROUNDUP

Most of the responses shown in these surveys were gathered either by personal interviews (Harris and Gallup polls) or by telephone (CBS/*New York Times* and the NBC/Associated Press polls). Unless otherwise noted, the samples usually consist of approximately 1,500 voting age men and women, chosen to constitute a representative sample of the entire U.S. population. In the typical sample of 1,500 respondents, there is a 95 percent chance or better that the margin of error will not exceed ±3 percent variation from the distribution which would appear if the nation's entire population were questioned. The possibilities for error are larger when numbers are displayed for subcategories of each sample.

The reader may note that in some cases a "no opinion" column is shown while in others it is not. This reflects a common practice in the publication of polls: when the "no opinion" or "undecided" responses are relatively small, on the order of 10 percent or less, one reports only the answers of those who have a definite opinion. However, when "no opinion" answers are a high proportion of the sample, they are reported because they reveal a substantial degree of unawareness or uncertainty within the populace on the issues in question.

Working Women

WHY WORK?

Question: Do you work mostly because you need the money or mostly for the personal satisfaction you get from your job?



Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization for the White House Conference on Families, March 21-24, 1980.

SEXES SPLIT ON WORKING

Question: If you had enough money to live as comfortably as you'd like, would you prefer to work full time, work part time, do volunteer-type work or work at home caring for the family?



Note: * = less than .5%.
Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates for General Mills, Inc., "Families at Work: Strengths and Strains," November-December, 1980.

OPPORTUNITY KNOCKS

Question: Do you feel you stand an equal chance with the men you work with in the following areas? (Asked of women) Do you feel women stand an equal chance with the men they work with in the following areas? (Asked of men)



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, October 1979.

MUDDLED RESPONSES

Question: Now here are some statements about marriage, work, divorce, etc. (Card shown respondent) Would you read each one and tell me whether on balance you tend more to agree with it or disagree with it? . . . There is no reason why women with young children shouldn't work outside the home if they choose to.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

Editor's Note: In a November-December 1980 Louis Harris study for General Mills, Inc., 55% of families interviewed said the trend toward both parents working had a negative effect on families. Fifty-eight percent of working men felt that way, compared to 46% of working women. Fifty-six percent of teenagers with working parents felt it had a negative effect on children under twelve. On the other hand, a March ABC/*Washington Post* poll asked of employed female and male respondents with a working spouse what effect the woman's working has on the family life—68% said "better." All these results suggest considerable tension and mixed feelings on the subject.

Question: I'm going to read you a list of some statements relating to current issues. For each one, I'd like you to tell me whether you agree strongly, agree somewhat, neither agree nor disagree, disagree somewhat, or disagree strongly. . . . A woman with young children should not work outside the home unless it is financially necessary.



Source: Survey by Research and Forecasts, Inc. for Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Company, September 1-November 15, 1980.

WOMEN MORE SEXIST

Question: Suppose both a husband and wife work at good and interesting jobs, and the husband is offered a very good job in another city. Assuming they have no children, which one of these solutions do you think they should seriously consider? (Respondent received list). The husband should turn down the job and stay where they are so the wife can continue with her job; the wife should quit her job, relocate with her husband and try to get another job in the new place; the husband should take the new job and move there, the wife should keep her job and stay where she is, and they should get together whenever they can on weekends, holidays and vacations.





Source: Survey by the Roper Organization for Virginia Slims, October 1979.

Occupational Prestige

Question: I am going to read off a number of different occupations. For each would you tell me whether you feel it is an occupation of very great prestige, considerable prestige, some prestige or hardly any prestige at all?

Believe occupation has very great prestige



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, October 8-16, 1977

WHO YOU ARE, HOW HARD YOU WORK

Question: I'm going to read a list of some of the top positions in our society (Card shown respondent) For each one, would you tell me the reason you think most people reach them—is it because of chance, say the type of family you're born into, who you know, etc., or is it more due to talent, hard work and a strong will on the part of the individuals to reach those positions in spite of chance? First, do you think more people get to be important political leaders such as president, state governor or U.S. senator because of who they are and who they know, or more get there because of hard work, talent and strong will?



Note: Responses recalculated for comparison purposes. The largest "don't know" was 11 percent.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-2), January 10-24, 1981.

WHO'S OVERPAID, WHO ISN'T

Question: Now here is a list of people in different kinds of occupations. (Card shown respondent) Would you go down that list and for each one tell me whether it is your impression that people in that occupation are generally overpaid, or underpaid, or paid about right for what they do?



Note: "Don't knows" calculated out for comparison purposes. "Don't know" = 21% for TV news commentators.

Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 79-6), June 2-9, 1979.

Government in the Workplace

Question: People feel differently about how far a government should go. Do you think our government should or should not—see to it that everyone who wants to work has a job? (1939)

Do you think it should or should not be up to the government to see to it that there are enough jobs in this country for everybody who wants to work? (1945)

The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. (1956, 1960)

The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work has a job. (1978)

The government in Washington ought to see to it that everybody who wants to work can find a job. Now would you say you have an opinion on this or not? (If yes) Do you agree the government *should* do this, or do you think the government should *not* do it? (1979)

Note: For 1960 and 1979, "agree" = total of responses "agree strongly" and "agree but not very strongly"; "disagree" = total of responses "disagree but not very strongly" and "disagree strongly."

Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization conducted for *Fortune*, 1939; National Opinion Research Center, 1945; Survey Research Center of the Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Election Studies, 1956, 1960; CBS News/*New York Times*, January 1978; Gallup Organization, January 19-22, 1979.



THAT'S NOT WHAT REAGAN TOLD US!

Question: Now I'm going to name some things, and for each one would you tell me whether you think there is too much government regulation of it now, or not enough government regulation now, or about the right amount of government regulation now? . . . Health and safety of working conditions.



Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 80-8), August 16-23, 1980.

Question: Is it your feeling that the types of regulations should be made more strict, made less strict, or kept about the way they are now . . . to protect employees from work conditions that cause accidents?



Source: Survey by Roger Seasonwein Associates for Union Carbide, September 26-October 21, 1979.

A NATION OF IMMIGRANTS . . . A NATION OF COMPLAINERS

Question: Some people say that immigrants are taking jobs that could go to Americans, while others say that there are enough jobs for all who really want to work. Which of these views would you say is closer to your own?



Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, February 26-March 6, 1981.

SOCIAL SECURITY INSECURITY

RETIREMENT ATTITUDES . . .

Question: Here is a list of things people do about work when they get older. Assuming you would have an adequate amount of retirement income, which one of these things would you prefer to do? Retire and stop working at normal retirement age, continue working full time, continue working at a part-time or less demanding job?

If retirement income adequate, would prefer to...



Note: Non-retired individuals shown here = 1,115. When asked to agree or disagree with the statement "The retirement years are the best times in one's life, 34% agreed, 50% disagreed, 16% no opinion. Retirees split, 46% agree, 47% disagree, 7% no opinion.
Source: Survey by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., for the National Commission on Social Security, November 16-29, 1979.

. . . AND INCOME

Question: Now looking ahead to the time when you or your spouse will be retired, tell me which of these you expect to be the most important source of income for your household.



Note: Non-retired individuals shown here = 1,115.
Source: Survey by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., for the National Commission on Social Security, November 16-29, 1979.

1936

Question: Do you favor the compulsory old age insurance plan, starting in January, which requires employers and workers to make equal contributions to workers' pensions?



Note: In late 1937 and early 1938 Gallup asked respondents whether the Social Security law should "be changed to make the employer pay the whole amount . . ." Eighty-five percent said "no."
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, November 6-11, 1936.

TODAY SYSTEM IS IN TROUBLE

Question: Some people have told us that the retirement and survivor income program of Social Security is in financial trouble, while others say the program is financially sound. What do you think?



Note: In another question in the Tarrance survey, 58% said people would receive a greater benefit if the equal individual and employer contributions had been deposited in a bank. Twenty-two percent said the benefits would be lower.
Source: Survey by V. Lance Tarrance Associates for the National Federation of Independent Business, April 2-7, 1981.

NOT ENOUGH FOR US . . .

Question: I have some questions about the Social Security system. Do you think the Social Security system will have the money available to provide the benefits you expect for your retirement?



Note: The Reagan Administration's proposed Social Security changes were announced on May 12, 1981.

Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, June 28-July 1, 1981.

TOO MUCH FOR THEM

Question: Out of every $100 of Social Security taxes taken in by the Social Security Administration, about how many dollars do you think go to pay for administration costs rather than to actual benefits paid out to recipients?



$1.30* Actual

$52.10 Median estimate of administrative costs of Social Security

*In calendar year 1980, the Social Security Administration spent $1.5 billion of $117 billion in tax receipts on administrative costs.

Note: Two percent of Americans felt that $0-9 was spent for administrative costs; 4%, $10-19; 10%, $20-29; 10%, $30-39; 7%, $40-49; 20%, $50-59; 8%, $60-69; 7%, $70-79; 3%, $80-89; 3%, $90-99. Twenty-seven percent responded "don't know."
Source: Survey by the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-6), May 30-June 6, 1981.

AMERICANS FEELING THE PINCH OF SOCIAL SECURITY TAX INCREASES

Question: Generally, how do you feel about the federal income taxes you yourself have to pay. Would you say that your income taxes are excessively high, somewhat high, about right, or extremely low? (May 1978) I'm going to name some kinds of taxes you might have to pay, and for each type would you tell me whether the taxes you have to pay are excessively high, somewhat high, about right, or extremely low? First (name item) (Ask about each type) . . . Social Security taxes, state income taxes, property taxes, or real estate taxes (May 1978)

I'm going to name some different kinds of taxes you may have to pay, and for each type would you tell me whether the taxes you have to pay are excessively high, somewhat high, about right, or extremely low. First, federal income taxes. . . . (March 1981)

Note: Percentages shown represent only the opinions of people who pay each type of tax.
Source: Surveys by the Roper Organization for H & R Block, May 1978; the Roper Organization (Roper Report 81-4), March 21-28, 1981.



☑ TAKE MONEY FROM OTHER PROGRAMS TO PROTECT SOCIAL SECURITY

Question: Which of these three statements about Social Security comes closest to your own views: (a) Social Security benefits should be reduced so that Social Security paycheck deductions stop going up, (b) Social Security paycheck deductions should be raised so that Social Security benefits don't have to be reduced, (c) Social Security benefits should be protected at all costs even if money has to be taken from other government programs.



Note: Seventy-nine percent of Social Security retirees felt that the program should be protected at all costs. In a similar question asked by Market Opinion Research for the Republican National Committee (June 5-21), 70% said Social Security benefits should not be reduced in any way, 24% said they should be reduced somewhat, and 5% said they should be reduced the same as other government programs. Sixty-one percent of Republicans, 70% of Independents, and 76% of Democrats said benefits should not be reduced in any way.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 14, 1981.

☑ FAVOR REMOVAL OF EARNINGS LIMITATION CEILING

Question: Currently there is a limit of $5,500 on the amount a person sixty-five or older may earn without having Social Security benefits reduced. Under the Reagan administration proposal, by 1986 a person would be allowed to earn any amount without having Social Security benefits reduced. Do you approve or disapprove of that change?



Note: A Louis Harris question in early June found that 62% favored elimination of the earnings limitation ceiling, with 38% opposed.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 14, 1981.

☑ INCREASE TAXES IF SYSTEM IN SERIOUS TROUBLE

Question: If the old age and survivors retirement program proves to be in serious trouble, two major ways to solve the problem are—Rotate—(1) cutting benefits for future retirees, or (2) raising taxes. Given these two alternatives, which alternative would you choose?



Note: In a late June CBS/*New York Times* question, "If there is not enough money in the Social Security system to meet its obligations, what should be done? Would you prefer increasing Social Security taxes, or limiting benefits in some way?" 46% said "limit benefits," 26% said "increase taxes."
Source: Survey by V. Lance Tarrance and Associates for the National Federation of Independent Business, April 2-7, 1981.

☒ DON'T SHORTCHANGE FUTURE RETIREES

Question: Many financial experts say that the Social Security system is paying out more money in benefits than it takes in from payroll deductions even though Social Security paycheck deductions have been increasing. Supporters say the Reagan administration's proposal is needed to save the Social Security system. Opponents agree that change is needed, but say that the Reagan proposals are going too far. The Reagan administration proposal would mean that by the year 1987, the average worker retiring at age sixty-five would get 4 percent less than retirees today under the system. Do you approve or disapprove of that change?



Note: In an early June Louis Harris poll, 67% opposed the change that would reduce benefits to those retiring at age sixty-five from $719 a month to $692 a month, effective in 1987.
Source: Survey by ABC News/*Washington Post*, May 14, 1981

☒ OPPOSE BENEFIT REDUCTION FOR EARLY RETIREMENT

Question: Let me read you some of the cutbacks the Reagan administration has proposed on Social Security in order to keep Social Security taxes from rising a great deal. For each, tell me if you favor or oppose that cutback. . . . To discourage early retirement, those who retire at sixty-two years of age would receive an average of $246 a month from Social Security rather than the $372 now received.



Note: In a June 28-July 1, 1981 survey, CBS News/*New York Times* asked the question "Ronald Reagan has proposed that the Social Security benefits for people who retire early, that is, at age sixty-two instead of sixty-five, be sharply reduced. Do you approve or disapprove of doing this?" Forty-two percent approved, 58% disapproved.
Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, June 3-7, 1981.

☒ NO TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT

Question: Now I am going to read you some statements. For each, please tell me if you strongly agree, mildly agree, mildly disagree, or strongly disagree. (Read list, repeat choices) . . . No one should have to retire if he or she wants to continue working.



Note: Non-retired individuals shown here = 1,115. Agree = strongly/mildly agree; Disagree = strongly/mildly disagree.
Source: Survey by Peter D. Hart Research Associates, Inc., for the National Commission on Social Security, November 16-29, 1979.

☒ OPPOSE INCREASING RETIREMENT AGE

Question: It has been proposed that as a cost saving measure the retirement age for Social Security be increased from sixty-five to sixty-eight. Would you favor or oppose such a change?



Note: Among 18-24 year-olds, 63% opposed increasing the retirement age from 65 to 68; among 50-59 year-olds, 80% opposed it. When asked if such a change were to become effective 20 years from now (by CBS News/*New York Times*, June 28-July 1, 1981), 54% were in favor, 46% were opposed.
Source: Survey by the Gallup Organization, October 1-10, 1977.

☑ FAVOR MAKING SOCIAL SECURITY VOLUNTARY

Question: Would you favor or oppose making the Social Security system voluntary, so that people can choose not to pay Social Security taxes and not to get benefits?



Note: In another question, CBS News/*New York Times* asked respondents if the Social Security system were made voluntary, whether or not they would participate in it. Seventy-five percent of all respondents said they would participate, 25% said they would not.
Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, June 28-July 1, 1981.

? INDEXATION CONFUSION

Question: Social Security benefits are now increased because of inflation. Do you think these increases in benefits have been too high, too low or about right?



Source: Survey by CBS News/*New York Times*, June 28-July 1, 1981.

Question: As it works now, Social Security payments, payments to the handicapped and to those on government pensions and other federal benefits are indexed to rises in the cost of living. As the Consumer Price Index goes up, the amount of benefits goes up by the same percentage. Those who favor this system feel those who get the benefits should not suffer from increases in the cost of living. Others feel that by increasing the amount of benefits as prices go up, government spending goes up and that makes inflation still worse. All in all, do you favor or oppose indexing these benefits to the cost of living?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, March 27-April 2, 1981.

Question: One of the reasons Social Security costs have gone up so much is that benefits are now indexed to go up as prices go up. If Social Security payments had been geared to wage increases rather than price rises, the government would have saved 6.5 billion dollars a year over the past few years. President Reagan is opposed to changing the current system of indexing Social Security payments. Would you favor or oppose changing the way Social Security benefits are indexed, so that both price and wage increases would be looked at and the benefits would go up by whichever index went up least?



Source: Survey by Louis Harris and Associates, June 3-7, 1981.

RATING REAGAN TO DATE



Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Reagan is handling his job as president? (Gallup) How would you rate the job President Reagan is doing as president—excellent, pretty good, only fair, or poor? (Harris)

Gallup	Approve	Disapprove	No opinion
January 31-February 2	51%	13%	36%
February 13-16	55	18	27
March 13-16	60	24	16
April 3-6	67	18	15
April 10-13	67	19	14
May 8-11	68	21	11
June 5-8	59	28	13
June 19-22	59	29	12
June 26-29	58	30	12
July 17-19	60	29	11
July 24-27	56	30	14

Harris	Excellent/ pretty good	Only fair/ poor	Not sure
February 19-22	62%	30%	8%
April 29-30	67	29	4
June 3-7	60	39	1
July 8-12	55	43	2

Source: Surveys by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 24-27, 1981, and Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of July 8-12, 1981.

IOWANS SAY PRESIDENT ALMOST MEETS HIS MAKER

Question: How would you rate your confidence in each of the following governmental, business and social institutions, on a scale of one to six, with one representing the lowest level of confidence and six the highest level?

Rated favorably (4-5-6)



Note: In 1977, God came in first, the President 8th. In 1981, the *Des Moines Register and Tribune*, which conducts the Iowa Poll, was rated 15th out of a possible 39. Congress was rated 28th. Farthest down the list were federal government regulatory agencies, (37) gas and electric companies, (38) and farm organizations (39) [except the Iowa Farm Bureau].

Source: Survey by the Iowa Poll, *Des Moines Register and Tribune* Company, April 20-25, 1981.

THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: THE COUNTDOWN CONTINUES

Question: Many of those who favor women's rights favor the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution. This amendment would establish that women would have rights equal to men in all areas. Opponents argue that women are different from men and need to be protected by special laws which deal with women's status. Do you favor or oppose the Equal Rights Amendment? (Harris, 1975-July 1980)

Have you heard or read about the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution which would give women equal rights and equal responsibilities? (If yes) Do you favor or oppose this amendment? (Gallup 1975-1980)

Have you heard or read about the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution which would prohibit discrimination on the basis of sex? (If yes) Do you favor or oppose this amendment? (Gallup 1981)

Note: 1981 polls on the ERA indicate continuing support. For example, an April 1981 CBS/*New York Times* poll showed 57% favoring the amendment and a May 1981 ABC/*Washington Post* poll yielded 61% of informed respondents favoring it.

Caution to the reader: It should be noted that the percentage of respondents who had no opinion on the ERA questions fluctuated considerably over the survey period. Furthermore, some polls reflect only opinions of respondents who had heard or read about the ERA: Gallup 1975 = 91%; 1976 = 90%; 1978 = 90%; 1980 = 91%; 1981 = 88%.

Source: Surveys by Louis Harris and Associates, latest that of November 7-10, 1980; by the Gallup Organization, latest that of July 17-20, 1981.



Harris

	Favor	Oppose	Not sure
1975	51%	36%	13%
1976	66	23	11
1977	56	35	9
January 1978	51	34	15
June/July 1978	55	38	7
December 1979	56	36	8
November 1980	52	46	2

Gallup

	Favor	Oppose	No opinion
1975	58%	24%	18%
1976	57	24	19
June 1978	58	31	11
July 17-20, 1981	63	32	5

AND THE ONLY "POLL" THAT COUNTS

States which *have* ratified
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment

	Date ratified
Alaska	April 5, 1972
California	November 13, 1972
Colorado	April 21, 1972
Connecticut	March 15, 1973
Delaware	March 23, 1972
Hawaii	March 22, 1972
Idaho*	March 24, 1972
Indiana	January 18, 1977
Iowa	March 24, 1972
Kansas	March 28, 1972
Kentucky*	June 15, 1972
Maine	January 18, 1974
Maryland	March 31, 1972
Massachusetts	June 21, 1972
Michigan	May 22, 1972
Minnesota	February 8, 1973
Montana	January 11, 1974
Nebraska*	March 23, 1972
New Hampshire	March 23, 1972
New Jersey	April 17, 1972
New Mexico	February 13, 1973
New York	May 3, 1972
North Dakota	February 3, 1975
Ohio	February 7, 1974
Oregon	February 8, 1973
Pennsylvania	September 20, 1972
Rhode Island	April 14, 1972
South Dakota*	February 2, 1973
Tennessee*	April 4, 1972
Texas	March 30, 1972
Vermont	February 21, 1973
Washington	March 22, 1973
West Virginia	April 22, 1972
Wisconsin	April 20, 1972
Wyoming	January 24, 1973

States which *have not* ratified
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment

Alabama
Arizona
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Illinois
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
Nevada
North Carolina
Oklahoma
South Carolina
Utah
Virginia

Note: *Five states (Idaho, Kentucky, Nebraska, South Dakota, and Tennessee) have voted to rescind their ratification of the proposed Equal Rights Amendment. The federal government does not acknowledge a state's act of rescission.

Source: Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress.

ALASKA: A NORTH POLL

A SEPARATE PIECE

Question: As far as you know, what is the *relationship between Alaska and the continental United States*, that is, is Alaska a territory, a state, a commonwealth, or a separate country?



POLAR BARS . . .

Question: Just from anything you have seen or heard, *how many people* would you estimate live in Alaska?

Estimates of number of people living in Alaska:



Question: How big is Alaska in terms of *physical size* compared to the continental United States, that is, is Alaska twice as big, about the same size, half as big, one-fourth as big, or about one-tenth the size of the United States as a whole?

Size of Alaska compared to U.S.:



Note: Actual population of Alaska according to 1980 Census data is 400,481. Alaska is one-fifth the size of the continental United States, a category not offered by the pollsters.

ESKIMO PIES . . . WANTING YOUR PIE AND EATING IT TOO

Question: If you had to make a choice between these two, which is most important . . . developing *Alaska's energy resources* or protecting *Alaska's environment?*



Question: Do you feel Alaska's natural resources can be developed without causing unacceptable environmental damage, or not?



Source: Survey by Dittman Research Corporation, April 1-17, 1981.

by Hans Zetterberg and Greta Frankel

Working Less and Enjoying it More in Sweden

At the time of writing it is July in Sweden. That means that the country is closed.It's on vacation. Everyone is entitled to five weeks of holidays which, by general consensus, are usually taken in July. Businesses are run with skeleton staffs; dry cleaning has to wait until August; and the exertions entailed in procuring medical help can be hazardous to one's health. Factories are closed; industrial deliveries are virtually at a standstill.

The Swedish Workplace

The total number of hours worked in Sweden declined from 1.33 billion in 1970 to 1.25 billion in 1980. Increased vacation time accounts for most of the drop, but other forms of leave have also increased. Swedish law grants paid leave not only for an employee's sickness, but also for the sickness of his children; fathers as well as mothers are entitled to leave to care for the newborn; paid leaves are granted for study, for union work, and for a score of other causes. Vacation may by law be accumulated into sabbaticals. People employed in the public sector (34 percent of the labor force) are automatically granted leaves of absence to work at higher-level jobs.

Employee absenteeism, like many facets of Swedish life, is a public rather than a private matter between employer and employee. Employers are bitter about their loss of control over presence and absence on the job.

Our research shows that most people do not use all their leave time. Most take a yearly vacation and an occasional sick leave. Only a minority—youngish and well-educated—makes full use of the benefits.

The privileges of ample vacations and liberal leaves, for which the labor movement has fought, are today regarded by many Swedes as rights. In the course of a generation, many have come to perceive work as an interlude between periods of leisure and as the source of the wherewithal to enjoy that leisure.

Yet, more people work in paid employment than ever before. The number of jobs increased by nearly 400,000 in the 1970s while the working-age population remained relatively stationary. Most new jobs come from the bureaucratization of services previously performed on a voluntary basis. Women constitute the main addition to the labor force. Their entry into the job market has been encouraged by a change in values (the decline of patriarchy), and by changes in tax laws: in Sweden a husband's and wife's incomes are no longer combined for tax purposes, but are taxed separately. Eighty-eight percent of men aged eighteen to sixty-five and 74 percent of women aged eighteen to sixty-five now hold paid jobs.

Because most women are now gainfully employed, pressures have mounted to give people time off to attend to traditional women's chores: care of the sick, raising of children, and tending the home. Thus, absenteeism rights are a consequence of the full labor force participation of both sexes.

The paradox of fewer working hours but more workers is explained partly by an upsurge in so-called part-time jobs. (We say "so-called" because traditional part-time jobs are becoming the norm.) Again, the Swedish tax system encourages the trend. Wages from a full-time job are taxed at rates between 50 and 85 percent; the part timer can reap the lion's share of his or her earnings.

Black Market Jobs

Many benefits of a welfare state such as Sweden's are linked to holding a regular job. But more short-term benefits may flow from black market jobs. The Swedes tend to prefer to have a foot in both economies. In an in-person survey conducted among 1,002 respondents in November and December 1979, SIFO asked: "Have you during this year paid anyone in black [tax-free] money without getting a receipt in order to get a job done, or have you not done so?" Every fifth person interviewed admitted that he had done so. Among persons with an annual household income over 80,000 Crowns ($15,560), 22 percent had made black payments during 1979. The corresponding figure for persons with household incomes under 80,000 Crowns per year was 15 percent. Every seventh respondent (14 percent) admitted to having received black payments during 1979.

To pay for or perform a small job or service without receipts was seldom considered a serious offense by survey respondents. About half of the respondents didn't consider an exchange of services between craftsmen or tradesmen a transgression of the law at all, and such exchanges were thought to be prevalent. A majority, however, considered that construction workers who earned more than 10,000 Crowns ($1,940) tax-free in the exercise of their trade were guilty of a major offense.

Those involved in the black economy are found in all social classes, but in varying proportions. On the whole, it appears that the financially stronger groups pay black money, and the financially weaker groups receive it.

Table 1

	Those who make black payments	Those who receive black payments
Social strata		
Upper class	33%	9%
Upper middle class	31	13
Lower middle class	18	12
Skilled workers	14	22
Semi-skilled workers	20	20
Manual laborers	12	13
Sectors of economy		
Employed in public sector	24	19
Employed in private sector	18	9
Self-employed, professionals	25	4

Every third member of the higher social strata is a payer of black money and every fifth member of the working class is a recipient. The figures also suggest that skilled and semi-skilled workers are on both the paying and receiving ends.

The younger generation is more involved in tax-free transactions than the older generation. The younger generation views the tax-free exchange of small services as more normal and customary than their elders do. (See Table 2)

It is entirely possible that the declining number of work hours in the regular economy is matched by an increasing number of work hours in the informal economy.

Table 2

	Under 40 years of age	Over 40 years of age
Payers of black money	25%	14%
Recipients of black money	21	7

The Declining Emphasis on Work

SIFO asked men eighteen to fifty-five years of age "What gives your life the most meaning: work, leisure activities outside of the home, or your home life?" The question was posed in 1955, 1977, and 1981. We found that the percentage of those who gave work the highest priority sank from 33 percent to 14 percent in the span of a quarter of a century. The drop took place during the long economic boom between the Korean crisis of the 1950s and the first Arab oil crisis in the early 1970s. Between 1955 and 1977, the percentage giving leisure the highest priority rose from 13 percent to 27 percent. Since 1977, no significant change in priorities has been recorded.



An increasing proportion of the working population experience a conflict between their work, which does not particularly appeal to them, and their lifestyle outside of work, which really engrosses them. In this contest, work often turns out to be the loser. The only ones not to experience this conflict are those who have work as a lifestyle.

There are two plausible explanations for shifting priorities:

(1) Work has become so rationalized that it more often than before appears sterile, fragmented, and deadening to the individual worker. Technology, bureaucratization, and computerization take the joy out of work for those without

the skill or leverage to influence the system.

(2) Industry's productivity and the advantages of the welfare state have encouraged the majority to develop their lifestyles outside of their work. Leisure-time activities have become increasingly attractive.

Support for the first explanation comes from the persistent correlation between low job satisfaction and highly rational job organization. Support for the second explanation comes from lifestyle surveys. The conclusion we have drawn from our own studies is that popular lifestyles—which are the fruits of hard work—are undermining work as a lifestyle. One of the chief rewards of work has become the privilege to stay away from work.

Salaried workers were asked "If you had to choose between a salary raise and a longer vacation, which would you choose?" Their choices appear below:

	All employees	*White-collar workers*	*Blue-collar workers*
Salary raise	*37%*	*33%*	*42%*
Longer vacation	*58*	*62*	*53*
Don't know	*5*	*5*	*5*

Again, we asked "If you had to choose between a salary raise and shorter working hours, which would you choose?" And their answers:

	All employees	*White-collar workers*	*Blue-collar workers*
Salary raise	*38%*	*34%*	*46%*
Shorter working hours	*56*	*62*	*49*
Don't know	*6*	*4*	*5*

The importance attached to financial rewards and status has decreased over time. This is reflected in the responses to questions we posed in 1966 and again in 1978. (See Table 3)

These responses portend a crisis for our traditional system of rewards at the workplace. In the span of twelve years, the percentage who consider it *unnecessary* to have a higher level of income than most people has climbed from 62 to 77 percent, and the percentage who consider it unnecessary to have a position of leadership at work has risen from 50 to 66 percent.

Let us explore more closely the configuration of values reflected in these trends.

The Value Shifts

> *The shift from a psychology of scarcity to that of abundance is one of the most important steps in human development. A psychology of scarcity produces anxiety, envy, egotism (to be seen most drastically in peasant cultures all over the world). A psychology of abundance produces initiative, faith in life, solidarity.*
>
> Erich Fromm[1]

Table 3

Question: How necessary is it for you to have a higher income than most people?

	1966		1978	
Very necessary	9%		4%	
Rather necessary	28		14	
Rather unnecessary	52	62	54	66
Entirely unnecessary	10		12	
Uncertain, don't know	1		6	

Question: How necessary is it for you to have a position of leadership at work?

	1966		1978	
Very necessary	13%		3%	
Rather necessary	36		23	
Rather unnecessary	43	50	55	77
Entirely unnecessary	7		22	
Uncertain, don't know	1		6	

(Asked only of persons who were gainfully employed.)

The welfare states of Europe are already a generation or more into the psychology of abundance, not only for the privileged but for the ordinary citizen. When an industrial economy produces an abundance of wealth and a welfare state distributes the wealth somewhat equitably throughout society, the stage is set for another major shift in values. The responsibility of sustenance is shifted toward government. The individuals are free to pursue personal needs beyond sustenance, survival, and basic security. "Surplus values" of all kinds can be created. These surplus values can be seen in the production and distribution of wealth—and in "reproduction," in the Marxian sense of the term (that is, the bringing up of new generations of workers and the nurturance—physical and intellectual—of the existing work force). Hereafter, we will refer to these values as those of "personal growth."

In short, we find in an advanced society today three systems of values that always mingle and sometimes conflict with one another:

(a) *The values of sustenance* have their roots in the agrarian society. These values are built up around one's daily bread and the need for well-filled barns. The fruits of labor belong to the worker. According to the values of sustenance, he provides himself and his family with the basics of existence. Very little is provided for the market.

(b) *The values of production* have their roots in the industrial society. These values are built up around involvement with the processes of production and the generation of prosperity. The fruits of labor (which are considerable) are marketed, and the proceeds are shared by the workers and the representatives of capital. According to the values of production, one works for economic growth and for a certain standard of living. Within the broad realm of values of production we may follow the lead of Burkhard Strümpel and distinguish the *entrepreneurial vision* in which creation of new wealth is central and the *equalitarian vision* in which the equitable distribution of wealth is central. The former is embraced by the right and the latter by the traditional left in the industrial states.

---

[1] Erich Fromm, "The Psychological Aspects of the Guaranteed Income," in Robert Theobald (ed.), *The Guaranteed Income* (Doubleday, New York, 1966).

(c) *The values of personal growth* have their roots in the welfare state. These values are built up around involvement with one's own (and others') inner development and the creation of quality of life. The fruits of work (besides a salary and capital accretion) are the work itself and what it offers in terms of meaning, comradeship, and potential for personal growth.

The three systems of values are not new. But their relative strength varies from time to time and from place to place. Individuals are not fashioned from whole cloth. They do not embrace all the values and attitudes of one specific value orientation but are rather tapestries in which one or two patterns emerge predominant. In the advanced countries of the West there has been a dramatic shift during the past half-century. The proportion of people concerned with the values of sustenance has decreased since the 1930s. The values of production rose to a peak in the 1950s. In the seventies we saw a decline in the values of production and a rapid rise in the values of personal growth.

Corresponding shifts can be documented in the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Western Europe, and Australia. The proportions vary, but the direction of the shifts is the same.

SIFO's most recent nationwide youth survey carried out around the new year, 1981, documents the shift from values of production to values of personal growth. We asked 1,055 young people, aged sixteen to twenty-four: "How do you think your parents regarded their work while you were growing up? Did they work just to . . . ?" and "How do you, yourself, regard work? Should a person work just to . . . ?" (See Figure 2)

Figure 2



We discern a dramatic decline in the values of sustenance and production, based upon the perceptions of young people. We also note that the decline is largely one-way. There is a 43 percent drop in the values of sustenance between the two generations, and a 31 percent drop in the values of production. The values of personal growth, on the contrary, have more than tripled and show a 236 percent increase. About one out of three sets of parents with values of production have children with values of personal growth. Four out of five sets of parents with values of personal growth have children who share the same basic values.

The production-minded parents stress visible criteria of success such as grades, degrees, promotions, and job titles while their personal growth-minded children stress the inner satisfactions and new experiences that come with their jobs.

Jobs in Production and Personal Growth

One symptom of the value shift is the declining interest in industrial jobs. We asked the 1,055 young people: "Realistically, what kind of job do you expect to have when you are thirty?", and obtained these answers:

Occupations of production:	
Industry	7%
Trade	23
Occupations of personal growth:	
Social and medical service	29
Education	14
Other, mixed jobs	27

Among those who would work mainly for self-development, only 2 percent mentioned jobs in industry. The actual needs of industry may be estimated at 15 to 20 percent of the new generation.

To fill industrial jobs, Sweden has resorted to importing workers from Finland and Southern Europe. Our research shows that the children of these workers also move away from industry: of a sample of immigrant factory workers, only 16 percent thought that their children would work in factories. Importing labor may prove to be a short-term remedy for industry, leaving the nation with a long-term problem of accommodating an alien population.

While jobs in industrial production lose their appeal as values shift, one should not assume that jobs in health, education, and welfare necessarily remain an attractive alternative. In the welfare state, the work in the personal growth sphere is becoming bureaucratized, mechanized, and computerized. Those who thought that they would work with people find instead that they are working with files, computer records, and microprocessed curves.

The Attractions and Detractions of Paid Work

The 1970s witnessed an increased participation of young people in the nation's worklife but also a higher rate of unemployment for youth. Our research shows that the nation's youth want to work. Few say that they would be satisfied collecting unemployment checks for a long period of time: 7 percent of those interviewed answered that their preferred means of support if unemployed would be unemployment compensation, and then for only a one- to three-month period. Only a fraction (1 percent) say they could contemplate the prospect of never working at a paid job and deriving their income from welfare, rent subsidies, and the like.

While some pure followers of personal growth values see work as its own reward, a number of today's youth who are more production-oriented have a rather dim view of their prospects in Sweden's economy.

Like many adults, they regard the steep rate of progressive taxation in Sweden as a factor that dampens one's zest to work hard, and leads to a withholding of commitment to one's job. The social security network is also seen as an incentive dampener.

The groups were also critical of the Swedish tenure legislation (which guarantees job security to all employees after a short trial period). In their view, these laws were prejudicial to young untried workers because employers were reluctant to hire inexperienced help which, if found unsatisfactory in job performance, might nonetheless have to be retained as permanent employees.

And starting one's own business was regarded as a risky venture indeed. The declining entrepreneurial vision can also be seen in surveys of adults. In 1963, 1978, and 1981, we asked: "If you had a choice, which would you choose—to own your business or to be an employee in a business?" In the course of almost twenty years, entrepreneurial vistas have lost much of their appeal:

	1963	*1978*	*1981*
Prefer to:			
Own one's own business	43%	27%	28%
Be an employee	46	58	60
Makes no difference	6	8	9
Don't know, can't say	5	7	3

The Challenge

It is of great policy significance that the values of personal growth rose to such strength in the Western world toward the end of the 1970s when the oil crises put severe strains on the economies. To work their way out of the economic binds of the seventies, the Western nations are struggling to mobilize the flagging values of production. To succeed with an economic recovery in the 1980s it may, however, also be necessary to mobilize the values of personal growth to generate resources.

Bold thinking on the part of legislators, businessmen, and other planners will be required to win the commitment of young people to their work, both those who are production-oriented and those who are personal growth-oriented. The former may withhold or simply not bother to invest their imagination and creative abilities as well as energy and time if they feel initiative and industry are unrewarded—or even discouraged, as some of our group participants felt. The personal growth-oriented may similarly withhold their full capacities from jobs that they feel do not provide sufficient leeway for the expression of their inner-oriented values.

The production-oriented ask from society and their employers the traditional rewards for hard work and the removal of obstacles to individual and collective achievement. They represent less of a problem to corporate and political administrators—they want only less scrutiny from them.

The personal growth-oriented present a more complex challenge. They ask for a new style of leadership which not only makes use of the standard stock of motivational devices in the form of pay, titles, and consumption so suitable to values of production but also a new stock in the form of self-growth, enhancing togetherness and a rich inner life. Political and corporate leaders must acquire greater insight and knowledge into ways of motivating people who have values of personal growth. Otherwise the energies of these people go to waste. The men and women of personal growth values—who include a majority of our best-educated and most talented youth—must be offered a worklife that mobilizes their values into channels that promote the creation of economic resources and a viable social order. Otherwise there is a danger that they may be a drain on the system.

These notes contain some of the thinking of the Swedish national project in the international research program "Jobs in the 80s: Bridging the Gap Between People and Work." The idea for this research and communication program comes from The Public Agenda Foundation and from the Aspen Institute of Humanistic Studies.

The Swedish research team includes Karin Busch (sociology), Goran Crona (sociology), Greta Frankel (psychology), Bert Jonsson (industrial planning), Ivar Soderling (sociology and social psychology), Bo Winander (economics), and Hans L. Zetterberg (sociology, project leader).

The main support for the Swedish project comes from the Tercentenary Foundation of the Bank of Sweden.

Unless otherwise stated, the quantitative data presented here are based on probability samples of 1,000 individuals each in nationwide surveys conducted by SIFO.

by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann

Working Less and Enjoying it Less in Germany

"We are not living through a post-industrial but a post-industrious phase." The pun could be made only in English, but as a German I understood it immediately. One of my colleagues made the remark in Chicago in 1978. The parallel to the German situation surprised me—then and now. Since the late 1960s, we at the Allensbach Institute for Demoscopy have observed a decline in people's enjoyment of their work in the Federal Republic of Germany. We have the impression that people find it more difficult than ever before to be industrious. To explore these feelings, we asked the following three-point question: "Which hours of the day do you generally like the most: the hours at work or the hours during which you don't work, or do you like both?" We tried to word the question so that it didn't sound like a question on the work ethic. We didn't expect many people to say they liked their working hours most of all, and in fact, they didn't. Only 3-4 percent ever gave that response. We identified those who enjoyed their work as those who selected the "hours at work" category and the "both work and leisure category." When we first asked the question twenty years ago, a clear majority (58 percent) enjoyed their work; 33 percent preferred leisure time alone. Gradually, but persistently, the relationship changed. In 1979, for the first time, those who preferred leisure time took the lead.

Such persistent changes usually do not have a single cause. They are brought about by various, often unrelated factors moving in the same direction.

The Impact of Television

Television is one of the rare factors which changed leisure-time habits in many countries at almost the same time, and it may help to explain the parallel symptoms of a "post-industrious" phase.

To determine the impact of television on attitudes toward work, we began a unique experiment in 1966. At that time, 29 percent of Germans aged sixteen and over did not have television. We began field experiments designed to compare the attitudes of individuals who had just purchased a television with those of individuals in households without television. Representative population surveys provided the addresses of households planning to buy a TV set. These households formed the test group. The control group was composed of households which indicated they did not have a television and had no intention of buying one. For each household in the test group, another household with the same number of adults in the same age and occupational grouping, was chosen for the control group. Both groups were interviewed with identical questionnaires. As expected, there were some differences in interests and attitudes between the two groups, despite their statistical comparability. One year later, in 1967, we interviewed both groups a second time, with virtually identical questions. We measured the development between the first and the second interviews with index numbers, the situation in the first interview equaling 100.

Our results suggested that enjoyment of work dwindles among persons who watch TV regularly. In the test group—the group which had just purchased a television for the first time—the reply "I prefer leisure

Figure 1



time" went up, reaching an index value of 125. Nothing changed in the control group.

Table 1

Question: Which hours of the day do you generally like most: the hours at work or the hours during which you don't work, or do you like both?

	Test group before and after TV sets were purchased (N = 167)		Control group without a TV set (N = 169)		Index 1966 = 100	
	1966	**1967**	**1966**	**1967**	**Test group**	**Control group**
When I don't work	24%	30%	21%	21%	125	100
The hours at work, like both	70	65	68	72	93	106

Note: Undecided not shown.

The results are not surprising. Unlike other leisure-time distractions—conversations, reading, games, do-it-yourself projects, sports, and music—television provides entertainment without requiring any effort from the viewer. It may be less pleasant to go to work from a leisure-time occupation that requires no effort (like TV) than to do so from a leisure-time activity which in itself challenges and develops the individual.

The Changing Context of Work

Some have sought to explain the dwindling enjoyment of work with another worldwide factor—the transition from agriculture and crafts to industry and manufacturing as the focus of employment. Theoretically, in the former occupations, one is able to experience fully the meaning of work; in the latter, one experiences alienation and boredom.

The German data contain nothing that could be used to support this. First, enjoyment of work has declined among all groups—not just those that could be described as victims of the machine age.

Table 2

	Leisure time	Hours at work/ both
Blue collar		
1962/1967	38%	53%
1980	54	41
White collar		
1962/1967	29	64
1980	47	48
Management Employees		
1962/1967	21	73
1980	35	61
Self-employed		
1962/1967	15	74
1980	31	64
Professionals		
1962/1967	8	87
1980	28	70
Farmers		
1962/1967	12	64
1980	36	54

Note: Undecided not shown.

Second, there is not a shred of polling evidence which suggests that working people perceive their work as more monotonous. In a survey question which asked individuals to list the advantages or disadvantages of their jobs, 51 percent in 1979 (compared to 34 percent in 1960) felt that their work was "interesting" and that "there is always something new going on." Sixty-five percent of all employed persons said that they "work independently, and have responsibilities" compared to 48 percent who felt that way in 1960. Neither of these findings suggest an increasing sense of alienation or monotony among German workers. Further, the number saying that there was little variety in their work, that it was "always the same," actually decreased —from 25 to 19 percent—in this period. In comparing what people describe as the disadvantages and advantages of their jobs in 1960 and in 1979, we found that the disadvantages had remained about the same in the nineteen-year period, but that the advantages grew markedly. This makes it all the more amazing that the time spent at work has become less attractive.

Working at Home

Among housewives, displeasure with work has also

Table 3

Question: Every job has its advantages and disadvantages. When you think of your own job, which of the things on these cards apply to your work? Please sort out everything that applies to you. (Presentation of a set of cards)

Advantages	1960	1979
Feel comfortable there, get along well with my colleagues	52%	72%
Can work independently, have responsibilities	48	65
Interesting, there is always something new going on	34	51
Good superior, good boss, get along with him	44	52
Well-equipped place of work, modern, clean	26	40
Can make a lot of money there	33	32
Good fringe benefits, the firm does a lot for its staff	21	35

	1960	1979
Sum of advantages	258	347
Sum of disadvantages	294	281

Disadvantages	1960	1979
Too much work, too hectic	27%	32%
Spend too much time on my feet, run around too much	26	31
Too little fresh air, bad air	30	31
Physically very strenuous	26	23
Nerve-racking, intellectually very strenuous, emotional strain	14	19
Uncomfortable, cramped posture	13	19
Too much dust, dirt	25	18
Little variety, always the same	25	19
You can't advance there, no prospects	21	19
Too much responsibility; if something goes wrong, I am blamed	14	15
There are too many sluffers at my job	23	16
Too much noise	20	15
Exposed to the weather too much	15	11
Dangerous, hazardous work	15	13

increased. The number of German housewives feeling that housework was a burden rose ten points—from 12 to 22 percent—in the period 1969 to 1977, whereas the number who liked their housework decreased by seven points. German housewives are noted for their devotion to household cleanliness and order, but their attitudes toward daily chores are clearly changing. (See Table 4.) The number of housewives who felt they could let the dishes go from time to time increased from 35 to 45 percent between 1969 and 1977.

Table 4

Question: Women differ when it comes to housework. Some like it; they're happy if everything runs the way they want it to. Others find it a real burden. How about yourself? Are you more like the first ones or more like the second ones?

	Housewives	
	November 1969	January 1977
More like the first: like household work	73%	66%
More like the second: think it's a burden	12	22

Question: Two women are talking about how they go about washing dishes. Please read what they say. Which of the two do you like more? (Presentation of an illustration)

	March 1969	January 1977
I can't stand having something dirty lying around. I always do the dishes immediately after dinner. You simply have to take the time for that.	61%	51%
From time to time I don't get around to doing the dishes and let them sit untouched. After all, there are other things to do.	35	45

Question: We have listed various things people said in surveys on these cards. Would you please look through them and sort out all cards where you would say this is true or this applies to me? (Presentation of a set of cards)

	November 1967	October 1976	June 1980
Agreeing with the statement:			
I don't think it is very pleasant to do work that is repeated almost every day.	29%	37%	38%

Note: Undecided not shown.

Separating Rewards from Achievement

Another argument used worldwide to explain why attitudes toward work are changing runs as follows: the development of modern technology has relieved humanity of so much work that a rigid work ethic is no longer necessary. However, this assumption also implies that the work of each individual would have to be reduced so that there would be enough work for all. The notion that there is, in any case, no longer enough work is linked in turn with neo-Marxist tendencies to construe work and achievement as exploitation and hence to encourage the individual to work less.

It is true in Germany that there has been a change of values that has the effect of depriving work and achievement of their moral support, or at least of reducing that support. Achievement and its rewards are being decoupled. For example, using school grades as a yardstick of achievement has been publicly attacked for more than fifteen years. Some argue that what matters is not achievement but effort—something which can hardly be measured. Others suggest that the procedure under which achievement is measured and grades are given is unreliable or that there are no reliable procedures. The effects of the value shift can be observed in the results of a question Allensbach has asked since 1962: "I would like to tell you about a situation now and ask you what you think about it: A father has two sons in school. During the vacation one of them will have the opportunity of going to England in an exchange agreement with an English boy. The family must decide which of the two will be the lucky one. Finally the father says that whoever gets the best grades next time will be the one to go. Do you think that the father decided fairly or unfairly?" In 1962, 63 percent of the population from ages sixteen to sixty thought it fair to bestow the reward of a trip according to grades; 32 percent thought it unfair. In 1972, a smaller majority (50 percent) endorsed the father's decision. In 1975, the majority had become a minority (41 percent); 53 percent said the father's decision was unfair. Since then, the figure has remained stable.

In 1975, we also tested a new version of the question for the first time. Since the old idea of justice appeared to have been lost, we tried to zero in on the new content of "justice." We found that the new content required a system of rewards which was as independent of achievement as possible. The question began: ". . . a father has two sons . . ." and so on, as in the previously used question. However, it concluded, "Finally the father says they will draw straws to solve the question of which one can go. Do you think the father acted fairly or unfairly?" Sixty-two percent of the population sixteen and over replied "fairly" in 1975 and 68 percent did so in 1981 ("unfairly" 25 percent, 24 percent). "Equality" had replaced "reward for achievement" as justice.

Whenever social support or acknowledgment is withdrawn from work morale, the morale will go down. One way to measure the social support or value system is to ask about the goals toward which children should be raised. In 1967, we asked: "Now a question about bringing up children. We have compiled a list concerning what children should learn from their parents. Which of these do you think are *particularly* important?" In only five years, between 1967 and 1972, the educational goal "Children should learn from their parents to do their work in an orderly and conscientious way" lost a considerable portion of its traditional esteem in Germany. The views of older Germans (forty-five years and older) did not change in that period and thereafter; the total results, therefore, did not reveal the extent of the shift. In 1967, 76 percent of the total population and in 1972, 67 percent viewed teaching children to work in an orderly and conscientious way as an important task for parents. In 1967, 71 percent of those younger than thirty, the age group of those who themselves were parents or were soon going to become parents, viewed the ability to do orderly and conscientious work as an important goal of raising children; in 1972 only 51 percent did so. In the course of the 1970s, the traditional German value system was restored somewhat, but there was a lasting change.

Table 5

Question: Now a question about bringing up children. We have compiled a list of various claims as to what parents should teach children for their later life, what children should learn at home. Which of these do you deem *particularly* important?

	1967	1972	1979
"A child should be taught to do his work in an orderly and conscientious way."			
Younger than 30	71%	51%	61%
Total population 16 and over	76	67	71

The Protestant work ethic Max Weber described could not resist these tendencies toward a change of values. An Allensbach question which was asked first in 1974, and then in 1979 and 1981, shows the development: "Sometimes you may ask yourself what life is all about, or what it all means. What, above all, is the meaning of your life?" The respondents received a list of sixteen responses. That coming closest to the Protestant work ethic was: "It is the purpose of my life, as I see it, to achieve something." In 1974, 54 percent saw the purpose of their lives in achievement. In 1979, only 42 percent saw achievement as a goal, and in 1981, only 43 percent did. The counterpart to the Protestant work ethic was presented in the list by two attitudes which read this way: first, "I see the purpose of my life in being happy, in enjoying myself." From 1974 to 1981, support for this notion of the purpose of life increased from 48 to 57 percent. The second attitude, "enjoying life" was chosen by 27 percent in 1974 but by 39 percent in 1981. Again, the total results conceal how much the attitude has changed among the younger generation. Sixty-five percent of the under-thirty-year-old men in 1974 saw the purpose of their lives in the ethos of achievement, "to achieve something, be someone"; in 1979, 51 percent did, and in 1981, 43 percent. This spirit of the time has affected women less than men. In 1974, 56 percent said that achieving something was the purpose of their lives. Today, 45 percent do.

International Implications

Does changed work morale jeopardize the performance of the German economy in international competition? Even by international standards, real work hours in Germany declined significantly in the past twenty years. The weekly average of work hours in Germany is 31.6 compared to 38.8 in Japan, 35 in the United States, 32.3 in France, and 31.9 in Italy. According to the information gathered from employed persons in representative surveys, vacation days increased from eighteen workdays in 1959 to 26.6 days in 1981. On the other hand, relatively few days are lost through strikes, a situation which is similar to those in Switzerland, Austria, and the Netherlands. Sick leaves did not increase considerably in the 1970s, although in comparison to the early 1950s, they have increased by about 50 percent. It is not easy to measure statistically the most important figure, i.e. work intensity, perseverance, and conscientiousness. Germans still think of themselves as being particularly industrious. In 1952, 72 percent answered the question, "All in all, what do you think are the best qualities of the Germans?" with "industriousness." In 1980, 66 percent still said that the best quality of the Germans was their industriousness.

Yet, many Germans are worried. When the Allensbach Institute posed the question, "The Federal Minister of Commerce recently said that the Germans will have to work more in order to be able to compete in the world economy. Two people are talking about this. Which of the two says what you think?", 44 percent adhered to the view "I also think that we will have to do more in the future in order to maintain what we have achieved and what nobody wants to give up," 42 percent take the opposite view: "I don't think this is true. Germans work too much and, in doing so, they often forget that there are other things than work in life." The under thirty year olds were most determined in their opposition to the Minister of Commerce. They opposed his view by a two-to-one ratio (56 to 28 percent).

The indifference of the younger generation of Germans to the relationship between achievement and standard of living is not without dangers for an industrial nation relying heavily on exports. One cannot simply say that the tendencies to appreciate work less and less exist to the same extent in all industrial nations and that, consequently, international competition won't be affected. Climate of opinion studies on the subject of work show considerable differences if one compares, for example, the situations in the USA and in West Germany. In 1978, the American Gallup organization asked the American population about its hopes for the future and about which social trends should become stronger and which should not—basically, a question about their value system. One possibility being tested read: "Would you welcome it or not if less emphasis were placed on work, in the future?" In the United States, a clear majority spoke out against such a development. Sixty-nine percent said "I would not welcome it." Twenty-five percent said they would welcome it. When the Allensbach Institute posed the same question to Germans in the spring of 1981, in a survey commissioned by the business magazine *CAPITAL*, Germans were evenly split. Thirty-eight percent said they would welcome the development; 42 said they would not. One might almost suspect that the Germans are in the middle of an all-out effort to change their national character.